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Preface 
 Every philosophical inquiry is oriented by a metaphilosophical understanding, and it is 
the purpose of this preface to broadly lay out the metaphilosophical underpinnings of this 
project. 
 When we ask metaphilosophical questions, we basically ask for an account of the nature 
and purpose of philosophical inquiry.  The ‘nature’ side of such an account might manifest itself 
as a description of the basic structures and tendencies of philosophical inquiry; the ‘purpose’ side 
perhaps looks at these structures and tendencies and asks ‘what is aimed at?’  Another way of 
approaching such questions is by way of a negative analysis concerning other modes of inquiry, 
e.g., scientific, historical, artistic, etc.  Still another way of approaching these questions is by the 
negative analytical method of limits—what is it that philosophical inquiry can not inquire into, 
and what does this imply about what it properly does inquire into? 
 Despite philosophical inquiry’s meta-ness when compared with other disciplines—
questioning and defining the ways in which those other modes of inquiry can go about in their 
dealings, what their proper subjects and aims are—philosophy itself is not immune from 
philosophical inquiry.  Underlying each and every particular inquiry are metaphysical, 
epistemological, ethical, and methodological assumptions (indeed, the very classifying of these 
assumptions into the above categories reflects metaphilosophical presuppositions). 
 Indeed, we might better rename these philosophical categories by what it is they really 
indicate: (1) the nature and structure of reality, (2) the accessibility of this reality to us, (3) the 
proper modes of comportment in accordance with this reality, and (4) the modes of 
communication one ought to adopt in order to explicate this reality.  Of course, all of these 
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assumptions are reliant on the first: namely, metaphysical questions; or rather more simply, the 
assumptions concerning reality or ‘is-ness.’ 
 Thus, assumptions concerning reality permeate every philosophical inquiry, and imply 
assumptions concerning its accessibility, valuableness, and privileged modes of explication.  In 
explaining the metaphilosophical grounding of the work to come, do we mean to simply put our 
inquiry on a more fundamental basis, and thus get outside of our philosophical prejudicial 
assumptions?  Do we mean to push the regress of ‘meta’ inquiry back simply one further step?  
No—rather, we seek to more thoroughly ground our work and orient our reader in that which is 
to come. 
 Let us first begin our metaphilosophical inquiry with a brief statement on the nature of 
philosophy: what does it consist in?  Namely, modeling, depicting, representing reality.  This 
statement is admittedly non-informative in a crucial sense, as it fails to specify what ‘reality’ 
implies, and admits definitions ranging between and beyond ‘idealism’ and ‘materialism.’ 
Nevertheless, what is important is the givenness of reality and the depicting of reality.  In 
philosophical inquiry as in lived experience in general, reality is absolutely, irreducibly given: 
although it might not be ‘objective,’ although it might be ‘illusory,’ ‘elusive,’ or ‘simplifiable,’ it 
cannot be conceived of as ‘not’; it cannot be reduced to unreality.  Reality is given, and not as a 
separate analytic ‘chunk’ of life or philosophical inquiry, but as the very whole of life and wholly 
the subject of philosophical inquiry.  Philosophy inquires into reality by depicting it in some 
manner or other.  That is to say, reality is given to the philosopher, who philosophizes on reality 
via representing that which is given to her. 
 This is to pave the way for what should be an uncontroversial remark in that the business 
of philosophy is depicting reality, and the purpose of philosophy is to depict reality as faithfully 
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as possible—that is to say, as close to reality itself as possible.  The implication of this is the 
obviousness of the claim that reality is more real than any depiction of it, and any philosophical 
inquiry that wishes to proceed with integrity must never make pretensions of ‘capturing’ reality 
in any more real of a way than reality itself actually is given.  Reality is primary, philosophy is 
secondary.  The duty of philosophy is only to ever more reverently delve into, point towards, 
illuminate, and hold open reality; the duty of philosophy is not to develop or construct reality. 
 This, in turn, paves the way for an analysis of the prejudices inherent to philosophy, or 
the particular ‘diseases’ philosophy is prone to contracting.  To take the depiction as primary and 
the givenness as secondary is to commit the egregious fallacy of ‘reification.’  To attempt to 
‘capture’ a purified form of reality is to in one sense commit this fallacy; similarly, in 
undertaking a systematic analysis, to sacrifice commitment to given reality for the sake of 
commitment to one’s system is to commit this fallacy.  Reification is a disease plaguing 
philosophy, and one that we will take great pains (in attempting) to avoid.  Another disease that 
philosophers are prone to contracting—indeed, must contract—is to understand reality as given, 
but problematically so.  Philosophers qua, as Plato noted† are in some sense removed from 
ordinary life.  Importantly, philosophers do not find reality as unproblematically given, for in 
that case, there would be no reason to concern oneself with the business of philosophy—namely, 
depicting reality.  Indeed, philosophers do not merely depict reality as the mirror depicts the 
looker; rather, philosophers depict reality as glasses depict words on the page: there is something 
problematically out of focus, obscured, concealed, etc.  The business of philosophy is to depict 
reality in focus, clarified, unconcealed.  Thus, philosophical inquiry necessarily presupposes a 
problematic in reality’s givenness.  Is this a disease?  Perhaps—many people live their lives 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
† “Ordinary people seem not to realize that those who really apply themselves in the right way to 
philosophy are directly and of their own accord preparing themselves for dying and death” 
(Phaedo 64a). 
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largely untroubled by the philosopher’s worries, and this is something that the philosopher must 
cope with.  But that reality is problematically given as such is not the issue; rather, it is the 
assumption of the nature of the problematic that is at issue.  Much of philosophy looks to 
philosophize without questioning the nature of the problematic—for centuries, the ‘mind-body,’ 
‘subject-object,’ ‘problem of knowledge’ conception of the problematic dominated the Western 
philosophical landscape, and without much attention paid as to whether this conception is truly 
faithful at all.  Philosophers since then have argued against this conception, and we will join 
them, most especially in the early work of Martin Heidegger.  Thus, philosophers must be aware 
of the ‘disease’ that they are inflicted with—that they assume a problematical givenness to 
reality—and of their metaphilosophical conception of the disease. 
 The metaphilosophical assumptions underpinning this work are as follows: an ontological 
conception of ‘difference’ following Heidegger, to be explained below; an epistemological 
conception of the hermeneutic circle, also following Heidegger; ‘ethics’ is the phenomenon that 
will be investigated, and thus admits of no definition outside of the givenness of this 
phenomenon in reality due to our methodology being one of Heideggerian hermeneutical 
phenomenology, which investigates phenomena as they are given in experience.  What is the 
philosophical problematic, the disease, that we take as constituting the calling of philosophy?  
Namely, the veiling of phenomena as regards their constitutive Being due to linguistic and 
philosophical tendencies that discuss them as entities.  
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Abstract 
In Being and Time, Heidegger articulates his understanding of the ontological difference 
and the Being of the human-like entity, or Dasein.  Dasein’s Being, as existential, consists in the 
care structures of projection, thrownness, and fallenness, the unitary meaning of which is 
grounded in the ecstatical temporalizing modes of future, Present, and having-been.  However, 
despite his deeply insightful ontological analysis of human Being, Heidegger rejects ontical 
ethical manifestations of the human as constitutive of Dasein.  We claim that this neglect is the 
result of his initial focus on fallenness as one of Dasein’s constitutive ontological structures.  
Thus, we seek to re-Interpret Heidegger’s ontological conception of Dasein via the human’s 
constitutive projection and thrownness in such a way as makes accessible genuinely ethical 
phenomena.  We thereupon conclude that human Being is constituted by projection-continuums 
whose meaning is grounded in the ecstases of future going-towards, Past being-brought-here-
and-attested-to, and present Being-oriented.  These projections, as existentiell, we call ‘narrative 
[lines],’ which are the concrete manifestations of existential-Narrative-Being.  These narrative 
lines are each constituted by a fundamental projection that automatically entails various 
contingent projections.  In moving on to the analysis of ethics as constitutive of Narrative-Being, 
we consider phenomenal ‘immorality’ via its modes of antagonism and underminingness.  The 
former consists in an Interpretation of conscience as imperativizing the human towards her 
existentially optimal Narrative fulfillment; the latter consists in an analysis of evil as 
prospectively annihilating the human’s fundamental projections, thus revealing her world as 
conditionally-held-open-to her optimal Narrative fulfillment.  Thus, these two structures, as 
unitarily holding-open-and-holding-me-to-my Narrative fulfillment, constitute ontological ethos.  
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I. Introduction 
I.1. Basis, Justification, and Purpose 
If Heidegger’s thought is so constitutive of this project, then what is the purpose of 
undertaking this project at all?  What have we to originally contribute to a philosophical 
conversation? 
 The answer is the following: despite Heidegger’s profound analysis of human Being1 as 
Dasein, he neglects to treat at length ethico-moral phenomena;2 instead, he claims that any 
ethical system must reside in the call of conscience to one’s ownmost Being-guilty,3 which he 
Interprets in a decidedly amoral manner.4  Moreover, the process by which an ethical system 
could thereupon arise, or the phenomenon of its arising is neglected by Heidegger; and in any 
case, he views what is typically called ‘morality’ as some fallen mode of existence as an 
inauthentic ‘they-self.’5  However, it is important that we note that this neglectful treatment is 
not a failure of Heidegger’s work, as its focus lies in more general matters of illuminating the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Although we employ the term ‘human Being’ to describe ‘Dasein,’ it is important to be wary of 
and reject the impulse to consider ‘Dasein’ to be an anthropological term.  Heidegger himself 
would find this suggestion repugnant; as de Beistegui states, “what renders this straightforward 
anthropological reading of Heidegger impossible is Heidegger’s fundamental intuition according 
to which what constitutes the human as such, its essence, if you will, is itself nothing human” 
(HP 117).  This non-anthropological sense will be clarified below (cf. sections I.3 and II.1). 
2 In Heidegger and Ethics, Joanna Hodge begins her work with the following: “Heidegger 
himself writes very little about ethics, and then only to state that ethical questions are not his 
concern” (HE 1). 
3 “This essential Being-guilty is, equiprimordially, the existential condition for the possibility of . 
. . morality in general and for the possible forms which this may take factically” (SZ 286). 
4 “The idea of guilt must . . . be detached from relationship to any law or ‘ought’ such that by 
failing to comply with it one loads himself with guilt” (SZ 283). 
5 “The common sense of the ‘they’ knows only the satisfying of manipulable rules and public 
norms and the failure to satisfy them.  It reckons up infractions of them and tries to balance them 
off” (SZ 288).  Heidegger continues in SZ 292-293, elaborating on this moralistic ‘reckoning-up’ 
and ‘balancing-off’: he Interprets these moralisms as within a mode of ‘guilt’ oriented towards 
resolving debts, or perhaps filling voids.  This is a mode based-upon a metaphysics of presence-
at-hand, which ultimately is inauthentic. 
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human being’s understanding relationship to Being.  Nevertheless, it is a conspicuous privation 
in Being and Time, considering that ethical phenomena are manifest in the forefront not only of 
daily life (e.g., having to make ‘moral choices,’ making ‘ethical evaluations’ of oneself and 
others) but of specifically philosophical life, as well—i.e., ‘ethics’ is typically considered one of 
the three central ‘categories’ of philosophy, and certainly is the focus of much of the work of 
Plato and Aristotle, commonly considered the two central ‘founders’ of Western Philosophy. 
 Thus, the questions arise: on what basis is the Being of ethics passed over in Being and 
Time?  Is there some way that, maintaining the integrity of Heidegger’s Dasein, the ontological 
Being underlying ontical ethical manifestations can be made accessible?  The assumptions that 
we make in answering these questions form the basis and justification of our work: namely, that 
the Being of ethics is passed over in Being and Time due to the work’s ultimately focusing on 
phenomenal distinctions between the optimum of authenticity and the everyday fallen, counter-
optimum of inauthenticity.  This focus, we claim, pushes Heidegger’s Interpretation of Existenz 
and care away from an ethical Being that is constitutive of human Being.  In other words, while 
it makes accessible some phenomena that are deeply constitutive of human Being—e.g., the 
phenomenon of ‘anticipatory resoluteness’ in connection with Dasein’s fallenness as constituting 
Dasein’s Being-a-whole—it nevertheless obscures or passes over ethical phenomena, as 
automatically abiding by the tendency to link ontical ethical manifestations with the inauthentic 
mode of Being of the they-self.  Thus, our project is laid bare: a re-Interpretation of human 
Being that makes accessible ethical phenomena, and a phenomenological characterization of 
these phenomena.6 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 This is to say that the ‘ethical’ focus of this Heideggerian-inspired work is not Heidegger’s own 
‘ethical failings’ as being an at times outspoken and enthusiastic member of the Nazi Party. 
Although this is a subject worth considering, it does not bear in any significant sense on our 
	  	   14 
 Our re-Interpretation of human Being will involve a re-capitulation of Heidegger’s 
analysis of the structures of projection and thrownness in connection with temporality that are 
constitutive of human Being; but our re-capitulation will cast these structures in new terms, 
terms that help make accessible the conception of human Being as Narrative, which we claim 
holds open the path to the provisional illumination of ethical phenomena.  This ‘Narrative’ 
indicates differently than does Heideggerian ‘care.’  But this indication is not so much, we claim, 
different substantially—i.e., in terms of the constituent ontological structures of human Being—
but rather emphatically—i.e., it brings existential-ontological constituents of human Being 
implicitly indicated but not explicitly disclosed into the ‘clearing’; it indicates as emphasizing 
different constituents of human Being than ‘care.’  This emphatic difference, we believe, holds 
open the accessibility of the phenomenon of ethics in ways previously covered-over.  Thus, our 
project will first move to Interpreting human Being, generally, and then move to Interpreting the 
Being of ethics as a constituent of the human being.  How is the phenomenon of ethics 
existentially-ontologically related to our Being as Narrative?  This is the purpose of our 
philosophical inquiry, and comprises the body of our work below.7 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
project: we are not ‘locked-in’ to an Interpretation of Heidegger’s work in keeping with his own 
nationalism and prejudice; rather, we Interpret his work purely according to its ontological 
notions, and these ontological notions’ bearing upon ethics.  The question as to whether 
Heidegger’s ontology implicitly entails German nationalism, anti-semitism, etc., although 
interesting, thus would only serve to detract us from our aims, and will be put aside for the sake 
of this project.  Nevertheless, should one wish to research more into these matters, cf. Faye, 
Heidegger: the Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy in Light of the Unpublished Seminars of 
1933-1935. 
7 Cf. sections III and IV below. 
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I.2. Methodology 
 The methodology that we employ is Heideggerian hermeneutical phenomenology.  
Although in many ways, this section might resemble a recapitulation of (¶7) of Being and Time, 
we will simply summarize the main points of this section and explain some technical 
terminology that we already have employed and will continue to employ. 
 Heidegger breaks down ‘phenomenology’ into its etymological constituents of 
‘phenomenon’ and ‘logos,’ before providing an explanation of the unitary indication of these 
terms.  A ‘phenomenon,’ quite simply, is “the showing itself in itself” (SZ 31).  But as Heidegger 
continues, this is further clarified as “the Being of entities” (SZ 35), which is to be distinguished 
from ‘appearance,’ which is “an entity itself” (SZ 31).  This distinction requires the further 
distinctions between ‘Being’ and ‘being,’ and between ‘Being’ and ‘entity.’  What is an entity?  
Quite simply, entities are all those things that are, in whatever manner(s) that they are.  Thus, 
what is ‘Being,’ as distinct from ‘entities?’  “Being is always the Being of an entity” (SZ 9); or 
rather, “Being [is] . . . that which determines entities as entities, that on the basis of which 
entities are already understood” (SZ 6).  We might further clarify this term by saying that ‘Being’ 
is ‘the mode of being’ of an entity—although crucially, Being is never an entity itself.  The 
‘mode of being’ of an entity essentially answers a how question, rather than a what question; or 
rather, in a statement of the type ‘I am’ it focuses on the ‘am,’ or rather, the way that I am, rather 
than the ‘I’ that I am.8  Importantly, Being is the subject-matter of ontology.  According to 
Heidegger, as well, the history of the field known as ‘ontology’ has implicitly presupposed the 
Being of entities, and actually functions more as a listing-off of entities.  But since an entity is 
nothing other than its constitutive Being, the essential character of an entity, if its Being has been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Thus, we might say that, while entities are as ‘nouns,’ any entity’s Being always is as a ‘verb.’ 
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concealed, has also been concealed.  Take the following example: the entity is a car.  But what is 
the Being of a car?  There could be different accounts of this: some might say that the Being of 
the car is an actualized, present object, which is composed of other present and simpler parts; 
Heidegger would be prone to saying,9 differently, that the Being of the car is as a ready-to-use 
thing that gets me around where I need to go.  The ‘Being’ of the car—the ways in which it is—
importantly defines its being a car.  To be a car is to ‘Be’ as a car—in other words, if there were 
an entity whose Being were something other than ‘getting me around where I need to go’ then 
this entity would simply not be a car.  In order to be a car, some entity must ‘Be’ as a car.  Thus, 
‘Being’ signifies the way in which an entity is, and furthermore that which determines this entity 
as what it is; meanwhile, ‘entity’ signifies something that is, but only is in virtue of its Being; 
meanwhile, ‘being’ signifies some spare statement of presence or equivalence—e.g., this 
doorknob is (i.e., is presently) hot, or entities are their Being.  Henceforth, when our subject is 
Being, the ‘B’ will be capitalized—however, in our future conjugations of the verb ‘to be’—e.g., 
is, am, are, were, will be, etc.—the first letter will remain lowercased in either the case of 
‘Being’ or ‘being.’  Although this might seem convoluted at first, it ought to become quite clear 
in our discussion which sense of the verb is employed in each context. 
 Thus, a ‘phenomenon’ is the Being of an entity.  But what about ‘logos?’  Heidegger 
identifies the signification of this term with “discourse” (SZ 32), but of a peculiar type: 
discourse, namely, in the crucial sense of “to make manifest what one is ‘talking about’” (SZ 32).  
But even more penetratingly, discourse “‘lets something be seen’ . . . that is, lets us see 
something from the very thing which the discourse is about” (SZ 32) by “pointing it out” (SZ 33).  
Importantly, since discourse lets something be seen by pointing it out, it has: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 That is to say, early Heidegger, as seen in Being and Time. 
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. . . the structural form of [synthesis] . . . [which] does not mean a binding and linking 
together of representations, a manipulation of psychical occurrences where the ‘problem’ 
arises of how these bindings, as something inside, agree with something physical outside 
. . . [it rather] means letting something be seen in its togetherness with something—
letting it be seen as something. (SZ 33) 
Thus, ‘logos’ as discourse is ‘letting something be seen as something by pointing it out.’  But the 
basis for this discourse is that things require being seen as something.  That is to say, discourse, 
as being about something, must have truth as its goal.  But the nature of ‘truth’ as Heidegger 
conceives of it is not in any sense co-extensive with ‘agreement’; rather, truth, for Heidegger, is 
‘discovering.’  That is to say, truth is ‘dis-covering’ as in uncovering or unconcealing, while 
falsity is “covering up” (SZ 33) or ‘covering over’ or ‘concealing.’  Thus, the ‘logos’ that 
Heidegger conceives of is ‘letting something be unveiled as something by pointing it out.’  To 
discourse is to ‘talk’ in such a way as to aim at unveiling something. 
 Thus, what can we say of the unitary concept of ‘phenomenology?’  Phenomenology is 
discourse on phenomena; but put a bit more formally, it is ‘letting phenomena be seen in their 
unconcealment by pointing them out.’  Thus importantly, a ‘veiling’ or ‘concealment’ in reality 
is given for Heidegger, and it is this veiling that comprises the problematic of philosophy: 
namely, in reality, appearances or entities are proximally and for the most part manifest; 
however, phenomena or the Being of entities are proximally and for the most part covered-over 
or veiled.  Thus, phenomenology is a descriptive science of Being—it aims to describe 
phenomena precisely and demonstratively.  There are a couple of important implications of this 
understanding of phenomenology: (1) as Heidegger points out, ‘what is discoursed about’ 
(namely, phenomena) is prior to ‘what the discourse says’ (namely, the linguistic formulations 
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that are manifest in any concrete from of discourse).  This is to say that phenomenology 
primarily unfolds as linguistically indicating or signifying phenomena rather than capturing or 
dissecting them.  In other words, ‘phenomena’ are ‘pointed at’ or ‘pointed towards’ in discourse; 
they are not ‘taken,’ held,’ and ‘dissected.’  That is to say, in reading phenomenology, one must 
take care to focus on the phenomena themselves that the linguistic formulations are attempting to 
indicate, rather than the linguistic formulations themselves.  And (2) the second implication is 
that phenomenological inquiry is hermeneutical.  As Heidegger writes, “the meaning of 
phenomenological description as a method lies in interpretation” (SZ 37).  This can be 
understood as follows: since the basis of phenomenology is ‘letting something be unconcealed as 
something by pointing it out,’ the ‘as something’ structure is fundamentally interpretation.  That 
is to say, phenomenology consists in seeing each entity as its Being, and thus entities must be 
interpreted in such a way that their respective modes of Being become accessible.  Another way 
of considering this ‘hermeneutical’ nature of Heideggerian phenomenology is to refer to 
Heidegger’s analysis of the ‘fore-structures’ composing the ‘hermeneutic circle,’ consisting in 
“fore-having,” “fore-sight,” and “fore-conception” (SZ 150).  The ‘fore-having’ is “something we 
have in advance [that in every case interpretation is grounded in]” (SZ 150); the ‘fore-sight’ is 
“something we see in advance [that in every case interpretation is grounded in]” (SZ 150); the 
‘fore-conception’ is “something we grasp in advance [that in every case interpretation is 
grounded in]” (SZ 150).  These might be re-Interpreted as follows: the ‘fore-having’ is the 
givenness of reality to us—reality is pre-theoretically and pre-present-to-consciousness given as 
something—but this givenness is as of yet undivined (i.e., not-yet-unconfigured); the ‘fore-sight’ 
is the initial divining or unconfiguring of the givenness of reality—it is the as of yet 
unarticulated route to delving into this reality, the unarticulated route to analysis; the ‘fore-
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conception,’ meanwhile, is the articulation of the analysis of the givenness of reality.  Thus, in 
the ‘fore-having,’ reality is intuitively given; in the ‘fore-sight,’ reality is intuitively analytically 
visible; in the ‘fore-conception,’ the visible analysis of reality is intuitively articulable.  Thus, 
the hermeneutical process works as a circle: the ‘fore-having’ comprises the horizon or the 
starting and solely possible endpoint of philosophical inquiry—philosophical analysis can 
proceed no further than the articulation of the fore-having via the fore-sight and the fore-
conception. 
 Do these hermeneutical ‘fore-structures’ clarify Heidegger’s hermeneutical 
phenomenology?  Indeed they should: phenomena are intuitively given in the fore-having; 
phenomena are implicitly understood in the fore-sight; and this understanding of the phenomena 
is intuitively articulated or appropriated in the fore-conception.  To ‘unveil’ Being 
phenomenologically is to take one’s unitary, as-of-yet unpenetrated fore-having and sight and 
articulate it; in other words, although proximally and for the most part Being is veiled while 
entities are manifest, primordially, Being is given via the fore-having; to then describe this Being 
is to interpret the primordial givenness of Being that is in the fore-having along with the manifest 
presence of entities; when this interpretation is complete, the primordially given Being is sighted 
and articulated as constitutive of the manifest phenomenon. 
 This ends our methodological discussion of Heideggerian hermeneutical phenomenology, 
although we still must clarify some technical terminology. 
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I.3. Technical Terminology Explained 
 In addition to the terms that have been defined above, there remain a few more in need of 
clarification: Interpretation vs. interpretation; proximal, primordial, existential, existentiell, 
existentiale; ontical vs. ontological; constitute and constituent vs. categorial and category; and 
phenomenal vs. phenomenological.  Some of these terms have already been employed above, 
and all will continuously be employed throughout the remainder of this essay. 
 The capitalized ‘I’ in ‘Interpretation’ (Interpretation) is no accident.  It is to be 
distinguished from ‘interpretation’ (Auslegung).  Although “in many cases these may be 
regarded as synonyms, their connotations are not quite the same” (Macquarrie and Robinson, BT 
19).  Interpretation connotes a more “theoretical or systematic” (Macquarrie and Robinson, BT 
19) mode of interpreting—e.g., exegetical interpretation of a text—while Auslegung refers to the 
broader sense of interpreting any thing, occurrence, etc. as something.  Thus, when we are 
speaking of the general activity of interpreting or interpretation, we will use the lowercased form 
of the word; however, whenever we employ the term to speak of our systematic Interpretation of 
Being and ethics, we will employ the capitalized term. 
 The term ‘proximal’ or its adverbial form ‘proximally’ follows the German adverb 
zunächst, which ordinarily means, ‘first of all,’ ‘at first,’ ‘for the moment,’ or ‘nearest to’ 
(ONGD 253).  While all these meanings are not entirely beside the point when reading 
Heidegger’s work, they nevertheless fail to faithfully disclose his intentions: as Macquarrie and 
Robinson point out, “Heidegger often uses ‘zunächst’ in the sense of ‘most closely’, when he is 
describing the most ‘natural’ and ‘obvious’ experiences which we have at an uncritical and pre-
philosophical level” (BT 25).  Thus, ‘proximal’ and ‘proximally’ signify a pre-theoretical mode 
of Being in which my understanding of myself and the world is rooted in those dealings which 
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are instantaneously closest to my concern.  For example, if I am at the moment furiously 
engaged in attempting to find my lost wallet, proximally, I am as ‘trying-to-find-my-wallet,’ 
even if more fundamentally (i.e., primordially), I am something or someone else. 
 ‘Primordial’ (ursprünglich) can be understood as compared and contrasted with 
‘proximal.’  In ordinary German, ursprünglich signifies ‘original,’ ‘initial,’ or ‘natural’ (ONGD 
224); however, in Heidegger’s terms: 
[If] the ontological Interpretation is to be a primordial one, this not only demands that in 
general the hermeneutical Situation [i.e., the fore-structures] shall be one which has been 
made secure in conformity with the phenomena; it also requires explicit assurance that 
the whole of the entity which it has taken as its theme [i.e., object of systematic inquiry] 
has been brought into the fore-having. (SZ 232) 
Thus, combining this passage with the ordinary German definition, we can understand that 
‘primordial’ signifies a closeness to Being, as does ‘proximal.’  But while ‘proximal’ is only 
concerned with a instantaneous closeness to concern, ‘primordial’ is concerned with a 
fundamental closeness to the whole of an entity’s Being.  Thus, while ‘proximal’ refers to a 
constituent of Being: namely, closeness to one’s nearest-by existentiell-ontical concernful Being; 
‘primordial’ refers to (1) one’s whole existentiell-ontical Being (which includes the constituents 
of one’s Being that are ‘furthest-away’ from one’s concern), or (2) the constitution of one’s 
Being, generally: namely, the existential-ontological structures of Being.  The important 
distinction is that while I might be proximally [as this], I am nevertheless primordially [as that].  
Proximally, I can be close to my instantaneous concern in such a way that my fundamental 
(primordial) whole-existentiell-Being or existential-structural-Being lies veiled from me. 
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 Next, we must clarify existential, existentiell, and existentiale in their relation to and 
distinction from one another.  But in order to do this, we must first undertake the task of 
clarifying the distinction between ‘ontological’ (ontologisch) and ‘ontical’ (ontisch).  While 
Heidegger in Being and Time develops a systematic analysis of ‘ontology,’ this analysis is, for 
the moment, beyond our purposes.  It suffices to say that for Heidegger, ontology is primarily the 
study of Being (as opposed to an enumeration of entities).  In undertaking an ontological inquiry, 
one analyzes phenomena in their constituent components—but this is not to say that one partakes 
in ‘pulling apart’ these phenomena into predicated ‘categories.’  Rather, an ontological 
investigation takes the unitary whole of a phenomenon into one’s fore-having and fore-sight and 
analyzes the structures that constitute this whole.  This is to be distinguished from an ontical 
inquiry—in an ontical inquiry, one already operates with a pre-supposition of an entity’s Being 
and analyzes it as an entity on that presupposed basis.  Consider that, for Heidegger, “only as 
phenomenology, is ontology possible” (SZ 35); however, the natural sciences, e.g., are ontical 
forms of inquiry.  To crystallize this distinction, consider the following: ontologically, things lie 
concealed from the understanding; ontically, however, everything is explicitly manifest.  
Ontologically speaking, an entity requires extensive analysis in order for its Being to be 
unveiled, while ontically speaking, an entity requires only observation of explicit facts in order 
for it to be comprehended. 
Having undertaken the clarification of ‘ontological’ and ‘ontical,’ we can again look back 
to clarifying existential (existenzial) as distinct from existentiell (existenziell) and existentiale 
(Existenzial). These Heideggerian terms spring from an understanding of Heidegger’s concept of 
‘existence’ (Existenz) as the phenomenal fore-having of the Being of the human being.  Although 
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an analysis of this phenomenon will be systematically developed below,10 the referents for these 
terms can be understood in virtue of this general statement of ‘the phenomenon of human Being.’  
Thus, ‘existential’ signifies ‘of the very essence of human Being’ or ‘constitutive of the general 
ontological structures of the human’; existentiell, meanwhile, signifies “the understanding of 
oneself that [only gets straightened out through existing]” (SZ 12)—or more accessibly, ‘relating 
to the individually-lived life of the human being’ or ‘as being a part of the ontical facts of the 
human being’; finally, existentiale signifies any one particular ontological structure of the 
human being.  To crystallize this distinction, assume that the existential Being of the human 
Being can be described as ‘living towards the future unto death.’  Therefore, the existentiell 
Being of the human might therefore be ‘living towards the possibility of raising a large and 
successful family,’ or rather, ‘becoming the most famous rock star on the planet.’  Meanwhile, 
an existentiale of the human could be ‘death,’ or ‘the future,’ or ‘living-towards.’  Therefore, the 
existentiality of the human can be analyzed in its constituent components or existentiales, while 
the existentiell dealings of the human being are reliant on (i.e., they necessarily presuppose) their 
hidden existentiales, but such dealings themselves are nevertheless manifest.  Thus, ‘ontological’ 
is often linked with ‘existential’ or existentiale,’ while ‘ontical’ is often linked with ‘existentiell.’ 
Our foregoing discussion has also demanded, which we have hitherto ignored, 
clarification of the terms ‘constitution’ and ‘constituent,’ and it might be helpful to define these 
terms in contradistinction with ‘categorial’ (kategorisch) and ‘category.’  To be constituted by 
things is to be not only the locus or ‘sum’ of those things (as would be the case in categorial 
discussions of entities), but rather to be this unitary whole only in virtue of those things that 
constitute this whole.  Thus, while a unitary phenomenon might be nevertheless unitary, it might 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Cf. section II.1. 
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be constituted by certain particular analyzable components, i.e., existentiales.  Thus, the 
constituents of human Being are those existentiales.  This discussion can be further clarified as a 
distinction between constituted entities and categorial entities.  Entities that are constituted have 
a unitary Being, while entities that are categorial have disparate Being—i.e., Being that is 
nothing beside the spatio-temporally located sum of metaphysical ‘categories.’  That is to say, a 
‘categorial’ relationship implicitly depends on a predication-relationship: i.e., taking an entity as 
having some fundamental Being as presence, and then having a predicated ‘category’ or 
‘property’ superadded on to/metaphysically distinguishable from it.  Thus, one might say, 
following Heidegger, that a ‘stone’ can have the primordial Being of ‘presence-at-hand’—i.e., it 
can fundamentally be as something that is ‘merely there’ as ‘just present in front of me’—and 
then also can be predicated by the category of ‘hardness’ or ‘grayness’ superadded on to its 
fundamental Being-present.  To contrast, the human’s Being is a constituted, unitary whole.  
There is no ‘property’ that one can superadd or predicate on to the human in order to gain clarity 
as to her ontological structures.  Humans are not something primarily ‘just present’ and 
secondarily things with animation, rationality, etc.; rather, humans are entities primordially 
existent, differing from the stone, which is primordially just ‘here.’  Thus, the human’s Being is 
existentially constituted, not categorially predicated. 
Our final set of terms to shed light on is ‘phenomenal’ vs. ‘phenomenological.’  And this 
distinction is indeed rather simple: since we have analyzed the concept of ‘phenomenon’ to mean 
the respective modes of Being of entities which are the entities as that-which-makes-them-what-
they-are and yet problematically lie hidden behind the entities, we now simply must explain 
these variants on the concept.  As Heidegger states: 
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That which is given and explicable in the way the phenomenon is encountered is called 
‘phenomenal’ . . . Everything which belongs to the species of exhibiting and explicating 
and which goes to make the way of conceiving demanded by this research, is called 
‘phenomenological’. (SZ 37) 
Thus, ‘phenomenal’ and ‘phenomenally’ refer to the primordial encounter with the phenomenon 
itself; ‘phenomenological’ and ‘phenomenologically’ refer, distinctly, to the business of 
discursively describing these phenomenal encounters.  For example, when analyzing the 
phenomenon of, e.g., cold, I might say: ‘phenomenally, cold is as a that-which-makes-me-
uncomfortable . . . phenomenologically, we have rendered ‘cold’ as a ‘that-which-makes-me-
uncomfortable.’ 
 Although there are other technical terms that will pop-up throughout this essay, they will 
be defined on an as-needed basis.  For the moment, the above list of clarifications suffices. 
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I.4. Preview 
 This last (and brief) subsection concludes our introductory remarks preceding and 
grounding our analysis to come.  The remainder of our analysis consists in the following.  
Section II is divided into several subsections: subsection II.1 comprises a broad-brush 
summary of Heidegger’s Interpretation of human Being in Being and Time, especially his 
analysis of care as comprising the call of conscience, and the meaningful grounding of care in 
temporality; the other subsections (II.2-II.5) involve analysis of certain critical approaches taken 
with regard to Being and Time that are relevant to an ethical discourse.  Section III consists in 
our original analysis that is substantively based upon but emphatically divergent from 
Heidegger’s analysis.  This re-Interpretation consists in an analysis of our projection and 
thrownness into the ecstases of future, past, and present, which analysis will conclude in our 
rendering the unitary phenomenon of human Being as Narrative-Being constituted by existentiell 
narrative lines.  Section IV consists in our provisional Interpretation of the phenomenon of 
ethics.  Through the ethical phenomena of antagonism and underminingness we attempt to 
demonstrate the Being of ethics as existentially-ontologically constitutive of the human, and 
most faithfully indicated by the term ‘ethos.’ 
 Section III is undertaken for the sake of holding-open before us the route for section IV’s 
analysis.  As we have concluded above, Heidegger’s Interpretation of human Being, while not 
deficient in any way, and while generally primordially faithful, nevertheless veils the 
phenomenon of ethics.  We, therefore, undertake to re-Interpret human Being in order to make 
accessible an analysis of the Being of ethics.  And of course, an Interpretation of human Being is 
always ontologically prior to an Interpretation of the Being of ethics, as it is only in virtue of our 
human Being that the phenomenon of ethics is manifest and constitutive of us.  Thus, section 
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IV’s analysis, comprising an inquiry into the ontological structures of ethics, is only possibly 
(properly) undertaken as the phenomenal encounter of ethics by the human, and this phenomenal 
encounter can only be properly grounded if we have in the first instance precisely (if 
preparatorily) demonstrated the general structural components of the mode of Being that 
encounters, and the unitary meaning of these structures as constituting this mode of Being. 
 Thus concludes the body of our analysis.  Still, this essay will end with a concluding 
section V that raises objections to our foregoing analysis, attempts to answer said objections, and 
finally discusses the philosophical implications of our analysis, including what additional 
analyses are required to further ground and develop the analysis hereupon undertaken. 
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II. Heidegger and Beyond 
II.1. Heidegger’s Being and Time11 
 Heidegger begins Being and Time by discussing the basic aim of his project: fundamental 
ontology.  This term denotes as ‘the ground of inquiry into Being,’ and this is roughly what 
Heidegger has in mind.  What he means, however, can be more formally phrased as: an answer 
to the question of the meaning of Being as such and in general.  ‘Meaning [Sinn],’ for Heidegger, 
has a peculiar signification: “that wherein the intelligibility [Verständlichkeit] of something 
maintains itself” (SZ 151).  Thus, ‘fundamental ontology’ seeks to find some understanding of 
‘Being’ that allows this term to be consistently intelligible, and moreover to find a meaning that 
does not merely investigate the Being of some particular entity or entities, but rather seeks to 
understand the meaning of Being in general, for all entities.  In seeking a fundamental ontology, 
Heidegger looks towards the existential analytic of Dasein to provide at the very least a clue, if 
not the answer itself.12 
 In order to unpack this phrase, let us examine its components.  Heidegger’s ‘Dasein’ is a 
term composed of two component words: ‘Da’ and ‘sein.’  Da-sein, therefore, denotes as ‘there-
Being’ or ‘Being-there.’  Recall that ‘Being [Sein]’ signifies ways or modes of being, or ways or 
modes that things are that is constitutive of what they are—a focus on the ‘how’ verb that is 
constitutive of the noun ‘what.’  ‘There [Da],’ meanwhile, does not indicate any absolute or 
relative spatio-temporal position; rather, it refers to a “clearing [Lichtung]” wherein the “lumen 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Our exploration of Being and Time will move through Heidegger’s analysis quite quickly, 
stopping for deeper clarification on the pieces especially relevant to this thesis (namely, 
conscience and temporality). 
12 “Therefore fundamental ontology, from which alone all other ontologies can take their rise, 
must be sought in the existential analytic of Dasein” (SZ 13). 
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naturale”13 (SZ 133) can shine.  This ‘clearing’ is metaphorically a cleared-out14 space in which 
the light of understanding discloses (or alternatively: reveals, unveils, unconceals).  What is 
important in the conjunction of these two indications in Da-sein is that Heidegger is referring to a 
type of entity—namely, the human-like entity15—but referring to this entity solely by way of its 
Being.  Therefore, ‘Dasein’ is the human, but it more fundamentally is the Being of the human.  
And this Being signified by ‘Dasein’ indicates that understanding and disclosedness (truth) are 
constitutive of the human being: in some manner or other, our Being is tied-up with this aspect of 
either ‘darkness’ concealing or ‘light’ unveiling. 
 ‘Dasein’ is Heidegger’s first hermeneutical spiral into the unveiling of human Being, and 
his second is soon forthcoming: namely, existence [Existenz].  ‘Existence,’ for Heidegger, is not 
the simple notion of ‘being actual’ or ‘being present,’ but indicates in a rather more technical 
sense: this indication can be best captured by the phrase, “Dasein is an entity that . . . is ontically 
distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it” (SZ 12), or rather: 
‘my Being is an issue for me.’  This phrase implicitly signifies the following: (1) there is a 
‘mine-ness’, or some sense of individual ownership, over each Dasein’s Being—i.e., my Being 
concerns me in a way that no other entity’s Being does.  As Heidegger states, “Because each 
Dasein has in each case mineness [Jemeinigkeit], one must always use a personal pronoun when 
one addresses it” (SZ 42).  (2) My Being is importantly unfinished—it requires something of 
me—i.e., my Being constantly presents me with ‘questions’, so to speak, and these ‘questions’ 
must be answered, and answered, moreover, only through my very existing (that is to say, not 
merely intellectually); Dasein’s Being is such that the way that it is becoming is of central 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 I.e., natural light, or the light of understanding. 
14 I.e., free from obstructive obscurants. 
15 Or perhaps it would be more proper to say ‘the type of entity whose extensionality is 
exhausted by humans.’ 
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importance to it.  Finally, (3) each Dasein exists in the disclosedness or disclosure of (1) and (2); 
in Heidegger’s words, “Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein’s 
Being” (SZ 12). 
 Therefore, in stating that fundamental ontology must proceed via the ‘existential analytic 
of Dasein,’ Heidegger claims that only in taking seriously Dasein’s Being-there and existence, 
and proceeding with the whole of Dasein’s Being as Da-sein and Existenz having been taken up 
into one’s fore-having, can this analysis (i.e., fore-sight and fore-conception) be properly 
grounded. 
 Heidegger spirals ever further into his hermeneutical project: Dasein’s Being can more 
formally be indicated by the unitary term ‘Being-in-the-world [In-der-Welt-sein].’  This term, 
although unitary, can be analyzed in its three constituent components: ‘Being-in,’ ‘the 
[worldhood of] world,’ and ‘Being-with [as whom].’ 
 Dasein’s Being-in[-the-world] is indicated by the phrases “I reside” or “I dwell 
alongside” (SZ 54).  In other words, Dasein’s Being-in implies Dasein’s being at home within a 
meaningful context.  That is to say, Dasein’s Being-in is characterized by concern [besorgen]: 
personally engaged encounters with entities fundamentally in terms of their places within a 
meaningful context (i.e., proximally, Dasein’s Being-in is distinctly opposed to disinterested 
observation of entities’ perceptual properties).  This is all to say, Dasein encounters the world not 
as something outside and alien, but as its home, or the fundamental space within which it 
concerns itself; Dasein exists in this world as engaged in projects, and encounters entities as 
meaningfully constituted by a relationship to these projects, not as simply actualized, present-at-
hand things to be perceived and cognized-upon. 
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 The ‘worldhood’ of the world is the world’s essentially being a network of relationships 
of significance to Dasein’s projects.  That is to say, the ‘world’ is a meaningful context in which 
entities are insofar as they are ‘ready-to-hand’ (i.e., pertinent to Dasein’s projects).  What more 
can we say about readiness-to-hand?  Heidegger indicates such readiness-to-hand in calling the 
totality of entities (qua their Being-ready-to-hand) by the term “equipment [Zeug]” (SZ 68).   A 
totality of equipment’s readiness-to-hand is a mode of Being in which each item of equipment is 
‘referred’ or ‘assigned’ (i.e., organized) on the basis of a network of involvements: this 
‘network’ consists in sets of ‘in-order-to(s)’ and ‘for-the-sake-of-which(s).’16  Each item is 
assigned to do some piece of work as a ‘towards-which’ (i.e., towards accomplishing something) 
along an ‘in-order-to’ continuum; and this ‘in-order-to’ continuum seeks to accomplish 
something, which accomplishment is a ‘for-the-sake-of-which.’  Importantly, there can be layers 
of involvements in any particular network: say I am tightening a screw as part of an ‘in-order-to’ 
for the sake of ‘getting my car battery installed’; similarly, I am getting my car battery installed 
as an ‘in-order-to’ for the sake of being able to drive my car, which I am accomplishing as an in-
order-to for the sake of being able to get around where I need to go.  Thus, the ‘world’ is as 
networks of significance, consisting in equipment that is ready-to-hand in-order-to accomplish a 
‘for-the-sake-of-which.’  Importantly, the world is not present-at-hand, or a collection of present-
at-hand entities.  ‘Presence-at-hand’ indicates an entity’s merely Being as actually and sparely 
present; this mode of entities’ Being is what Heidegger calls “[f]ounded” (SZ 59)—that is to say, 
‘un-originary’ or founded upon some more fundamental, primordial, elemental state: namely, 
readiness-to-hand.  The upshot of this is that, most primordially, the world is not a bare, present 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Or in the more traditional parlance, ‘means’ and ‘ends.’  However, the reader of Heidegger 
must take care not to accept the problematical metaphysics underlying the ‘means-ends’ 
distinction; thus, in order to avoid these philosophically loaded terms, we preserve Heidegger’s 
‘in-order-to(s)’ and ‘for-the-sake-of-which(s).’ 
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object of perception and cognizing; rather, the world is primordially a meaningful space of 
involvements. 
 ‘As whom’ does Dasein exist as in Being-in-the-world?  In other words, ‘who,’ precisely, 
is doing the Being in the world?  Always, Dasein’s ‘as whom’ is as ‘Dasein-with’ or ‘Being-
with’—that is to say, Dasein is as existing alongside other Daseins and other entities within the 
world.  Ordinarily, in its average everydayness (i.e., proximally and for the most part), Dasein 
exists as an inauthentic ‘they-self [das Man]’; however, Dasein can be existentielly modified into 
becoming its own authentic Self.  As a ‘they-self,’ Dasein’s existence really is not its own, nor is 
it anyone else’s;17 it is inauthentic.  As one’s own Self, on the other hand, Dasein’s existence is 
authentically its own. 
 These three components of Being-in-the-world are, in turn, reliant-upon three basic 
structures of existence: projection [Entwurf], thrownness [Goworfenheit], and fallenness 
[Verfallenheit].  ‘Projection’ can be understood as pro-ject-ion: ‘ject’ is to throw, ‘pro’ indicates 
ahead or forward; thus, ‘projection’ is the quality of throwing-ahead-of-oneself.  When we speak 
of ‘projection,’ we speak of ‘throwing our Being ahead of ourselves.’  What can this mean?  As 
Being-in-the-world, Dasein is always already invested in certain projects.  These projects 
comprise for-the-sake-of-which(s) that involve in-order-to(s).  But to be doing work in 
attempting to accomplish something, Dasein is constantly ahead of itself—that is to say, invested 
in some potentiality that is not yet actual.  Thus, projection is always the projection-upon (i.e., 
throwing its Being ahead of itself towards) some possibility of Being.  A ‘possibility-of-Being’ is 
a non-actual, but rather potential state-of-Being.  At any given moment, Dasein has all sorts of 
possibilities-of-Being that are available to it; in projecting, it ‘chooses’ some of these—
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 “The ‘who’ [of the they-self] is not this one, not that one, not oneself, not some people, and 
not the sum of them all.  The ‘who’ is the neuter, the ‘they’”(SZ 126). 
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importantly, however, this ‘choice’ is not necessarily (indeed, proximally and for the most part is 
not at all) consciously cognitive.  Dasein’s projection-upon possibility is simply its Being’s 
being constituted as ahead of itself in some particular possibility-of-Being. 
 Thrownness is not the counter-concept to projection.  Nevertheless, it indicates Dasein’s 
Being as Being-thrown-into-existence.  In other words, Dasein’s ‘thrownness’ is its ‘having-to-
be’—or rather, its simple ‘that-I-am-always-already’; it is Dasein’s Being in some peculiar 
manner over and above any ‘consent’ or ‘input’ that it could possibly give pertaining to its 
existence.  It is thrown into Being-in-the-world; it has no possibility to choose otherwise than its 
own existence.  Thus, Dasein always already is Being-in as projecting, existing in a world of 
significance, Being-with others proximally and usually as a they-self.  This is Dasein’s ‘facticity 
[Faktizität]’ or its thrownness into its Being-in-the-world. 
 Fallenness is the most difficult of these items to explain, but it should metaphorically be 
understood as a ‘falling [verfallen]’ from Dasein’s ownmost authentic Self to its inauthentic 
they-self.  In its fallenness, Dasein falls away from its Being as truly its own, and into its Being 
as not its own, but nobody else’s—its Being as an anonymous ‘they.’  In falling, Dasein ‘loses’ 
itself in inauthenticity—but this also implies that it can re-gain itself.  Dasein’s ‘as whom’ in 
Being-in-the-world can be gained as its own or lost in anonymity. 
 Importantly, each of these structural items constituting Dasein’s Being is disclosed via a 
particular mode: Dasein understandingly projects, is thrown with a state-of-mind, expresses its 
Self in discourse. 
 Dasein understands itself.  Dasein’s understanding [Verstehen] is “the existential Being of 
Dasein’s own potentiality-for-Being . . . this Being discloses in itself what its Being is capable 
of” (SZ 144); that is to say, Dasein, as understanding, exists in the disclosure of its own 
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projections-upon possibilities-of-Being.  As Heidegger states: “As projecting, understanding is 
the kind of Being of Dasein in which it is its possibilities as possibilities . . . Dasein is constantly 
more than it factually is” (SZ 145).  That is to say, as projecting, Dasein is throwing its Being 
ahead of itself; but this ‘ahead of itself’ implies that Dasein is not presently actualized as this 
possibility—Dasein, in any given moment, is more than it is presently actualized as.  Heidegger 
goes on to call this understanding Dasein’s “sight” (SZ 146).  This ‘sight’ is Da-sein’s seeing the 
clearing of its ‘there.’  On the basis of its understanding, Dasein interprets.  Interpretation is “the 
projecting of the understanding . . . [wherein] the understanding appropriates understandingly 
that which is understood by it” (SZ 148).  In other words, interpretation is the development of the 
understanding—Dasein, in appropriating its understanding according to its projected-upon 
possibilities interprets both itself and other entities in the world.  
 Dasein’s thrownness into its existence is disclosed via its finding itself in a state-of-mind 
[befindlichkeit].  Finding itself in a state-of-mind, Dasein expresses its primordial ‘mood’ in 
response to its having to be, its being thrown into both its own existence and any given particular 
situation.18  Writes Heidegger, “a mood makes manifest ‘how one is, and how one is faring’.  In 
this ‘how one is’, having a mood brings Being [Sein] to its ‘there [Da]’.  However, a state-of-
mind does not make explicitly known to Dasein all of its disclosive elements; rather, a state-of-
mind unveils Dasein in its ‘having-to-be-existingly-in-a-situation’ in terms of its feeling towards 
this situation.  That is to say, finding itself in a state-of-mind, “[t]he pure ‘that it is’ shows itself, 
but the ‘whence’ and ‘whither’ remain in darkness” (SZ 134).  Crucially, however, “[a] state-of-
mind always has its understanding . . . [u]nderstanding always has its mood” (SZ 142-143).  But 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 “What we indicate ontologically by the term ‘state-of-mind’ is ontically the most familiar and 
everyday sort of thing; our mood, our Being-attuned” (SZ 134). 
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this is just to say that Dasein is always already thrown into having to project, and in projecting, 
Dasein’s world is organized around this projection, and thus Dasein is thrown into this world.  
 The final structure of Dasein’s disclosedness is discourse [Rede].  In its modes of 
discoursing, Dasein reveals its fallenness.  For Heidegger, discourse is not “‘reason’, ‘judgment’, 
‘concept’, ‘definition’, ‘ground’, or ‘relationship’” (SZ 32)—or rather, discourse does not mean 
what we take it to mean in its ‘scholarly’ usage as an esoteric dialectic.  Rather, discourse simply 
means ‘talk,’ but understood in a peculiar way: “to make manifest what one is ‘talking about’ . . . 
it lets us see something” (SZ 32).  Alternatively: “Discourse is the Articulation of intelligibility” 
(SZ 161); but this ‘intelligibility’ can be articulated as either letting ‘what the talk is about’ come 
into the foreground and illuminate the ‘there’ (authenticity), or letting “what-is-said-in-the-talk” 
(SZ 168) upstage that which the talk is truly about and darken the ‘there’ (inauthenticity).  In 
either case, discourse, “equiprimordial with state-of-mind and understanding” (SZ 161), discloses 
Dasein’s ‘Being-with.’  Proximally and for the most part, Dasein discourses in the inauthentic 
modes of idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity—wherein Dasein falls and loses itself into the ‘they’ 
in its inauthentic discourse as “gossiping” (SZ 168), plunging itself ever-anew into the search for 
amusing “distraction” (SZ 172), finding itself within the ambiguity of the public’s covering-over 
in the mode of “pass[ing] off” (SZ 174) what has been falsely understood.  Inauthentically, 
Dasein’s particular discursive modes reveal its fallenness and lostness in the anonymous ‘they.’ 
 Meanwhile, authentic discourse generally keeps silent, allowing intelligibility to be 
articulated without distracting artifice.  In this and other modes of authentic discourse, what the 
talk is truly about is disclosed; the ‘talk’ does not distort, but rather points towards in clarity. 
 But the question as to how Dasein’s wholeness and authenticity can be ontico-
ontologically attested remains.  Heidegger identifies the call of conscience as that which can 
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attest to these matters.  This call is a mode of discourse, and one that calls Dasein out of its 
inauthentic fallenness into the ‘they’ and to its own authentic Self.  The call of conscience is a 
discursive mode of “keeping silent” (SZ 273) that “summons Dasein to its ownmost potentiality-
for-Being-guilty” (SZ 289).  Dasein’s Being-guilty, however, ought not to be understood in the 
standard manner of ‘making oneself responsible for others,’ or ‘feeling that one owes something 
to others’; rather, Dasein’s Being-guilty is its always already “Being-the-basis-of-a-nullity (and 
this Being-the-basis is itself null)” (SZ 285).  This ‘Being-the-null-basis-of-a-nullity’ signifies 
two component ‘nullities’ or voids in Dasein’s Being, both constituted by Dasein’s Being-
thrown:19 namely, ever-constant nullity, and ultimate nullity. Dasein’s Being-the-null-basis 
signifies that Dasein’s existence always and at every moment consists in void; Dasein is thrown 
into projection, which projection must constantly and evermore either nullify or fail to sight all 
possibilities save for the one that is projected-upon.20  That is to say, Dasein’s existence always 
and at every moment is thrown into largely consisting in nullity—Dasein mostly consists in that 
which it is not [projecting-upon]; and in projecting-upon one possibility, Dasein irrevocably give 
up on countless others.  Moreover, Dasein, as thrown into projecting, is therefore thrown into 
constantly and evermore being a ‘not-yet’ at any given moment; that is to say, “[i]n being a 
basis—that is, in existing as thrown—Dasein constantly lags behind its possibilities” (SZ 284). 
 Dasein’s Being-the-null-basis-of-a-nullity signifies the ultimate void underlying its 
existence: Dasein is as hurtling towards the inevitability of death, where ‘death’ stands-in to 
mean the total and irrevocable loss of Being itself.  In death, Dasein not only relinquishes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 “‘Nullity’ does not signify anything like not-Being-present-at-hand or not-subsisting; what one 
has in view here is rather a ‘not’ which is constitutive for this Being of Dasein—its thrownness” 
(SZ 284). 
20 “The nullity we have in mind belongs to Dasein’s Being-free for its existentiell possibilities.  
Freedom, however, is only in the choice of one possibility—that is, in tolerating one’s not having 
chosen the others and one’s not being able to choose them” (SZ 285). 
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numerous possibilities, it relinquishes all possibility evermore of even having possibilities: 
“[Death is] the possibility of the impossibility of any existence at all” (SZ 262).  Dasein’s 
ultimate existential nullity is its stemming irrevocably from a void (birth) and hurtling 
irrevocably towards a void (death).21 
 Therefore, Dasein’s ontological Being-guilty, as Being-the-null-basis-of-a-nullity, 
signifies Dasein’s Being-thrown into existing as “permeated with nullity through and through” 
(SZ 285). 
 Therefore, if conscience discursively calls Dasein out of its lostness in the ‘they-self,’ in 
which it closes-off its fundamental wholeness and truth, it therefore calls Dasein as beckoning it 
silently, without words,22 to Dasein’s disclosive ‘there’ as its Being at every moment null, and 
being entirely enveloped on both ends of its totality by nullity.  By disclosing its ownmost Being-
guilty to Dasein and thereby Dasein’s death, the call of conscience leaves Dasein as utterly and 
radically individualized—called from its lostness in the they-self to its primordial and authentic 
own Self.  This is because death is, existentially speaking, the revelation of Dasein’s utter 
individuality—for the ‘they’ says that “‘one dies’ . . . [but] ‘in no case is it I myself’, for this 
‘one’ is the ‘nobody’” (SZ 253); in short, the they never discloses one’s death as one’s ownmost 
and uttermost possibility.  They ‘they’ discourses on death in idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity, 
wherein the true and irrevocable claim that death holds on us is lost, closed-off, darkened.  For 
the ‘they,’ as being no one in particular, never itself dies, nor knows any possibility of death.  
Only the individual Dasein dies; thus, when called by conscience to face up to its own death, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 “[T]he nullity by which Dasein, in its very basis, is defined . . . is as thrownness into death” 
(SZ 308).  
22 “The call dispenses with any kind of utterance.  It does not put itself into words at all; yet it 
remains nothing less than obscure and indefinite.  Conscience discourses solely and constantly in 
the mode of keeping silent” (SZ 273). 
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Dasein is radically individualized and beckoned out of its ‘they-self.’  In Being-guilty, Dasein is 
privy to its existence as uncanny [unheimlich].  ‘Uncanniness’ here indicates as “‘not-being-at-
home’” (SZ 188); this ‘not-being-at-home’ means being displaced from one’s previous ‘home’ in 
the inauthentic with-world of the they-self—i.e., the they dictates the existentiell possibilities 
that every Dasein sights and projects-upon, and thus dictates the world’s particular worldhood.  
For example, we might assume for the moment that in contemporary American society, ‘hard 
work’ and ‘supporting your family’ according to ‘traditional values’ organizes the world and 
one’s possibilities—I either fail to sight or take seriously existentiell possibilities outside of these 
(e.g., joining a Buddhist monastery in Thailand).  But in my uncanniness, suddenly these 
omnipresent possibilities seem unwelcoming and foreign to me; in conscience, Dasein is called 
to its ownmost Being-guilty, wherein its death is disclosed, and thus it is radically individualized, 
thrown out of its everyday Being a they-self; in this individualization, it finds itself as uncanny.  
And in this uncanniness, it finds itself in the state-of-mind of anxiety.  Dasein, as anxious, exists 
as finding itself in the full disclosedness of its ownmost existentiality: its Being is suddenly an 
issue for it, but there is no quick and ready-to-hand resolution to this issue. 
 Anxiously, Dasein exists in anticipation [Vorlaufen] of its death.  Dasein has been 
anxiously disclosed in its guilt as a null basis of a nullity—it exists at each given moment as 
projecting-upon one possibility that it is not-yet, and in projecting-upon such, it must at each 
given moment irrevocably relinquish innumerable possibilities; and it must ultimately relinquish 
all possibility of ever having possibilities.  Thus, the issue of its existence is made plain: how is 
one to exist in such nullity?  Certainly not as a ‘they,’ for the ‘they’ merely conceals the truth of 
death.  Dasein, abandoned to its existence, must resolve the issue of its existence as abandoned to 
its own Self. 
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 Thus, how does Dasein ‘resolve’ the issue of its existence?  Namely, in anticipatory 
resoluteness.  ‘Anticipation’ in the original German means ‘running-ahead’; this ‘running-ahead’ 
has the signification of ‘running-ahead’ of one’s current factical situation to one’s always-
impending death.  But this ‘running-ahead’ is nothing other than projection.  In anticipation, 
Dasein projects-upon its ownmost and uttermost possibility of death.  And in thus projecting, 
Dasein reclaims itself from its lostness unto death; it makes it takes death over as its own.  Thus, 
Dasein can authentically be its wholeness (i.e., its taking over its own Self as a whole totality 
from beginning (birth) to ending (death)). 
 But how does Dasein maintain itself in such authenticity?  Namely, in resoluteness 
[Entschlossenheit].  This resoluteness is resolutely certain in its Being-towards-death, existing 
unto death.  And with this certainty, resolute Dasein resolutely holds itself open for its 
authenticity.  This openness [Erschlossenheit] can best be described in terms of a ‘Situation.’  
According to Heidegger, “the Situation is the ‘there’ which is disclosed in resoluteness—the 
‘there’ as which the existent entity is there” (SZ 299).  Less formally, the Situation is the array of 
possibilities over and above those bestowed upon the individual Dasein by the ‘they’ that Dasein 
at any given moment has available to it.  Resoluteness does not signify any particular 
possibilities that Dasein must project-upon; rather, resoluteness signifies Dasein’s holding itself 
open to the full array of possibilities available to its fully individualized Self at any given 
moment. 
 Thus, in anticipatory resoluteness, Dasein runs ahead of itself and thus reclaims its own 
individual Self; and moreover it holds itself open to its always-impending and uttermost 
possibility of death, and as individualized, its full array of possibilities over and above those 
given by the ‘they.’  In anticipatory resoluteness, Dasein exists authentically in its wholeness as a 
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Self.  Therefore, according to Heidegger, “[t]his distinctive and authentic disclosedness, which is 
attested in Dasein itself by its conscience—this reticent self-projection upon one’s ownmost 
Being-guilty, in which one is ready for anxiety—we call ‘resoluteness’” (SZ 296-297).  Thus, 
conscience calls not as a calling to our responsibility to others—and in fact, it calls us out of 
such inauthentic modes.  Similarly, Being-guilty means not that we are indebted to others, or that 
we are guilty of some evil, but rather that we are, in our very thrown existence, guilty.23 
 Thus, in our preceding analysis of understanding projection, thrown state-of-mind, and 
discursive fallenness, in addition to our extended analysis of conscience, Being-guilty, 
uncanniness, anxiety, and anticipatory resoluteness, we have delineated (broadly) the full outline 
of the meaning of Heidegger’s care [Sorge], which counts as yet a further hermeneutical spiral in 
the existential analytic of Dasein: formally, Heidegger defines ‘care’ as “‘ahead of itself—Being-
already-in (a world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world)’” (SZ 317).  
Thus, ‘care’ is this disclosive structure.  However, it is important for Heidegger that ‘care’ is 
considered as a unitary phenomenon—although he has analyzed it according to its constituent 
components, most primordially, Heidegger believes, care indicates unitarily.  Thus, Heidegger 
begins his search for the ‘meaning’ of this unitary care—or that which will allow us to maintain 
ourselves in care’s unitary intelligibility.  It is from here that he begins his analysis of 
temporality. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Heidegger addresses in Being and Time the four typical significations of ‘conscience’ and 
‘guilty’: 
(1) that the function of conscience is essentially critical; (2) that conscience always 
speaks in a way that is relative to some definite deed which has been performed or willed; 
(3) that when the ‘voice’ [of conscience] is experienced, it is never so radically related to 
Dasein’s Being; (4) that our Interpretation takes no account of the basic forms of the 
phenomenon [of conscience]—‘evil’ conscience and ‘good’, that which ‘reproves’ and 
that which ‘warns’. (SZ 290) 
Heidegger dismisses each of these significations as arising on the basis of Dasein’s inauthentic 
existence as a ‘they,’ thereby existing as divorced from its true existential Being. 
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 Temporality [Zeitlichkeit] might be alternatively indicated as ‘temporariness.’24  Its 
constituent structures meaningfully ground the Being of Dasein, which Heidegger has indicated 
as ‘Being-there,’ ‘existence,’ and ‘care.’  Care comprises his most thoroughgoing elaboration on 
Dasein’s Being, but its unitary meaningfulness has been obscured through the necessity of 
analyzing it in its constituent components.  Meanwhile, ‘temporality’ is composed fundamentally 
of one component (i.e., future) that appropriates itself in different relations.25 
 Heidegger designates each of temporality’s ‘components’ by the term ‘ecstasis 
[Ekstase].’  This word etymologically denotes as ‘standing outside,’ which for Heidegger’s 
purposes is proper: the ecstases of time are not fundamentally different ‘components’; they are 
more primordially different ways of manifesting one’s relationship to one’s Self.  Dasein’s 
ecstatical character indicates Dasein as Being-constituted by a movement outside of one’s ‘here 
and now’; or rather, that one’s ‘here and now’ is merely a manifestation of Dasein’s fundamental 
moving-towards and coming-from. 
Dasein’s ecstasis of future meaningfully grounds its Being-ahead-of-itself, or projecting.  
Dasein’s ‘having-been’26 grounds the meaning of its Being-always-already, or thrownness.  And 
Dasein’s Present grounds the meaning of its Being-with, or fallenness.  Temporality 
meaningfully grounds Dasein’s primordially Being-a-whole, constituted by Being-towards-death 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 We follow Lewis in reading ‘temporality’ in this way. States Lewis: “I would prefer to 
translate ‘Zeitlichkeit’ as ‘temporariness’ or ‘temporaeity’.  [This] means that [B]eing is founded 
upon the presence within beings as a whole of a being [Dasein] which has only a temporary 
span” (HPE 15). 
25 “This phenomenon has the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having 
been; we designate it as temporality” (SZ 326). 
26 Clearly, ‘having-been’ corresponds to something like ‘the past’; nevertheless, Heidegger 
explicitly refrains from using ‘the past’ because of its connotative baggage as tied-in to 
inauthentic conceptions of ‘time.’  Heidegger states: “‘As long as’ Dasein factically exists, it is 
never past, but it always is indeed already as having been . . . [o]n the other hand, we call an 
entity ‘past’, when it is no longer present-at-hand” (SZ 328). 
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and Being-towards-birth.  And as meaningfully grounding its Being-a-whole, temporality 
meaningfully grounds Dasein’s authentic or inauthentic relationship to its Being-a-whole. 
 Dasein relates itself existingly to every temporal ecstasis either authentically or 
inauthentically.  Futurally, Dasein is authentically as a ‘coming-towards’ where what it is 
‘coming-towards’ is some projected-upon possibility; however, this ‘coming-towards’ means 
nothing different than ‘running-ahead’; thus, Dasein is authentically futural as anticipating.  
Meanwhile, “the inauthentic future has the character of awaiting [or expecting]” (SZ 337).  In 
awaiting and expecting, Dasein’s Being is not seized hold of in its own way; rather, it is 
projected-upon as an ‘external given.’ 
 Dasein’s ecstatical having-been is a characteristic of Dasein’s future, wherein Dasein has 
the possibility of “com[ing] back” (SZ 326) to re-gather itself.  That is to say, insofar as Dasein is 
authentically futural, Dasein is also as having-been.  Thus, this movement ‘back-towards’ 
oneself has the character of ‘taking up again’ one’s having-been, which Heidegger designates as 
repetition.  In repetition, Dasein takes hold of its having-been in such a way as to make itself a 
whole: coming back for itself to gather-itself-up for its thrown projection.  Inauthentic having-
been, on the other hand, has the character of forgetting.  As Heidegger states: “[t]he ecstasis 
(rapture) of forgetting has the character of backing away in the face of one’s ownmost ‘been’, 
and of doing so in a manner which is closed off from itself” (SZ 339).  This forgetting is a 
forgetting, importantly, of one ownmost Self—in other words, founded upon this inauthentic 
having-been of forgetting is ‘retaining.’  Retaining is an ecstatical movement in which one has 
forgotten one’s Self, but nevertheless retained one’s proximal concern. 
 Dasein’s ecstatical Present might be more tellingly described as Being-constantly.  As a 
Being-constantly, Dasein exists and maintains itself as a temporal relation to itself at any given 
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moment.  This temporal relation is constituted entirely according to its relationship between its 
future and its having-been.  Therefore, authentically, Dasein exists as a Being-constantly that 
anticipates as a repetition.  Inauthentically, Dasein exists as a making-present that awaits as it 
forgets, or else expects as it retains.  Dasein’s authentic relationship to its Present, Heidegger 
maintains, is the “‘moment of vision’ . . . [i]t means the resolute rapture with which Dasein is 
carried away to whatever possibilities and circumstances are encountered in the Situation as 
possible objects of concern, but a rapture which is held in resoluteness’” (SZ 338).  Thus, 
Dasein’s authentic Present is a holding-onto as a holding-itself-open-for the moment of vision.  In 
holding itself open for the moment of vision, Dasein anticipates (runs-ahead-of-itself) and 
repeats (comes-back-for-itself).  Dasein’s inauthentic Present, therefore, is a making-present that 
leaps away.  Its movement as characterized by leaping away can be understood as a constancy of 
awaiting that forgets its having-been.  As such, as that which it awaits passes along into its 
having-been, Dasein’s Present leaps away to awaiting the next thing.  As constantly leaping 
away, Dasein utterly loses itself in the Present of forgotten awaiting.  It never is grounded in a 
having-been; its future, as merely awaiting, is not groundingly seized hold of; thus, existing as 
devoid of grounds, temporally inauthentic Dasein in its Present cannot be anything other than a 
lostness unto its making present.  As Heidegger states: 
[T]he making-present is abandoned more and more to itself.  It makes present for the sake 
of the Present.  It thus entangles itself in itself, so that the distracted not-tarrying [not 
holding on to one’s having-been] becomes never-dwelling-anywhere.  This latter mode of 
the Present is the counter-phenomenon at the opposite extreme from the moment of 
vision. (SZ 347) 
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A founded mode of inauthenticity, as well, is in one’s proximal and everyday concern: as 
concerned, one’s inauthentic making-present manifests itself as an expecting that retains.  In this 
founded mode, one’s Present does not quite have the character of leaping-away; nevertheless, it 
is only on the basis of such leaping away—i.e., one’s ability to forget one’s Self and invest one’s 
Being in a close-to-hand future that is not seized upon—that it can manifest itself.  In such a 
Present, Dasein’s making-present retains its having-been not in its own primordial Self, but in its 
objects of proximal concern.  In expecting, one awaits with a degree of assurance (as opposed to 
in mere awaiting), but this expectation is nevertheless not wholly a possibility that has been 
resolutely seized hold of as one’s own.  In this form of concernful inauthenticity, Dasein is 
always  “abandon[ed] to a ‘world’ of which it never becomes master” (SZ 356); moreover, this 
form of concernful inauthenticity in making-present comprises the “theoretical attitude” (SZ 357) 
of the natural sciences, wherein a certain form of concern “aim[s] . . . to free entities we 
encounter within-the-world, and to free them in such a way  . . . that they can become ‘Objects’” 
(SZ 363). 
 Thus, it is only through the ecstases of temporality that Dasein can ‘[authentically] win 
itself’ or ‘lose itself [in inauthenticity]’: in forgetting the primordial having-been of its Self, 
Dasein loses its own Self; it therefore takes refuge in the anonymous ‘they-self.’  Meanwhile, in 
repeating itself, Dasein comes back for its ownmost primordial Self in its projecting.  But more 
must be said about this ‘repetition’ of Dasein’s ecstatical having-been.  The grounds of this 
repetition lie in Dasein’s historicality [Geschichtlichkeit].  Dasein’s historicality is not the 
scholarly practice of history (Heidegger refers to this latter phenomenon as ‘world-historical-
historiology’), nor is it fundamentally a present-at-hand consciousness of the ‘past’: rather, 
Dasein’s historicality primarily resides in its being constituted by having-been.  Dasein, as 
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thrown into its existentially Being-in-the-world as care, is thus thrown into (1) gathering and 
organizing the world around its having-been, and (2) being born into a world made significant by 
other Daseins who have-been-there.  Thus, Heidegger speaks of a ‘heritage’: Dasein draws its 
possibilities from its thrownness; ordinarily, Dasein is thrown into Being a they-self; but even 
more primordially, Dasein is thrown into Being-with, in a world made significant according to 
other Daseins who have-been-there; thus, the ‘well’ from which Dasein must draw its 
possibilities of Being is irrevocably a historical well; thus, Dasein’s heritage comprises its 
possibilities that have-been handed-down to itself that it may repeat.  Therefore, Heidegger 
states: 
The resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself, discloses current factical 
possibilities of authentic existing, and discloses them in terms of the heritage which that 
resoluteness, as thrown, takes over.  In one’s coming back resolutely to one’s thrownness, 
there is hidden a handing down to oneself of the possibilities that have come down to 
one[.] (SZ 383) 
Therefore, on the basis of having this heritage that comprises Dasein’s source of sighted 
possibilities, Dasein can be said to have a “fate” (SZ 384).  And importantly, as every Dasein is 
also a Dasein-with[-Others], its collective historizing is drawn out of a collective heritage 
constitutive of its collective “destiny”(SZ 384).  But these terms are not necessarily meant to 
indicate as ‘determined to some particular lot in life’; similarly, one’s Being thrown into 
repeating one’s inherited possibilities does not mean one’s having to take up the identical means 
and ends of one’s ancestors; rather, it means that Dasein’s projections must always be in relation 
to Dasein’s inherited possibilities; only by fully grappling with one’s heritage and seizing-upon 
one’s self in a relationship with this heritage (which relationship is thus one’s own) can any 
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Dasein authentically ‘repeat.’  Illustrating this phenomenon, Heidegger employs the term 
“reciprocative rejoinder” (SZ 386), which roughly signifies that (1) Dasein is thrown into an 
inherited array of possibilities; (2) Dasein, in authentically projecting, must in some way 
reciprocate towards these inherited possibilities by making a rejoinder to them.  Thus, whether 
in embracing and upholding or rebelling and rejecting its inherited possibilities, Dasein is 
thrown into responding to its heritage in some manner or other.  This constitutes Dasein’s 
historicality; and thus, in authentically repeating, Dasein takes its thrown historicality and, 
disclosed in the moment of vision, takes up this historicality as its own. 
 Thus, the final hermeneutical spiral is completed: have the aims of fundamental ontology 
been achieved?  The Being of Dasein, whose Being has been provisionally indicated as ‘Being-
there,’ ‘existence,’ ‘Being-in-the-world,’ and ‘care’ has thus been made meaningful as grounded 
in temporality.  Dasein can exist authentically or inauthentically only as temporal; the existential 
analytic has revealed the meaning of Dasein’s Being—and thus the meaning of Being as such 
and in general—as temporality.27  This constitutes the project of Being and Time. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Although, one must note that Heidegger makes it clear that this provisional analysis is open for 
questioning.  He ends his book with the question: “Does time itself manifest itself as the horizon 
of Being?” (SZ 437) 
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II.2. Later Heidegger’s Response to Being and Time 
 In his mature years, Heidegger’s thinking underwent substantial revision based on his 
inability to express ‘the turn’ in his exploration of Being.  ‘The turn’ might best be (briefly) 
understood in the following manner: in Being and Time, Heidegger investigates the meaning of 
Being qua as revealed in Dasein’s Being.  ‘The turn’ is inverting this project: namely, 
investigating Dasein’s Being via Being qua.  While originally intended to be included as a part 
of Heidegger’s project in Being and Time, “[t]he division in question was held back because 
thinking failed in the adequate saying of this turning and did not succeed with the help of the 
language of metaphysics” (LH 250). 
 A way of broadly summarizing Heidegger’s change in thought between his early work in 
Being and Time and his later work might be the following: in Being and Time, the human being 
(Dasein) is analytically portrayed as the ground of all Being (i.e., is the basis of fundamental 
ontology), and thus, Dasein figures as the originator and master of all beings’ meaningfully 
Being—i.e., all non-Dasein-esque entities have their respective modes of Being in virtue of their 
readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand for Dasein’s projects.  However, in Heidegger’s later 
thought, the human is not so much the grounding master of all other beings’ Being so much as 
she is the guardian of beings’ meaningfully Being.  In other words, ‘Being’ is not first generated 
and secondarily amended by the human; rather, Being is always given, and the human being lives 
to guard and maintain this Being.28 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Heidegger states: 
Thinking accomplishes the relation of being to the essence of the human being.  It does 
not make or cause the relation.  Thinking brings this relation to being solely as something 
handed over to thought itself from being.  Such offering consists in the fact that in 
thinking being comes to language.  Language is the house of being.  In its home human 
beings dwell.  Those who think and those who create with words are the guardians of this 
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 Although expounding on the above points is of great interest to a great many 
philosophical projects, it is not of great interest to ours: our focus is on finding a ground for the 
Being of ethics in the analysis of Being and Time.  Nevertheless, Heidegger explicitly mentions 
‘ethics’ in several regards in his “Letter on ‘Humanism’,” and we will consider his remarks so as 
to better understand his career-long treatment of ‘ethics,’ and how critics have responded to his 
philosophical encounters with ‘ethics.’ 
 Heidegger’s first mention of ‘ethics’ in this work is in classifying it as a “suspect [true-
ism] demanded by “the market of public opinion” (LH 241).  He follows this up with a reference 
to the fact that his analysis of the ‘they’ in Being and Time is not to be understood “in an ethical-
existentiell way, of the selfhood of persons” (LH 242).  His next remark upon the subject 
mentions that “moral responsibility in every use of language” is undermined by “[t]he widely 
and rapidly spreading devastation of language” (LH 243).  He later remarks that his analysis of 
‘fallenness’ in Being and Time “does not signify the Fall of Man understood in a ‘moral-
philosophical’ and at the same time secularized way” (LH 253).  On ‘value’ in general, 
Heidegger writes: “through the character of something as ‘a value’ what is so valued is robbed of 
its worth . . . [e]very valuing, even where it values positively, is a subjectivizing” (LH 265).  He 
moves on to treat ethics more directly: “Where the essence of the human being is thought so 
essentially . . . a longing necessarily awakens for a peremptory directive and for rules that say 
how the human being . . . ought to live in a fitting manner” (LH 268).  In analyzing the history of 
‘ethical’ inquiry, Heidegger states that “The tragedies of Sophocles . . . preserve the ήθος [ethos] 
in their sayings more primordially than Aristotle’s lectures on ‘ethics’” (LH 269).  Finally, 
Heidegger defines his conception of ‘ethics’: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
home.  Their guardianship accomplishes the manifestation of being insofar as they bring 
this manifestation to language and preserve it in language through their saying. (LH 239) 
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If the name ‘ethics,’ in keeping with the basic meaning of the word ήθος, should now say 
ethics ponders the abode of the human being, then that thinking which thinks the truth of 
being as the primordial element of the human being . . . is in itself originary ethics.  
However, this thinking is not ethics in the first instance because it is ontology.  For 
ontology always thinks solely the being (όν) in its being. (LH 271) 
Therefore, what might we analytically gather from these various statements pertaining to ethics?  
Namely, that Heidegger has contempt for something like ‘ethics’ in the way it is typically 
practiced as an object of the philosophical dialectic concerned with ‘moralizing’ and developing 
standards of interpersonal valuation and normative behavior.  However, he clearly reveres 
something like “originary ethics” or ‘ethos,’ in his peculiar sense of the term as ‘thinking the 
truth of Being’ or ‘dwelling in the house of Being’—i.e., Dasein’s existing in closeness to its 
relationship with its constitutive Being.  But these remarks, as Heidegger indicates, seem to 
basically reduce to a mode of comporting oneself in ontological inquiry, and therefore pass-over 
ontical ethical manifestations such as ‘evil,’29 ‘moralizing,’ etc.  In short, even later Heidegger 
condemns ‘ethics’ as it is ontically practiced in ‘morality’ as something like the inauthentic 
Being of the ‘they’; he upholds ‘ethos,’ but only as a matter of comporting oneself 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Heidegger does provide us with some analysis of ‘evil’: “[t]he essence of evil does not consist 
in the mere baseness of human action, but rather in the malice of rage” (LH 272).  However, his 
succeeding analysis in this section indicates, by our lights, that this ‘malicious rage’ is a rage 
against a “letting-be of ek-sistence” (LH 272).  As ek-sistence means “standing in the clearing of 
[B]eing” (LH 247), we might state this ‘letting-be’ of ek-sistence consists in comporting oneself 
towards the truth of Being (i.e., the unconcealment of Being) in such a way as lets the 
unconcealed Being be—i.e., respects it as Being.  Thus, the ‘malicious rage’ that Heidegger 
discusses as constitutive of evil might consist in comporting oneself in disrespect or force 
against the unconcealment of Being.  But once again, this analysis of evil seems to pass-over 
ontical ‘evil’ manifestations, reducing the term of ‘evil’ to signify a mode of ontological 
comportment. 
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ontologically—namely, comporting oneself sensitively and respectfully30 towards the unveiling 
of Being. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 We should note that ‘respect’ here is not a normative imperative in the sense of ‘thou shalt be 
respectful,’ but rather, a mode of existing in which each Dasein lets beings meaningfully be, does 
not try to foist itself as the ground and master of their meaningfully Being. 
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II.3. Levinas on Heidegger and Ethics 
 The French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas writes phenomenologically, following 
Heidegger, but in such a way as to fundamentally reject Heidegger’s work in Being and Time31 
as not only failing to make sense of the ethical, but also failing to give the ethical its due place in 
philosophy—namely, as first philosophy.32  Both Levinas’s negative rejection of Heidegger and 
positive staking out of his own position are most famously expressed in Totality and Infinity.33 
 In writing his essay, Levinas divides philosophical discourse as oriented in accordance 
with either ‘totality’ or ‘infinity’;34 the history of Western Philosophy, he claims, is almost 
wholly oriented in accordance with ‘totality.’35  Such philosophical inquiry that proceeds as 
oriented towards totality, according to Levinas, automatically conceals truly ethical phenomena.  
Why is this the case?  Philosophical approaches oriented towards the implicit optimum of totality 
are inherently totalitarian.  Drawing a parallel between political conquest and philosophical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Manning states that, “Levinas’s phenomenology is always a matter of interpreting within but 
always otherwise than Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology” (IOH 7). 
32 “Levinas[ insists] . . . that it is not the knowledge of Being, but ethics—meaning our 
responsibility for the other person—that is the true subject of first philosophy” (IOH 7). 
33 Although his most famous work, we should note Manning’s reservations concerning overly 
focusing on Totality and Infinity in the Levinasian canon.  States Manning: 
Levinas’s attack on Heidegger is so strident in Totality and Infinity that the relation 
between Heidegger’s and Levinas’s philosophy is most often interpreted—especially by 
Heidegger’s defenders—as an oppositional and adversarial one.  This reading of the 
Levinas-Heidegger relationship is completely understandable, as Levinas scholarship has 
tended to interpret Levinas almost solely through Totality and Infinity, and Levinas’s 
attack on Heidegger in this work is severe.  (IOH 4) 
34 “Do particular beings yield their truth in a Whole in which their exteriority vanishes?  Or, on 
the contrary, is the ultimate event of being enacted in the outburst of this exteriority? . . . [This 
book] will proceed to distinguish between the idea of totality and the idea of infinity, and affirm 
the philosophical primacy of the idea of infinity” (TI 26). 
35 “[F]rom Plato to Heidegger, panoramic existence and its disclosure are equivalent to the very 
production of being, since truth or disclosure is at the same time the work or the essential virtue 
of being . . . [this attitude] rests on this primacy of the panoramic” (TI 294).  This “primacy of 
the panoramic” lies in contradistinction with “the break-up of totality, the denunciation of the 
panoramic structure of being” (TI 294, emphasis mine). 
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work, Levinas claims that the philosopher’s obsession with totalistic comprehension is akin to 
the politician’s/governor’s obsession with totalitarian domination.36  In other words, totalistic 
philosophy, in aiming to comprehend everything, thereby implicitly demands that all beings 
present and reveal themselves to the philosopher.37  “[T]o criticism everything must submit” 
(Kant, CPR, Axi n.)—this is the archetypal demand of the totalitarian philosopher.  Such a 
demand automatically entails the following: (1) all beings that phenomenally do not comply with 
the philosopher’s demands due to their standing outside of her philosophical ‘system’ as 
instances of problematical otherness or alterity are concealed in their truly exterior nature.  That 
is to say, the philosopher is forced to liquidate these non-compliant beings of their essential, 
phenomenal alterity or otherness by virtue of a ‘third term.’  This allows the philosopher to 
illicitly divest these innately exterior beings of their phenomenal exteriority by transferring them 
across a term that allows them to bear some relation towards some unproblematically 
comprehensible beings, and thus the philosopher reduces the truly other to a seeming same.38  
Therefore the philosopher, in denying such beings their essential, phenomenal alterity, and 
subsuming them beneath phenomenally familiar, already-comprehended beings, thereby 
expresses her orientation towards totalistic control or totalitarianism.  This demand also entails 
(2) a privileged emphasis on the individual human39—this is because the intersubjective 
relationship is most fundamentally a relationship of respect for otherness; but in attempting to 
gain a totalistic comprehension, the philosopher denies beings their phenomenal otherness, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 “The visage of being that shows itself in war is fixed in the concept of totality, which 
dominates Western philosophy” (TI 21). 
37 “To theory as comprehension of beings the general title ontology is appropriate” (TI 42). 
38 “[O]ntology: a reduction of the other to the same by interposition of a middle and neutral term 
that ensures the comprehension of being” (TI 43). 
39 “The meaning of individuals (invisible outside the totality) is derived from the totality” (TI 
22). 
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thus automatically undermines the essential basis of her own intersubjective relationships [with 
Others]; instead, she implicitly privileges identity, sameness, her own individuality.  Finally, 
such a demand (3) is oriented towards an implicit optimum of freedom, where ‘freedom’ means 
not ‘the ability to do anything,’ but rather, the ability to force all beings to cede to one’s 
demands.40 
 A philosophy prioritizing infinity, on the other hand, is one that first and foremost 
consists in ethics.  How does Levinas make sense of this?  He claims that ‘being’ is an 
anonymous and impenetrable force that abandons the human being, leaves her as existing with 
other beings in a finite world.41  But the human being, as constituted by this ‘being,’ constantly 
looks to escape her burden of finite abandonment and thus transcend herself. But such 
transcendence reaches, as reaching towards the impenetrability of ‘being’ itself, towards the 
infinite.  The infinite is that which overflows and overwhelms the finite totality;42 it is that which, 
as manifest within finite totality, thoroughly explodes any goal of comprehending its infinite 
nature; in short, the infinite is the incomprehensible.  Its infinitude might be alternatively stated 
as otherness, alterity, or exteriority—i.e., exterior to, other than finitude.  In other words, the 
individual human being, as finite, confronts beings bearing phenomenal infinitude, and confronts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 “Ontology . . . promotes freedom—the freedom that is the identification of the same, not 
allowing itself to be alienated by the other” (TI 42).  Moreover, “[s]uch is the definition of 
freedom: to maintain oneself against the other, despite every relation with the other ensuring the 
autarchy of an I.  Thematization and conceptualization . . . are not peace with the other but 
suppression or possession of the other” (TI 46). 
41 According to Manning, “Levinas chooses the term il y a, there is, to denote the anonymous, 
impersonal Being that exists before Dasein comes to be . . . As Levinas and many others have 
pointed out, the anonymous and impersonal il y a is meant to contrast with and to contradict 
Heidegger’s notion of es gibt, that which gives itself” (IOH 42). 
42 “Precisely perfection exceeds conception, overflows the concept; it designates distance: the 
idealization that makes it possible is a passage to the limit, that is, a transcendence, a passage to 
the absolutely other.  The idea of the perfect is an idea of infinity” (TI 41). 
	  	   54 
them as overwhelming, overflowing, primordially uprooting her own, individual finitude.43  In 
human existence, the phenomenon that most primordially expresses this infinity is the 
intersubjective relationship, which phenomenon most primordially is manifest in the face-to-face 
encounter with the Other [i.e., the human being that is not oneself].44  The Other’s face expresses 
truth more primordial than one could ever comprehend: it makes demands of one that, beyond 
the direct and immediate encounter, are not phenomenally manifest.  In the face-to-face 
encounter with the Other, one perceives both a welcoming, but also a demand: “you shall not 
commit murder” (TI 199).45  This phenomenal welcoming and demanding, as an encounter with 
infinitude, is of course cognitively incomprehensible.  Therefore, a philosophy oriented towards 
infinity is not oriented towards the implicit optimum of comprehension, for comprehension of the 
infinite is what is precisely ruled-out by the infinite’s very essence; rather, a ‘philosophy of 
infinity’ is oriented towards the implicit optimum of respect for alterity.  Alterity makes 
demands of one, and these are demands that one must respect.  As most primordially reflected in 
the intersubjective relationship, one is primarily and primordially demanded to respect the 
otherness of the Other.  Therefore ethics, as the philosophy concerning respect for the Other’s 
otherness, is thus the ‘first’ philosophy of infinity.46 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 States Levinas: 
[A] relation with the infinity of a being which exceeds the totality . . . [as a] breach of 
totality[ is] the possibility of a signification without a context.  The experience of 
morality does not proceed from this vision—it consummates this vision . . . [b]ut it is a 
‘vision’ without image, bereft of the synoptic and totalizing objectifying virtues of vision.  
(TI 23) 
44 “[A] situation [of encountering infinity] where totality breaks up . . . [s]uch a situation is the 
gleam of exteriority or of transcendence in the face of the Other” (TI 24). 
45 “[P]ower, by essence murderous of the other, becomes, faced with the other and ‘against all 
good sense,’ the impossibility of murder, the consideration of the other, or justice” (TI 47). 
46 “We name this calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other ethics.  
The strangeness of the Other, his irreducibility to the I, to my thoughts and my possessions, is 
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 In the section of his work entitled, “Metaphysics Precedes Ontology,” Levinas mounts 
perhaps his most direct attack against Heidegger’s Being and Time.  In this piece, Levinas 
describes Heideggerian ontology as a philosophy deeply oriented by totality: since phenomena of 
alterity absolutely refuse to be subjected to totalistic comprehension, the philosopher must invent 
a new ‘third and neutral term’ in which the incomprehensible can be mediately comprehended 
and thus divested of its otherness.  According to Levinas, for Heidegger the ‘ontological 
difference (i.e., the divorce of Being from beings)’ is the ‘wherein’ of this third term: namely, 
‘Being.’  ‘Being,’ as the explicit object of Heideggerian ontology, therefore is the locus of the 
divestment of the essential alterity manifest in beings that overflow comprehensibility; ‘Being’ 
allows such essentially exterior beings to be subsumed under the equivalence of Being as such 
and in general.  Thus, Heideggerian ontology forces an irreducible, incomprehensible difference 
into a comprehensible equivalence.47  Thus, Heidegger’s ontology is implicitly oriented towards 
an optimum of totalistic control, and this orientation automatically divests beings of their 
primordial, infinite otherness. And in thus undertaking his ontological inquiry, Heidegger (and 
most of Western Philosophy along with him) immediately and automatically closes off the 
ethical dimension.  This is because beings in whom ethics is phenomenally manifest are (qua 
beings bearing ethical relationships to oneself) exterior, incomprehensible, not to be known; that 
is to say, they primordially and primarily are as a demand to be respected in their infinitude; 
meanwhile ontological inquiry, which insists on phenomenal encounters with beings that 
manifest themselves as to be known or comprehended, is therefore inherently contra-ethics. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
precisely accomplished as a calling into question of my spontaneity, as ethics” (TI 43, emphasis 
mine). 
47 “[T]he relation with someone [subordinated to] a relation with the Being [of someone], which, 
impersonal, permits the apprehension, the domination of the existent, subordinates justice to 
freedom . . . affirms the primacy of freedom over ethics” (TI 45). 
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 Therefore, Levinas states: “ontology as first philosophy is a philosophy of power” (TI 
46).  However, it is important to note that ontology can only be a philosophy of power on the 
basis of encountering something that must be overpowered.  That which must be overpowered in 
ontological investigations is otherness.  Therefore, ontology presupposes otherness; and since 
metaphysics48 is the philosophy that primordially deals with otherness, “ontology presupposes 
metaphysics” (TI 48); and thus, metaphysics (and thereby ethics) precedes ontology. 
The philosopher R. J. S. Manning in his work on Levinas and Heidegger suggests that 
Heidegger’s ‘missteps,’ according to Levinas, count among themselves Heidegger’s inclusion of 
fallenness as a constituent structure of Dasein’s Being, and moreover his insistence on 
Interpreting Dasein through the analytical schema of authenticity and inauthenticity.  Manning 
claims that these foci, according to Levinas, privilege a solitary, individualized Dasein as 
‘authentic’ or ‘the primordial state of Being.’49  Meanwhile, Levinas believes that the 
intersubjective (or rather, social-communal) relationship constitutes the human’s primordial 
‘being’; thus Heidegger, with his individualized ‘Dasein,’ privileges individual freedom over and 
against intersubjective respect or justice.50 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 “The aspiration to radical exteriority, thus called metaphysical” (TI 29).  Thus, ‘metaphysics’ 
essentially consists in the will to transcendence of finitude.  Therefore, “[i]f . . . ethical relations 
are to lead transcendence to its term, this is because the essential of ethics is its transcendent 
intention” (TI 29).  Therefore, ‘metaphysics’ is inherently ethical. 
49 “Levinas’s argument is . . . [that] due to Heidegger’s notion of fallenness and inauthenticity, 
his analysis of authentic sociality takes as its subject solitary Dasein” (IOH 50). 
50 “Levinas interprets sociality explicitly otherwise than Heidegger does . . . [namely, as] the I-
you collectivity” (IOH 51). 
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II.4. Critical Responses to Heidegger and Ethics 
 Our project can be distinguished from the bulk of the philosophical critical literature 
pertaining to the Heidegger-ethics nexus, in that the latter centers around three characteristic 
syntheses, none of which our project takes-up. 
 These three characteristic syntheses synthesize: (1) Heidegger’s early work exemplified 
in Being and Time with his later work centering around ‘the turn’; (2) Heidegger’s philosophical 
work with his involvement as a member of the Nazi Party; and (3) Heidegger’s ‘ethos of 
dwelling’ as reflected in his “Letter on ‘Humanism’” with a conception of ethics similar to 
Levinas’s intersubjective relationship, a conception that privileges interpersonal-ontical ethical 
dealings. 
 Two examples of critical approaches centering around all three of these syntheses are 
Joanna Hodge’s Heidegger and Ethics (HE) and Michael Lewis’s Heidegger and the Place of 
Ethics (HPE).  In HE, Hodge attempts to rescue an ‘ethical’ standpoint implicit in Heidegger’s 
work by looking to synthesize later Heidegger’s ‘originary ethics’ with earlier Heidegger’s 
‘fundamental ontology.’  She first distinguishes between three conceptions of ethics: ethics as (1) 
a history of ethical inquiry; (2) an inquiry concerned solely with human beings’ well-being, and 
developing rules derived thereupon; and (3) an inquiry concerned with human beings in relation 
to difference and otherness (HE 1-2). According to Hodge, Heidegger himself, when putting 
down ‘ethics,’ only conceives of the first two conceptions of ethics; the latter conception goes 
explicitly untouched but implicitly suggested in his work.51  In undertaking her project, Hodge 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 States Hodge: 
Heidegger . . .  explicitly rejects the second version of ethics . . . since it takes the 
question of human flourishing in isolation from the wider context in which human beings 
find themselves.  This is a restricted conception of ethics[;] by contrast . . . I seek to find 
at work in Heidegger’s enquiries an unrestricted conception of ethics concerned not just 
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thus identifies ‘ethics’ as a relationship with ‘difference and otherness.’  This ethical relationship 
primordially manifests itself in “the self-constitution of human beings as individuals” (HE 191), 
which self-constitution culminates in Entschlossenheit.  And Entschlossenheit, as consisting in a 
“transformation . . . [from] a general structure of openness . . . into a specific, individuated self-
affirming recognition of the limited nature of any individual lifespan” (HE 195), therefore results 
in: 
an analysis of Dasein that is . . . a description of what it is to be human for which there 
are three central ethical concerns: taking responsibility for oneself, refusing the 
temptation to take responsibility for others with the structure of Dasein, and recognising 
differences between self and others. (HE 202) 
Ultimately, Hodge claims, Dasein’s ‘ethical concerns’ reveal the ontological conditions that 
constitute an ontically judging, normatively valuating, and character-forming (i.e., ontically 
ethical) entity. 
 Hodge implies that this understanding of ethics (i.e., relating to one’s self as self-same 
and to others as Other)—which is constitutive of the meaning of human Being as analyzed in the 
existential analytic of Dasein—is “linked to the question of human flourishing” (HE 12).  
Ultimately, Hodge claims that Heidegger’s implicit understanding of (ethical) human flourishing 
“on an individual level . . . can be extended to insisting that the affirmation of collective Dasein 
must take place at the level of human beings as a whole” (HE 189). 
Hodge also dwells at length upon Heidegger’s involvement in Nazism, engaging in an 
interesting dialectic with Heidegger’s most vociferous critics, critics who would dismiss his 
thought as innately infected with Nazism.  Hodge attempts to defend the position that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
with human beings, but with human beings in relation to difference and otherness.  (HE 
2) 
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Heidegger’s ontology is not through-and-through permeated by Nazism, but rather, that his 
Nazism is the result of “Heidegger [himself] fall[ing] short of the possibilities of his own thought 
by . . . step[ping] back into the ground of metaphysics, while failing . . . to affirm the 
coterminous necessity of taking a step forward into the potentiality of ethics” (HE 3). 
 Lewis’s HPE more directly approaches these three syntheses than does Hodge’s HE.  
Indeed, Lewis begins his argument by stating that his work was “originally designed” in order to 
“answer[] Levinas’s criticisms of Heidegger’s stance on ethics” (HPE 8).   Thus, explicitly 
moving forward with these syntheses in mind, Lewis attempts to demonstrate the following: it is 
Heidegger’s evolving understanding of ‘Being-with’ (before and after ‘the turn’) that 
accomplishes an ‘originary ethics’ that is innately intersubjective and repudiatory of his prior 
involvement with Nazism. 
 In Being and Time, according to Lewis, the ontological difference as the void or 
withdrawal of Being from beings is assumed, but not thought properly.  To think this withdrawal 
properly would be to “think the ontological difference in its very differentiation rather than to 
think [B]eing and beings in their already differentiated state” (HPE 162).  For Lewis, this 
problematical assumption permeating Being and Time is most visible in Heidegger’s analysis of 
Being-with as an existentiale.  Being-with functions as the genesis of the 
authenticity/inauthenticity schema propounded by Heidegger, which schema problematically 
generates Heidegger’s analysis of the individualization of Dasein on the basis of already-
differentiated-beings.  The beginning of the ‘cracking’ of this concealed problematic is initiated 
by Heidegger’s brief and ‘square-peg’ analysis of ‘authentic’ Being-with.52 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Cf. SZ 298. 
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Lewis’ position basically runs as the following: in the call of conscience, Dasein’s utter 
thrownness unto death (i.e., Being-the-null-basis-of-a-void) is understandingly disclosed, and 
disclosed as that which each Dasein must take-over.  Thus, Dasein is individualized. But the 
unthought nature of this individualization is its primordially making-singular.  How is this the 
case?  Conscience first suggests to Heidegger “the opening of a crack in indifference” (HPE 48). 
That is to say, conscience singularizes each Dasein from the unified totality of beings in the face 
of her death.  Thus, conscience attests to Dasein’s tearing herself out from this totality, making a 
space for her own individualized singularity; thus, this is the site of Dasein’s relating to Others 
as genuinely different.  Thus ‘torn-out,’ Dasein can now help tear-out other Daseins in true 
friendship.  Thus, in the call of conscience, each Dasein has the possibility of relating to others 
as absolutely Other for the very first time. 
But what we have just described here, according to Lewis, is the differentiation of the 
ontological difference itself—that is to say, Dasein’s Being-with-beings-in-their-Being.  Thus, as 
Dasein’s individualization tears Dasein into a space in which it bears a closeness to both beings 
and their Being, this individualization explodes the (in)authenticity schema.  This is because 
(in)authenticity, as a schema, comprises “determinations of the understanding . . . eclipsing 
mood at the expense of [such] understanding” (HPE 30).  That is to say, inauthentically, Dasein 
is thrown-into relating to absolutely Other beings, while authentically, Dasein projects-upon 
Being.  As thrown-into projecting-upon its own death, however, Dasein understandingly finds 
itself as an individual relating to others on the basis of these others’ Being other beings.53 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 “To think of Dasein as alternating between two states, authenticity and inauthenticity, is to 
remain one-sided.  Dasein is rather the stretch that opens a rent in the continuum of beings, a 
betweenness that allows it genuinely to be understood as [B]eing-with” (HPE 39). 
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 Thus, Levinasian intersubjectivity (by Lewis’s lights: singular beings relating to each 
other on the basis of their absolute difference from each other) is preserved in the crossing of 
Heidegger’s thought from Being and Time to his later work.  Moreover, Heidegger’s shift in 
thinking spurred-on by a rethinking of Being-with initiated his properly distancing himself from 
Nazism: 
In Heidegger’s acknowledgement that it was precisely his traumatic political engagement 
[with Nazism] and understanding of history that stirred the future windings of his thought 
do we not find his admission that the problem of [B]eing-with was precisely the 
motivation for the crossing of his thought? (HPE 41, first two emphases mine) 
Thus, in re-thinking Being-with on the basis of a more deeply-thought ontological difference, 
Heidegger preserves a place for ‘originary ethics’ as dwelling with beings in their Being—i.e., in 
the ontological differentiation itself. 
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II.5. Staking out our Project 
 In contradistinction to the characteristic critical discussions on the Heidegger-ethics 
nexus that are driven by the three specific syntheses mentioned above—syntheses that, as we 
briefly analyzed, manifestly function as driving forces in HE and HPE—we operate as 
attempting none of these three syntheses: (1) we admit that Being and Time’s explicit aim of 
‘fundamental ontology’ is unsatisfactorily developed; nevertheless, we believe that Being and 
Time still has much to say with regard to human Being that is worth listening to.  Therefore, we 
don’t discredit the insightful analysis within Being and Time on the basis of Heidegger’s own 
(later) critiques of its pretensions to ‘fundamental ontology’; and therefore, we do not assume 
that any ethical discussion based in Heidegger must begin with his more fundamentally-
ontologically-grounded ‘ethos of dwelling.’  (2) Heidegger’s Nazism is of no concern to us in 
our project.54  And (3) our ethical investigations will not begin from the assumption that 
Heidegger’s ‘ethos of dwelling’ must be synthesized with a Levinasian account of ethics as 
ontico-interpersonal;55 rather, the only assumption that we begin from is Heidegger’s conception 
of human Being as ‘care’ in Being and Time. 
 Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to point out one fundamental similarity that our project 
bears towards those others that we have reviewed.  Like Levinas and Lewis, we agree that the 
failure to consider ethical phenomena as constitutive of the human lies in Being and Time’s 
privileging of fallenness as one of Dasein’s ontological structures; we claim that thus analyzing 
the human according to this structure, ontico-ethical manifestations are automatically and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Cf. n. 6 above. 
55 Although we will leave the ontical manifestation of ethics as ‘interpersonally located’ 
explicitly neglected in this project’s analyses, we shall comment in section V on the reasons for 
this neglect and the possibility of phenomenologically taking-up this manifestation at a later 
time. 
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categorically conceived of as ‘inauthentic.’  However, in contradistinction to Levinas and Lewis, 
we do not see this as a reason to chalk up fallenness and the inauthenticity-authenticity schema 
as a general failure in Being and Time; rather, we claim that these foci of Heidegger’s analysis 
simply in the first instance obscure properly ethical phenomena, keep such phenomena from 
manifesting themselves in their true light.  That is to say, Heidegger’s focus on fallenness and 
(in)authenticity automatically forces ontical-ethical practices to conform to this schema, and in 
doing so, fails to give fully faithful sight and voice to these phenomena as possibly constitutive 
of human Being.  Nevertheless, fallenness and (in)authenticity remain invaluable foci of analysis 
that allow innumerable other phenomena to come to the forefront in their unconcealment in 
Heidegger’s analysis.  Therefore, our project’s starting point is not to forever ‘scrap’ fallenness 
and inauthenticity as analytical foci, but rather to place them on the ‘backburner’ so as to be 
considered at a later time. 
Our project will focus on projection and thrownness as the structures that allow the 
existential Being of ontical ethical manifestations to reveal itself.  Therefore, our re-
Interpretation of Heidegger is wholly based on Being and Time’s understanding of human Being, 
and re-Interprets so as to make ethical phenomena fully accessible.  That is to say, our work does 
not reject Being and Time; it re-emphasizes it according to the hermeneutical-phenomenological 
methodology.56 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 What we mean by this is not that our work lacks any substantive difference to Being and Time, 
but rather, that insofar as we consider the basis of human Being to reside in the existential-
ontological care-structures of projection and thrownness as meaningfully grounded in 
temporality’s temporalizing itself via the unitary ecstases of future, present, and having-been, our 
work merely re-Interprets or re-emphasizes the nature of this meaningful grounding.  However, 
we do part substantive company with Heidegger’s work insofar as we are not interested in 
undertaking a fundamental ontology, but rather an anthropological ontology—something that 
would be repugnant to Heidegger himself. 
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III. Being as Narrative 
III.1. Thrown Projection into the Ecstasis of Future 
To begin with, let us consider the most average and everyday ontical situation: I am 
going to the post office to deliver a package to a friend of mine who lives out of town.  Now, say 
that you were to stop me on the way, and ask me, “who are you?”  My answer to this question 
would undoubtedly smack of confusion—I would be caught off-guard and struggle to provide 
you with any answer at all.  Ultimately, however, I might say something such as, “I am a 
philosophy student,” or “I am a son,” or “I am a boyfriend,” or “brother,” “friend,” etc.  But if 
you were to have asked me in the first instance, “what are you doing?” rather than “who are 
you?” I should have no such trouble answering; I would answer straight-away: “I am going to the 
post office to deliver a package to my friend.  He lives out of town.” 
 The upshot of this hypothetical analysis of an average and everyday ontical situation is 
that, proximally and for the most part, I am aware of myself as that which I am doing. 
 But let us draw our hypothetical analysis out even further: imagine the following 
exchange taking place between you and I: you ask, “why are you sending your friend this 
package?”  Once again, at first I might be put off by your unexpected probing.  However, I reply 
with: “it is his birthday.  I thought I would do something nice for him.”  But your interrogation is 
not over still; you ask “why, if it is his birthday, did you think to send him this package?”  
Finally at this moment, I find myself truly perplexed.  I answer, “because that is what a good 
friend should do,” and quickly walk off in a huff, away from you and your incessant questions. 
 The above situation is illustrated to provide an example of the ontical occurrence of ‘a 
probing that probes too far,’ and the resultant perplexity on the part of the probee.  Once again, 
as we have already sketched, the above encounter reveals that proximally and for the most part, 
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my understanding of myself lies in my immediate concern, which is constituted by a ‘for-the-
sake-of-which’ and an ‘in-order-to.’  In this average and everyday projection, I understand 
myself as that which I am in the process of doing.  However, these immediate, instantaneous 
projections take place in light of a pre-instantaneous and non-immediate understanding.  In other 
words, beyond proximal, everyday understanding of myself, there lies more primordial 
understanding as contextualizing and constituting the proximal.  But this primordial 
understanding of myself is darkened from my sight; I cannot retrieve it; I walk off in a huff when 
you probe me too deeply about it. 
 In order to Interpret this primordiality in my understanding of myself, let us consider the 
phenomena of ‘success’ and ‘failure,’ and see if they might give us some phenomenal access to 
this meaning.  Recall: the world (in its worldhood) manifests itself in references and assignments 
constituting a totality of equipment as an ‘in-order-to’ on the basis of some ‘for-the-sake-of-
which.’  However, this ‘for-the-sake-of-which,’ in turn, is itself part of an ‘in-order-to’ towards a 
more fundamental ‘for-the-sake-of-which.’  And even this further ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ is a 
piece of equipment towards some even further end. 
 Now consider the following situation: I am a student who is preparing for a 
comprehensive exam.  Soon, I take the exam.  And by the next class, the results are in: I have 
passed—and with flying colors!  In response, I find myself as relieved: the load from my 
worrying is released.  Moreover, I find myself as filled with joy: my parents will surely be happy 
with the result and proud of their son; my grade is boosted and thus my transcripts will look 
better, and so I have a better shot of getting into Harvard Law School and becoming a rich 
lawyer.  Of course, finding myself in joy, I do not necessarily have the conscious experience of 
these thoughts as present-at-hand ‘in’ my mind; rather, what is clear is that the ‘relief’ and ‘joy’ 
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reveal a network of projections that I am projecting-along.  In other words, this event’s outcome 
matters to me because it is an ‘in-order-to’ towards a ‘for-the-sake-of-which,’ which in turn is an 
‘in-order-to’ towards a more fundamental ‘for-the-sake-of-which,’ etc.  There is a continuum of 
projections, with each further-along projection reaching ever closer to fundamentality as it stands 
in connection with the others. 
 To illustrate further, consider the previous case, but with the crucial exception that rather 
than passing, I have failed the exam.  Thus, in this instance, I am filled with dread: my parents 
will be disappointed; my grades and therefore transcripts will suffer as a result, and therefore I 
will not be getting into Harvard Law School, and I will not be getting that top-flight job with the 
high salary that I dreamed of.  Once again, whether or not these thoughts are present-at-hand in 
my mind or not, my state-of-mind reflects my corresponding projections, but not as standalone 
projections; rather, my projections are revealed as projection-continuums.  Thus, my thrownness 
is accompanied by a projection, and my state-of-mind by understanding: I understand myself as 
either moving farther along or moving further away from my fundamental projections on my 
projection-continuum.  In success, I am understandingly disclosed as moving-forward-towards; 
in failure, I am understandingly disclosed as moving-backwards-from. 
For the sake of economy, we might render as a placeholder for any given ‘for-the-sake-
of-which’ the variable (x).  Thus, in success, I am moving-forward-towards-x; in failure, I am 
moving-backwards-from-x; what matters is that in both cases, my movement is as a relation to x.  
In my states-of-mind, I find myself (in the above cases) as ‘doing well’ or ‘doing poorly’ on the 
basis of my thrownness into having to project-along a continuum.  I find myself as ‘doing-well’ 
or ‘doing-poorly’ as thrown into understanding myself in virtue of x. 
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 How might we more generally indicate the phenomenon of the ‘projection-continuum?’  
We might state that in this projection-continuum, I understandingly project myself as ‘going-
towards-x.’  In this instance, x represents any given projection within a network of projections or 
along a projection-continuum—that is to say, x represents any particular projection that is as 
within a series of interrelated and increasingly fundamental projections.  Thus, in any given 
moment, I am as a going-towards-x.  Proximally and for the most part, I understand myself as my 
nearest-by and most immediate projections; primordially, however, I understand myself as my 
most fundamental (and thereby ‘farthest ahead’) projections.  Thus, at this stage we might 
appropriately introduce the phenomenon of a ‘fundamental’ projection: a fundamental projection 
is the most fundamental ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ of a projection-continuum; it is a ‘for-the-sake-
of-which’ that is fundamental in such a way as to automatically generatively constitute the 
continuum itself.  In other words, in fundamentally projecting, I always automatically am 
projecting along more proximal, non-fundamental possibilities.  Thus, consider the following 
example: if I am as going-towards-becoming-a-professional-philosopher, then this ‘becoming a 
professional philosopher,’ as being done for no other, more fundamental ‘for-the-sake-of-which,’ 
but as being the ultimate for-the-sake-of-which that I am projecting-upon, thus is my 
fundamental projection; and as being my fundamental projection, it automatically gives birth to a 
whole projection-continuum.  This projection-continuum might, for instance, include such for-
the-sake-of-which(s) as ‘deeply immersing myself in excellent philosophy courses,’ ‘getting 
good grades,’ ‘going to a top-flight philosophy Ph.D. program,’ etc.  These automatically 
included projections along a projection-continuum we call contingent projections, as they are 
contingent upon a fundamental projection.  Henceforth, as a way of differentiating between 
fundamental projections and contingent projections, we will designate the former as xfundamental, 
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henceforth simply xf; to indicate our contingent projections, we will retain our previous x in its 
simplicity.  Therefore, formally speaking, a projection-continuum is a going-towards-xf that 
involves many goings-towards-x.  Therefore, I primordially understand myself in my xf(s), 
although I proximally understand myself in my x(s). 
 However, before we move along further, we ought to clarify one glaring ambiguity: the 
question might be raised, ‘can one project-along more than one continuum at one time?’  The 
answer to this question is of course ‘yes’; at any given moment, I am going-towards-various-
xf(s), and thus, my concernful projections will be on many different continuums, and will not be 
quite so uni-linearly-understandable.  There is not one ‘ultimate’ fundamental projection that 
‘rules them all’; and thus, my Being is spread out over various continuums, and my 
understanding of myself is thus also as such scattered. 
 Thus, we have discussed the human’s phenomenal thrown projection into the ecstasis of 
future, disclosed via the modes of state-of-mind and understanding; nevertheless, there is still the 
issue of investigating whether, and if so how, the human projects into her past.  We also have the 
task of analyzing the human’s phenomenal thrownness into her ecstases of future and past.  And 
lest we forget, the pesky phenomenon of ‘the ecstatical present’ must be treated in some fashion 
or other. 
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III.2. Projection into the Ecstasis of Past 
 Above, we have stressed that I am, in every instance, as a going-towards-xf consisting in 
many contingent and interrelated goings-towards-x as in-order-to(s) oriented towards my xf, my 
fundamental and ultimate for-the-sake-of-which. 
 It is important to note, however, that my Being is not simply a movement forwards; it is 
concomitantly a movement circling backwards.  This ‘having-been’ of Heidegger’s we will 
designate according to the (admittedly connotatively encumbered) more traditional term as 
‘Past.’57  What is the Being of the Past, as a constituent of my Being? 
 An analysis of the Past might seem simple: some might deem it as nothing other than the 
present-at-hand (reaching backwards as far as my birth, and as close-by as a moment ago) set of 
happenings that are behind me in time, and which lead up to my present.  But this ordinary 
Interpretation of the Past fundamentally obscures its true Being as constituting my Being. 
 We state that the Being of the Past is as ‘that-which-brought-me-to-where-I-am-now-as-
going-towards-xf.’  How might we phenomenologically justify our Interpretation? 
 Consider the following ontical scenario: I have had a ‘long day at the office,’ and I come 
home, exhausted.  After I get in the door, I take my coat off, drop my things down, and walk into 
my living room.  My wife is there, and she loves me; therefore, she is interested in my life, and 
asks me: “how was your day?”  I respond, “fine,” and grunt, feeling the weight of my 
exhaustion.  She pursues: “what happened today at the office?  What were you up to?”  Thus, 
what follows in this exchange is a sequential rehashing of events, explained in terms of each 
other (e.g., ‘I worked until lunchtime, then got a bite to eat with Bill and Susan, then we all went 
back to the office’) and running-up until this very moment of speech.  Thus, my proximal Past 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 We capitalize ‘Past’—thus differentiating it from the ordinary usage—in order to indicate the 
systematic way in which the Past fundamentally is as constituting human Being. 
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has a Being that corresponds to the phrase, ‘that-which-brought-me-here-now.’  That is to say, 
my proximal Past is automatically understood and interpreted as ‘those-happenings-that-
brought-me-here.’  Importantly, this is not to say that, primarily, my Past is as a present-at-hand 
set of happenings that are temporally behind me; rather, my Past simply is a ‘bringing-me-here’; 
without a ‘bringing-me-here,’ the phenomenal Past ceases to be entirely. 
 But thus far, we have only analyzed the proximal Past; what can we say about the distant 
or whole Past?  Indeed, the whole Past has a vastness to it that seems overwhelming.  Is there 
some way that this all-consuming vastness of the whole Past can be deeply related to a ‘here and 
now’ as my proximal Past has been shown to be?  Indeed, we can say that our whole Past is 
related to our ‘here and now,’ but in a much more fundamental and primordial manner than our 
proximal Past.  Indeed, we can say that, primordially, the Being of the Past is as a ‘that-which-
brought-me-here-now-as-going-towards-xf.’  That is to say, my Past is always understood as 
along my projection-continuums. 
 For example, consider the following case: say that my xf, in this case, is ‘becoming a 
lion-tamer.’  Therefore, my Being is, on this one projection-continuum, a ‘going-towards-
becoming-a-lion-tamer.’  Thus, what relationship does my Past stand in to this continuum?  My 
Past is, namely, my ‘how-I-got-to-be-going-towards-becoming-a-lion-tamer,’ or rather, ‘that-
which-brought-me-here-now-as-going-towards-becoming-a-lion-tamer.’  Therefore, say that you 
were to direct me, “tell me about your past”; I respond as understanding my Past as the 
following: I tell you that I was ‘born to become a lion tamer,’ or rather, that I was born ‘not 
understanding my destiny as becoming a lion-tamer’; in progressively telling you my ‘story,’ I 
cite my first trip to the zoo wherein I saw the majesty of lions for the first time, and knew that I 
had to be nearer to them than beyond this caged pen; I cite my childhood enthrallment with The 
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Lion King, my first trip to the circus, wherein I saw a ‘lion tamer’ in action for the first time; I 
cite my first job sweeping up the feces from the circus animals with Barnum & Bailey, my 
eventually joining the troupe and leaving home, etc.  When you ask me about my whole Past, I 
answer with a sequential description of interconnected events, all understood in relation to my 
fundamental projection or projection-continuum, understood as bringing-me-here-now-as-going-
towards-xf. 
 But now consider that I no longer want to become a lion tamer; that is to say, consider 
that my xf has changed from ‘becoming a lion tamer’ to ‘developing a lifelong romance with 
Maxine the trapeze artist.’  Suddenly, my whole understanding of my Past is uprooted: now 
when you ask me to explain my Past, I might explain the history of my romantic entanglements 
and heartbreaks as leading to my romantic engagement with Maxine.  I would now answer by 
saying that ‘I was born a romantic,’ describing my pre-school girlfriend Kirstie as my first 
romantic self-expression, following that up with an account of my first date with Natalie at 13, 
when I got my first kiss; I might explain the significance of my first viewing of When Harry Met 
Sally as speaking such deep truths to me about myself and romantic love that could not be 
denied; finally, I would describe my first encounter with Maxine: seeing her gracefully do twirls 
and backflips on the trapeze, the way time slowed down to reflect her balletic movements; ‘this,’ 
I would tell you, ‘was the first time that I knew, truly, that I was in love, and that this was the 
woman I would marry.’  When you respond by inquiring into my lost dream of becoming a lion-
tamer (‘what ever happened to that?’), I will simply brush this former xf off as a ‘flight of 
youthful fancy’ or a ‘distraction from my true dream of marrying Maxine.’ 
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 Thus, the primordial Being of the Past, as it is a constituent of my primordial 
understanding of my Being, is as a ‘that-which-brought-me-here-now-as-going-towards-xf.’  But 
once more before moving on, we must pause to clear the air of any confusions that might arise. 
 Some might say that our descriptions have portrayed my projected Past as ‘too simplistic’ 
or ‘too linear,’ objecting that, if someone were to ask me about my Past, I would not have such a 
ready-to-hand line of interconnected events to narrate.  However, this over-simplification we 
admit; it was merely for the sake of starkly illustrating our point.  But what is pertinent from our 
analysis should be the following: one’s understanding of the Past is always constituted in 
relation to one’s going-towards-xf; one’s Past is always already understood as a bringing-
oneself-to-one’s-presently-going-towards.  Therefore, it is likely that any ambiguities in 
answering the request to ‘explain one’s Past’ arise not on the basis of one’s understanding being 
something other than this, but rather on the basis of one’s xf(s) being various and disparate; thus, 
as one’s projected Being is scattered across manifold projection-continuums, so one’s 
understanding of one’s Past is similarly scattered. 
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III.3. Thrownness into the Ecstasis of Past 
We now will phenomenally attest to the human’s thrownness into her Past.  What 
Heidegger briefly mentions as “tenaciousness” (SZ 264) will provide a clue for our analysis to 
come.  Nevertheless, we will Interpret this phenomenon differently, and thus, we will accord it a 
new term, so as not to confuse it with Heidegger’s Interpretation: namely, we will discuss the 
phenomenon as entrenchedness. 
 What is the Being of one’s thrown Past as necessarily related to one’s going-towards-xf?   
The phenomenon of entrenchedness provides a clue.  Entrenchedness is a mode of Being-
towards one’s Past.  When Heidegger mentions this same phenomenon with the term 
‘tenaciousness,’ he discusses it as a mode of fallenness, in the sense that one’s authentic 
potentiality-for-Being is concealed as one ‘grips onto’ one’s Past. 
 When we discuss this phenomenon, however, as ‘entrenchedness,’ we will treat it not as a 
mode of fallenness or inauthenticity, but rather, as a basic mode of Being-towards one’s Past, 
one that is entirely due to the human’s constitutive thrownness into her Past (i.e., my having-to-
have-a-Past).  Thus Heidegger’s analysis is not so much denied as it is re-Interpreted, in line with 
the aims of our project as uncovering the Being of ethics. 
 When we say that the human is entrenched in her Past, we state something like the 
following: the human is highly invested in her projected Past (i.e., in her particular that-which-
brought-me-here-as-going-towards-xf)—whose basis, as discussed, lies in her projection-upon-
possibility into the ecstatical future (i.e., her particular xf)—and thus, is resistant to give up her 
current xf and project-upon some new possibility, giving her a new xf, and thus, a new that-
which-brought-me-here.  The state-of-mind by which the mode of Being underlying the 
phenomenon of entrenchedness as our Being-thrown-into-having-a-Past is disclosed to us is 
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reluctance.  This term implies two senses, both of which obtain in it as a state-of-mind: (1) a 
sense of being reluctant towards something (i.e., reluctant to do something), and (2) a sense of 
being reluctant from something (i.e., on the basis of something).  We are reluctant towards some 
new possibility-of-Being, or rather, towards some new fundamental possibility of Being 
implying a wholly new projection-continuum; we are reluctant from (on the basis of) our Being 
entrenched in our Past—that is to say, our Being-invested-in-our-current-that-which-brought-me-
here-as-going-towards-xf.  In reluctance, the Being of the Past as entrenchedness is disclosed. 
 To illustrate the above analysis, consider an example: Esther and I have been dating for 
the last nine years, and during most of that time, she was the love of my life—the woman I 
thought I surely would marry.  But recently, I met Jennifer, and I am enthralled by her.  In fact, I 
am so enthralled by her that I am seriously considering the possibility of being with her.  But in 
order to be with Jennifer, I would have to break up with Esther.  I find myself resistant to the 
idea of this—I think about all the moments Esther and I have enjoyed together, I consider the 
years that we have been together, the dreams long-held of our future marriage.  Thus, I am 
entrenched in my Past in such a way that I am held to my projection upon the possibility of 
marrying her. 
 Of course, we must keep in mind that this phenomenal ‘entrenchedness’ does not in 
principle refer to anything like some present-at-hand psychological state; rather, it refers to one 
of the human’s ontological structures—one of the true constituents of her Being (which, as we 
have discussed, is as a going-towards-x).  Namely, the constituent of her Being that 
entrenchedness signifies is ‘that-which-holds-me-to-my-current-xf.’  This is a mode of 
thrownness in that, although it has to do with projection (in the sense of keeping me projecting, 
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holding me to my current xf), our focus in discussing it specifically is that it is an influence on 
one’s projection on the basis of one’s being thrown-into one’s Past. 
 However, our discussion of our Being as constituted by thrownness into our Past is not 
yet complete: the phenomenon of entrenchedness, and our revealing its mode of Being as a ‘that-
which-holds-me-to-my-current-xf,’58 requires further clarification. 
 As noted above, the phenomenon of entrenchedness reveals to us both a Being-
entrenched in the sense of holding-onto one’s Past, and a Being-entrenched in the sense of 
holding-off-from a change in one’s xf  (i.e., one’s projection-upon some fundamental possibility 
that generatively constitutes a whole continuum of dependent projections, acting as a sort of 
‘roadmap’ to attaining one’s fundamental possibility-of-Being).  The latter of these senses of 
Being-entrenched has been demonstrated sufficiently: namely, that one holds-off-from a change 
in one’s xf on the basis of one’s holding-onto one’s current Past.  However, the former of these 
senses (holding-onto one’s current Past) has been taken merely as a given, and has not yet 
received its due treatment.  Below, we undertake this treatment. 
What does it mean to say that one is entrenched in one’s Past in the sense of holding-onto 
it?  On what basis does one hold-onto one’s Past?  To begin answering these questions, let us call 
to mind a common saying: ‘I am my Past,’ or ‘you are your Past,’ or ‘we are our Pasts.’  Now, 
connect this to some other common sayings: ‘we are what we do,’ or ‘we are our deeds,’ or ‘in 
the end, we all are judged on what we have done,’ or ‘actions speak louder than words.’  Of 
course, these common sayings are murky and confused in what they actually signify.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 For the sake of reminding the reader: recall that xf does not simply refer to a fundamental 
projection—as in, some free-floating fundamental possibility-of-Being.  But recall that the basis 
for calling this projection a ‘fundamental’ one is that it is fundamental to a projection-
continuum.  That is to say, it is the ultimate and culminating possibility-of-Being embedded 
within a series of dependent possibilities-of-Being. 
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Nevertheless, these bits of passed-down ‘wisdom,’ when properly clarified, offer us an entryway 
into the phenomenon of ‘holding-onto’ our Past. 
What these bits of ‘wisdom’ all point towards is the importance of an attestation to my 
existence.  Since my Being is phenomenally characterized by its being an issue for me, it 
therefore is constituent of my Being that I look to resolve this issue.  Now, recall what this issue 
precisely is: namely, a sort of unfinishedness or indefiniteness in my Being—in other words, I 
am constituted as such that I must make something of myself, and I must make something of 
myself newly again at every moment.  Any ‘making-something-of-myself’ will always be 
concretized as existentiell.  Thus, existentially, I am ontologically constituted so as to resolve 
myself existentielly.  Thus, in Being-existentially-thrown-into ‘resolving’ this issue, I look for 
something existentiell, complete, and definite.  Where do I look for this?  Not to my future—for 
my future is the most seemingly mutable part of my Being: I could always project on some new 
possibility, I could always do something different—in fact, I haven’t even yet done anything that 
I can conceive of with any definiteness.  Certainly not to my present: for the present is the most 
ephemeral phenomenon in my existence—where can I even find the present?  It is not now, for 
this ‘now’ that I speak of has already happened, and has slipped into my Past; and it is not ‘soon 
to come,’ for this lies in my future.  Thus, I cannot speak with any certainty or existentiell 
definiteness about my present. 
But should I then look to my Past? Phenomenally, I find that the Past is given to me as 
‘that-which-brought-me-here’; but another way of phrasing this is as ‘that-which-I-have-done-to-
get-here’ (indeed consciously, it is conceived of as this latter interpretation; however, concretely 
and proximally, it tends towards the former interpretation).  And since, phenomenally, one finds 
one’s Past—or rather, the Being of the Past in general—is ‘behind me,’ my Past is therefore my 
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existentiell Being that is behind me, and thus, as being behind me, is ontically ‘immutable.’  
Thus, while the other temporal constituents of my Being are disclosed to me as ‘ephemeral,’ or 
‘mutable,’ or ‘indefinite,’ I do not proximally look existentielly towards them as a means to 
resolving the issue of my existential-ontological Being.  Rather, I look towards my ontical-
existentiell Past, which as being behind me is immutable, solid, and inflexible: that is to say, it is 
disclosed to me as a certainty, a rigid definiteness.  Thus, my Past is the ‘well that I draw from’ 
in order to resolve the issue of my Being; or rather, its Being is as an attestation to my existentiell 
Being.  But this entails one further implication: my ontical-existentiell Past is my ‘objective’ 
Being; it is disclosed not only existentially, but also existentielly as outside of my control, as that 
which I am thrown-into.  I ‘carry’ my Past existentially as existentielly: my thrownness is utterly 
disclosed as having-to-have-a-Past; since my Past is behind me, it is something that is disclosed 
to me in my everyday experience as outside of my ‘control.’59  There is an element of truth to 
this: the ‘things that have been done’ certainly cannot be undone; I can never ‘move backwards’ 
in time.   However, this truth is distorted when I interpret the phenomenon of my Past in my 
existentiell everydayness: because I cannot be as going-backwards in time, I interpret the Past as 
wholly immutable.  What is thus covered over in my everydayness is the complete mutability of 
the meaning and significance of my Past.  And since, as we discussed above, the Past is 
primordially my ‘that-which-brought-me-here,’ it fundamentally can be changed, insofar as my 
‘that-which-brought-me-here’ changes with every relinquished and newly added xf. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Sartre develops an interestingly different position on the objectification of the existing human 
from herself.  While we state that the existing human is always existentielly ‘outside of her own 
control’ based on her purely own existential-ecstatico-temporal-ontological structures, Sartre 
states that the existing human’s ‘self’ is objectified only in the encounter with the Other’s 
freedom: “the Other does not constitute me as an object for myself but for him” (BN 275).  Thus, 
while we assert that our ‘objectified’ human Being is disclosed as unchangeably rigid, we do not 
assert, as does Sartre, that ‘that-which-is-objectified’ is a “stranger [to me]” whom “I accept 
responsibility for” (BN 274). 
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Nevertheless, in entrenchedness, the true Being of my Past as a mutable ‘that-which-
brought-me-here’ is disclosed, for in my Being-entrenched, I am pre-theoretically aware of the 
fact that a new xf entails a new Past.  And as we saw above, my pre-theoretical awareness of this 
is the basis of my holding-off-from a new xf.  But this basis, above conceived of as a ‘holding-
onto,’ need not imply the illusory understanding of Past as immutable; rather, in my holding-
onto-my-Past, it is implied that I can lose my Past, and thus, my Past as mutable is concretely 
disclosed to me.  Previously, this ‘holding-onto’ was in need of clarification, but the immediately 
foregoing stands-in as this clarification: this ‘holding-onto’ has its basis in the Being of my Past 
as that-which-attests-to-my-existentiell-Being.  Thus, I hold onto my current Past because in 
relinquishing it, I also relinquish this attestation to my existentiell Being, and thus, the key to the 
resolution of my existential Being.  The state-of-mind associated with this prospective 
relinquishing is lostness. 
 Finding myself in such lostness, my thrownness into my Past as an attestation-to-my-
existentiell-Being is disclosed to me in the mode of my not-being-able-to-attest-to-myself.  In 
this state-of-mind, I find myself thrown into my Past as needing-to-attest-to-my-existentiell-
Being, yet I am unable to find any reliable sense of myself that would allow me such an 
attestation.  In such a state of mind, my Being is indicated by the following phrases: ‘I don’t 
know who I am anymore,’ ‘I feel so lost,’ ‘what should I do?’ 
 As an illustration of lostness and the Being of the Past that it discloses as that-which-
attests-to-my-existentiell-Being, consider the following example: I am sitting at my desk in my 
cubicle in the office building of the Fortune 500 company that employs me, reviewing various 
reports.  As usual, these reports are dry, boring, and make me feel quite dead inside.  Suddenly, I 
put them down, and stare off into the dull, gray wall of my cubicle: it occurs to me that I could 
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do something else.  What else should I do?  My thoughts run rampant, but don’t alight on 
anything in particular; nevertheless, what is at once starkly clear is that I ought to quit this job, 
and find something else to do.  Soon, however, my thoughts drift from this open future towards 
my Past: but I have worked at this company for fifteen years, but I have run faxes, constructed 
proposals, sold projects, made alliances, defended the quality of my work, achieved several 
promotions, and now make a fat salary; I have come to this office five mornings per week for the 
last fifteen years; I have poured my blood, sweat, and tears into this job—how could I give it 
up?60  I once again consider this future possibility of quitting my job, which now seems dimmer 
and dimmer: what would I do?  Who would I meet?  What kind of person would I become?  I 
find myself as disconnected from my Past, and I feel lost.  I decide, for the moment, not to 
consider such possibilities anymore; I pick up the reports again, I feel comfortable, safe, and 
rooted in this task.  I am entrenched in my Past; I can attest to my existentiell Being; I hold onto 
my projection into the future along the same xf (that of being an executive at a Fortune 500 
company) that currently constitutes my existentiell Being. 
 Thus, I have attempted to demonstrate the Being of the Past as regards thrownness.  To 
recapitulate: my Being as thrown into my Past can be characterized as entrenchedness: this 
entrenchedness comprises my Being-entrenched in my Past (holding-onto my Past), which is 
based on the Being of the Past as that-which-attests-to-my-existentiell-Being, which is disclosed 
by the state-of-mind of lostness, wherein I find myself as not being able to attest to myself; this 
Being-entrenched in my Past also keeps me from sighting and projecting upon possibilities other 
than my current xf (i.e., holding-off-from-new-possibilities).  I am thrown into my Past as a that-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 The reader should note, as is always the case, that it is not important that these thoughts are 
explicitly spoken or present-at-hand in my mind; rather, it matters that my Being at this moment 
is oriented around this looking-to-attest-to-myself. 
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which-attests-to-my-existentiell-Being; in needing to resolve my existential Being, I am thrown 
into my Past as an-attestation-that-holds-me-to-my-current[existentiell]-xf. 
Remember that one must keep in mind the above discussion in section III.2 of my 
projection into my Past: namely, I project into my Past as the that-which-brought-me-here in my 
going-towards-xf.  This is disclosed to me via my understanding myself as going-towards-xf and 
then interpreting my Past as that-which-brought-me-here-now-as-going-towards-xf. 
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III.4. Thrown Projection into the Ecstasis of Present 
In everyday parlance, we speak of things that we term ‘orientations.’  What is an 
‘orientation?’  In this everyday parlance, an orientation might be considered some present-at-
hand ‘perspective’ or ‘way of perceiving’ or ‘meaning and value-laden approach’ to the world.  
Indeed, statements such as ‘I have [this or that] perspective’ imply a predication-relationship: I 
primarily ‘am’ and secondarily am predicated-upon by the property of ‘orientation.’  But can the 
phenomenon of ‘orientation’ be Interpreted as primordially existential-ontological, as a 
constituent of my Being as constituted by a thrown projection into the ecstatical future and Past? 
To be oriented is not simply to be imbued, or to have inhering in oneself, an ‘approach’ 
to ‘life’ or ‘reality.’  If the concept of ‘orientation’ keeps falling back on this idea of an 
‘approach’ is there some basis for its falling back on this?  Indeed there is.  Consider: one might 
rephrase ‘I have an orientation’ as ‘I am oriented,’ or rather, ‘my Being is constituted by my 
Being-oriented.’  Therefore, we might ask: what is the meaning of Being-oriented?  In answering 
this question, let us dissect the operant terms: ‘Being’ and ‘oriented,’ in reverse order. 
‘Orient’ with all its subsequent suffixes indicates something like ‘to arrange,’ ‘to locate,’ 
‘to determine a direction.’  Thus, how can we understand one’s Being-oriented as one’s Being 
‘arranged,’ ‘located,’ or ‘directionalized?’  To be arranged is to be organized, to be located is to 
be found somewhere, to be directionalized is to be facing somewhere.  A unitary indication of 
‘orientation’ might be phrased, then, as the following: ‘found as in an organized context facing 
towards something.’ 
What about Being-oriented?  This piece is simple and redundant: to be humanly is to be 
existingly—that is to say, to be in such a way that one’s Being is an issue.  In this regard we are 
following Heidegger in our analysis, but re-Interpreting Heidegger’s existential analytic in 
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regards to an existentially-ontologically constitutive projection-continuum: to exist as a going-
towards-xf-brought-here-now-by-an-attestation-to-my-existentiell-Being.  Thus, my Being is 
constituted by a thrown projection-continuum consisting in a ‘where I have been’ and a ‘where I 
am going,’ with the two being basically connected. 
Thus, my Being-oriented is my finding-myself-along-a-projection-continuum.  The 
‘organizing context’ of my Being is this continuum: my world and my Being are in relation to 
this continuum; they are organized around my xf.  The ‘foundness’ or ‘locatability’ of my Being 
consists in my ‘placement’ along my projection-continuum: as a becoming xf, what has brought 
me here?  How far, or what more, must I ‘go’ or ‘undergo’ until I become xf?  Finally, my facing 
somewhere is my facing forwards to my future as towards-xf and my facing backwards towards 
my Past as the ‘that-which-brought-me-here[-as-going-towards-xf].’ 
Therefore, we can appropriately designate one’s Being-oriented as one’s thrown 
projection into one’s ecstatical present.  For what is the present other than my instantaneous 
‘being-brought-here-now-by-an-attestation-to-my-existentiell-Being-as-going-towards-xf?’  In 
other words, my present is as a Being-arranged[-within-an-existentiell-projection-continuum], 
Being-locatable[-as-‘where-I-am’-in-terms-of-distantiality-between-my-Past-and-future], and 
Being-directionalized[-as-brought-here-as-going-towards-xf].  Thus, my Being-oriented is the 
existential-ontological expression for my Being-thrown into projecting as ecstatically present. 
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III.5. Conclusion 
 Ultimately, I am an entity with a unitary Being.  While heretofore, we have discussed the 
constituents of my Being in separate sections, we must always keep in mind that all along we 
have had the entirety of my Being in mind.  Now to recapitulate and reformulate: my Being-
towards my Past is indicated by the following: ‘that-which-brought-me-here-now-that-attests-to-
my-existentiell-Being.’  My Being-towards the future is indicated by the following: ‘going-
towards-xf.’  My Being-towards the present is indicated as ‘Being-oriented.’  Our ‘xf’ is a 
signifier used to stand-in for the concept of a fundamental projection.  What is a fundamental 
projection? Namely, some ultimate or culminating possible state-of-Being embedded in an 
implicit projection-continuum that comprises a series of dependent possibilities-of-Being that 
lead me to this fundamental possibility-of-Being. 
Thus, what is a unitary statement of my Being?  Namely, I am as a ‘Being-oriented-as-
a-going-towards-a-fundamental-projection-along-a-projection-continuum-brought-here-
now-by-a-that-which-brought-me-here-that-attests-to-my-existentiell-Being.’  Of course, 
this is a highly cumbersome—both uneconomical in terms of space, and unintuitive in terms of 
indicative ability—statement of my Being.  Therefore, to stand in as an indicative signifier for 
the unitary conception of my Being as stated and demonstrated above in (III.1-4), I will 
henceforth employ the term ‘Narrative.’  I am existentielly as narrative.  My existential 
Being, the unity of the structures constituting my existentiell narratives, is Narrative-Being. 
I have chosen to designate the unitary phenomenon of human Being as Narrative because 
this term unitarily indicates human Being: consider that ontically, we speak of ‘narratives’ as 
‘narrative lines,’ or rather, plotlines.  A plotline consists in a series of depicted events connected 
by virtue of their leading to some culminating state of affairs (the end of the narrative line).  At 
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any given moment within a narrative line, the depicted events are portrayed and understood as 
leading-to-some-culminating-state-of-affairs, or rather, as bounding towards the ending of the 
narrative line. 
This indicates human Being: at any given moment within its endpoints, a ‘narrative’ is as 
a going-towards-the-endpoint.  The present is understood as an oriented-going-towards-the-
endpoint; the future (that-which-is-to-come-narratively) is understood as a going-towards-the-
endpoint.  It is only a narrative’s endpoint (i.e., the final state-of-Being towards which the 
depicted events are bounding) and thus its future that makes its unitary structure intelligible as a 
line: for it is only a ‘line’ insofar as it is the unitary ‘that-which-brings-the-narrative-to-the-
endpoint.’  And as such a ‘bringing-towards-the-endpoint,’ we can therefore say that what we 
ontically speak of as a ‘narrative line’ is analogous to the ontological structure of the projection-
continuum. 
While the immediately foregoing discussion has explicitly focused on how ‘narrative’ 
indicates human Being as regards the ecstatical future, it has done much of the analysis for us as 
regards indicating human Being temporalizing itself via the ecstatical Past: a ‘narrative line,’ as 
being a projection-continuum of sorts, is the that-which-brings-the-narrative-to-its-endpoint.  
Thus, in its backwards-facing Being—i.e., at any given point within the narrative, whatever lies 
behind as ‘having already been told/read/seen/narrated/etc.’—the narrative line is as a that-
which-brought-the-narrative-here-now-as-going-towards-the-endpoint.  Thus, ‘narrative’ 
indicates the disclosive Past of the human.  Additionally, while a narrative’s future—although 
the driving and organizing force of the narrative in general in the manner described above—is 
always an indefinite and undecided thing (i.e., it is never clear exactly how or where the narrative 
line will go, even though it is inevitable that it goes somehow and somewhere), a narrative’s Past 
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is disclosed as definite, decided, and constitutive for the Being-here-and-now of any given 
moment within the narrative (constitutive in virtue of its Being that-which-brought-it-here-now).  
Therefore, the narrative’s Past also is (its Being is) as attesting-to-the-narrative (the ‘narrative’ 
qua its particular narrative line) at any given moment.  Thus, the unitary statement for the Being 
of ‘narrative’ is as follows: oriented-going-towards-the-endpoint-along-a-projection-continuum-
brought-here-now-by-a-Past-that-attests-to-the-narrative (qua its particular narrative line). 
Therefore, the term ‘narrative’ signifies this Being that we have formerly Interpreted as 
essentially human Being.  Moreover, this term’s connotations usefully indicate the essential 
structure of human Being as interpretive or hermeneutical.  Just as the primary relationship that 
receivers of narratives hold to the narrative is interpreting the narrative [text, scenes, depictions, 
etc.], the primary relationship that human Being has to itself is also interpretive: in projecting-
upon an xf, our Being is already-automatically organized and interpreted around this projection 
in the form of a continuum of contingent projections that, in projecting-upon xf, one necessarily 
also projects-upon. 
However, this also leads us to one disclaimer that we must state with regard to the 
analogy between human Being and what we ontically call ‘narratives: it is important to 
distinguish that, in the latter, the meaning-givers are neatly (if indefinitely) divided amongst 
author, character, and audience; meanwhile, in the former, the individual human (each Dasein)—
while in some sense only a ‘character,’ with one’s cultural heritage functioning as one’s ‘author’ 
and one’s society functioning as one’s ‘audience’—is fundamentally at once author, character, 
and audience: we ‘write,’ ‘act out,’ and ‘analyze’ our Being from our individualized standpoint.  
To be human is to be at once author, protagonist, and critic.  But this matter does not concern this 
	  	   86 
project; rather, our project focuses on the fact that my existential-ontological Being is 
Narrative-Being, my existentiell projection-continuums are my narratives or narrative lines. 
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IV. Narrative and Ethics 
IV.1. Staking out our Grounds 
 Having Interpreted human Being existentially-ontologically—that is to say, 
primordially—we have now laid the foundations for a thorough and systematic discussion of the 
existential-ontological Being of ethics. 
 But then, the first question that must be asked is the following: is ethics, truly and 
properly considered, an existentiale?  In other words, is ethics something essential to our 
existential Being?  Would it perhaps be more proper to discuss ethics as a cognitive 
phenomenon?  Or perhaps as an objectively (i.e., mind-independently) encounterable set of 
entities? 
 There are several related responses to this initial roadblock that should quiet all such 
objections: (A) ethics is phenomenally encountered by the human—whether or not it is essential 
to her Being is an open question, until demonstrated thoroughly one way or the other; however, it 
should be noted that all phenomena, as being encountered by us, must have some connection to 
our fundamental Being, even if that connection is trivial.  Thus, our task of Interpreting ethics in 
relation to our existential-ontological Being is still appropriate and indeed necessary if we are to 
gain any clarity as to the Being of this phenomenon.  (B) Discussing ethics as either a merely 
‘cognitive’ phenomenon, or rather as an ‘objective’ phenomenon pre-supposes an ontological 
Interpretation of the human being as having some ‘mental’ feature—as Heidegger discusses at 
length,61 this ontological Interpretation of the human as a ‘mental’ thing problematically assumes 
an inside-outside relationship between the human and reality.  What is a ‘mind?’  Why must we 
characterize reality as ‘that which is outside the mind?’  This Interpretation of the human being is 
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(1) reliant on a problematic metaphysical tradition which Interprets the meaning of Being as 
‘presence-at-hand,’ and (2) disconnected from its ontological roots—it considers these 
‘cognitive’ or ‘objective’ features without considering how these ontical ‘features’ are grounded 
in a particular ontological Interpretation.  Thus, our analysis of ethics, if undertaken 
phenomenologically (that is to say, primordially), must in the first instance rid itself of these 
linguistic constructions that our current conceptualizing of ethics is stuck in.  We must go back 
to the phenomenon itself, and inquire into how it is related to our Being as Narrative.  Although 
it is possible that our analysis will, in the end, reaffirm our inherited understanding of ethics as 
‘inside the mind’ or ‘outside the mind,’ it must demonstratively do or not do this. 
 Having cleared the ground of these initial worries, we can proceed with confidence in our 
analysis.  Recall: our question is: what is the Being of ethics, as it relates to our essential Being, 
which we have Interpreted as Narrative?  As with any analysis or inquiry, we must be guided by 
a pre-theoretical understanding of ‘what-is-to-be-analyzed’ or ‘what-is-to-be-inquired-about.’62  
Our fore-having is the horizon of our fore-sight and fore-conceptualizing.  Thus, when speaking 
of ethics, we understand phenomenally something that we have formerly deemed as ‘normative,’ 
or ‘imperative,’ or ‘universally imperative,’ or ‘good and evil.’  However, these ontical senses of 
ethics are loaded with implicit and presupposed ontological meanings handed-down through 
tradition, and as such, we will for the moment reject them as explicative of ethics; however, they 
are nonetheless indicative of ethics.  Since ‘ethics’ is thus ontically manifest in reality, even 
these perhaps improperly grounded ways of speaking about ethics must light the way to the 
original, primordially-encountered phenomenon. 
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 Thus, how can we characterize the phenomenon primordially?  It must be exhibited in 
relation to my Being as Narrative, which signifies my Being-oriented-as-going-towards-xf-
brought-here-by-a-Past-that-attests-to-my-existentiell-Being.  We will thus, in our efforts, 
analyze phenomenal immorality through the phenomena of antagonism and underminingness. 
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IV.2. Immorality via Antagonism 
 In the phenomenon of antagonism, I find myself thrown into a situation understood as 
opposing or standing against me.  That which I understand as standing against me I sometimes 
understand as ‘being in my way,’ and other times as ‘going against me.’  In the first instance, 
what is antagonizing me is blind to its opposing me; in the second instance, what is antagonizing 
me is purposive in its opposing me; nevertheless, in both modes, my situation is disclosed as 
‘opposing me.’ 
 But my situation can only oppose me if I am trying for something.  And of course, I am 
always trying for something: my Being as Narrative is fundamentally constituted by a going-
towards-xf.  At every moment, I am a project who projects-upon certain possibilities-of-Being.  I 
understand myself (am primordially disclosed to myself) as working-towards (or going-towards) 
actualizing these possibilities; thus, that-which-stands-against-me is more formally stated as that-
which-opposes-my-becoming-xf.  My thrownness into ‘Being-opposed’ is disclosed via my state-
of-mind: this might take the form of ‘irritation,’ ‘outrage,’ etc.; in any case, I find myself as 
‘having-to-deal-with’ that-which-opposes me. 
 Consider the following example: having left the house a few minutes later than usual, I 
am driving to work, anxious that I might be late.  Instantaneously, I am, and proximally 
understand myself, as a going-towards-getting-to-work-on-time.  As I am pulling out of my 
neighborhood and heading towards the highway, I look ahead: red brake lights and honking 
horns—indeed, I have left too late, and will be stuck in rush hour traffic.  But this ‘traffic’ is not 
primarily as a present-at-hand mass of cars that is secondarily ‘imbued’ with the property of 
opposing my ends; rather, it truly (i.e., phenomenally) is as a standing-against-me.  I find myself 
as ‘irritated’ or ‘exasperated’ in the face of it: I understand myself as going-towards-getting-to-
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work-on-time, and thus, I am thrown into confronting this opposition.  In other words, my world 
is automatically organized around this proximally projected-upon possibility-of-Being: that 
which assists me is ‘good,’ ‘to-be-sought-after,’ or ‘to-be-followed’; that which opposes me is 
‘bad,’ ‘to-be-avoided,’ or ‘must-be-overcome.’  In my everyday concern, my evaluations are 
automatically organized around my projections [my x(s)]; that which is antagonistic 
automatically is as ‘bad.’ 
 ‘But,’ you might object, ‘you have only discussed the general phenomenon of finding-
things-valuable; what you have neglected to distinguish between are different kinds of value: 
namely, prudential, moral, and aesthetic.  It seems to me that you have only discussed prudential 
value, and have left moral value unaccounted-for.’ 
 There are two responses to this: even in my everyday, non-fundamental projections and 
understandings of myself, that which antagonizes me is not only ‘to-be-avoided,’ but also is 
‘unfair,’ ‘ought not to be the case.’  Consider that when I am mired in this traffic, the seconds 
tick by, and the unlikelihood of my getting to work on time increasingly dawns on me, and thus 
so does the likelihood of my impending failure to fulfill my proximal projection.  As this occurs, 
I find myself ‘fuming,’ ‘furious,’ ‘upset,’ or ‘in control of my emotions.’  These states-of-mind 
disclose my thrownness, my having-to-deal-with the situation; however, it is notable that, 
proximally, these states-of-mind that I find myself in all take a similar character: I am ‘fuming’ 
or ‘furious,’ ‘upset’ or ‘in control of my emotions’ in the face of this traffic; but what my states 
of mind are about is my failing to become that which I narratively project-upon Being; they all 
are in relation to this projection.  Thus, the ontological structure of my reaction to the 
phenomenon of antagonism is as follows: outrage against some thing or situation on the basis of 
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its cutting me off from whom I am as going-towards; that is to say, on the basis of its destruction 
of my existentiell narratives. 
 I am outraged not merely because something is in my way that is non-advantageous, as 
would be the case in a phenomenon corresponding to something like ‘prudential value’—it is not 
the case that I rationally evaluate my situation, find it to ‘not be prudent,’ and then direct my 
outrage outwards towards that which impedes me as a way of psychologically purging myself, or 
as a way of prudently asserting myself.  Rather, I am outraged on an ontological basis: my very 
existentiell Being is at stake; my narrative faces impending destruction; in my outrage at that 
which antagonizes me, the world is disclosed to me not as merely ‘unsuitable to my aims,’ but 
rather as ‘unfair to my existentiell Being’ (i.e., as antagonizing my given going-towards-xf ). 
 But it is important to bear in mind that this projection of ‘getting to work on time’ is not 
free-floating: rather, it is a projection embedded within a projection-continuum, or narrative line: 
I am not upset about being late to work as such; I am upset about being late to work as this being 
late e.g., puts me in bad standing with my boss, or makes me a bad employee, or will result in 
my being fired.  And these bases for being outraged about being antagonized are not free-floating 
themselves, either: they are, in turn, based on more fundamental projections. 
 Thus, in the phenomenon of antagonism, that which antagonizes me is proximally 
disclosed as ‘unfair’ or ‘ought-not-to-be-the-case’; this unfairness and ought-not-ness, in turn, is 
based on its destruction of my existentiell Being in the form of my narrative(s).  The phenomenal 
value that I encounter in the world is automatically organized around my Narrative-Being. 
 But the other response we might give is that perhaps it seems that we have obscured the 
analysis of this issue by instancing a projection-upon an x rather than an xf; as such, it might 
seem that my outrage at my situation can hardly attain to the lofty status of ‘moral’ outrage.  
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Indeed, although I have attempted to demonstrate the great phenomenal difference between 
‘prudential’ values and those which I am Interpreting, it might still be thought that what the 
foregoing analysis of ‘antagonism’ merely shows is a sort of unreadiness-to-hand that is 
accompanied by a state-of-mind like ‘frustration’ that attests to my thrownness into a world that 
is unready-to-hand for my concern. 
 However, we have attempted to show that my outrage in the face of antagonism, even in 
trivial everydayness, stems from a threat to my very existentiell Being (which Being can only 
consist in narratives).  Nevertheless, this will become clearer below, when the threat to my 
narrative is not a threat to some trivial and contingent aspect of it (namely, a mere x), but rather 
to its fundamentally constituent element: namely, my xf. 
 In projecting-upon some fundamental possibility of Being, I author my narrative: I am as 
going towards this fundamental possibility.  And of course, a fundamental possibility is, as being 
fundamental, not proximal—it is ahead of me in the deepest sense, it is the horizon of my Being 
as becoming.  In any given moment, what I am becoming is not proximally what I am concerned 
with—that is to say, if I concern myself with ‘fixing my broken-down car,’ my Being does not 
fundamentally lie in the fixing of this car; rather, it lies in being able to get around where I need 
to go.  However, even this ‘being able to get around’ is contained within a narrative line (or 
projection-continuum): I need to be able to get around because I have something to get around 
for the sake of—e.g., going to the store, driving to class, going to see my girlfriend across town.  
And I do each of these things for other reasons—I go to the store to buy food, which I eat in 
order to satisfy my hunger; I drive to class so as to learn and attest to my learning in the form of 
high marks, which I hope to receive in order to get into a top-flight graduate program, which I 
desire to attend in order to be a well-trained professional philosopher; I drive to see my girlfriend 
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in order to connect deeply and romantically with another human being, which I hope remains an 
abiding theme in my life. 
 Ultimately, it is not important that these fundamental projections are ‘psychologically’ 
present-at-hand in my mind while I am proximally concerned with tasks along their respective 
narrative lines; what is important is that there are projections that lie at the horizon of my 
projecting (if only tacitly so) as the furthest ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ that a line extends towards 
as an ‘in-order-to.’  As such, therefore, my Being truly is constituted by an xf, and not merely an 
x. 
 Thus, can ethics be exhibited phenomenologically through an existential description of 
antagonism, which description could only be properly existential if it concerned my most 
fundamental and authoring projections?  What ontical phenomenon can attest to our analysis? 
 In analyzing this antagonism to my xf, let us call upon another phenomenon: namely, the 
phenomenon of ‘cruelty.’  When I encounter cruelty in the world, ‘what’ is it that I encounter, 
and how do I encounter it?  To illustrate, let us begin with an example: as I am walking home 
from work one night, I pass (as I usually do) through the ‘bad part’ of town.  Generally, although 
I am fearful, nothing of note happens as I pass through here: usually, there is nothing but the 
empty sounds of city streets at night—scattered voices, the touch of a breeze, doors opening and 
closing.  On this night, however, I hear something peculiarly different: occasional cries and 
yelps, broken by the sounds of laughter and whispering.  I hope the sounds will go away, but 
they only grow more apparent as I move nearer.  Soon enough, I am next to the outlet of an 
alleyway, and the cries, and laughter, and curses are surely down a few yards, within the alley.  
Quickly, as I walk past, I sneak a glance down the alley: there is a group of men, laughing, 
cursing, surrounding a solitary, trembling man.  I recall the reports that I’ve heard in the news of 
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‘gang initiations’ going on in the city this month.  At once, I am flooded with understanding, and 
terror, and outrage: when I am a block away, I quietly get my cell phone out of my pocket and 
call the police, alerting them of what I’ve seen, where I’ve seen it, and the urgency of them 
arriving. 
 This situation is meant to illustrate an everyday encounter with cruelty.  The standard 
way of interpreting such a scene would be the following: the scene is constituted by a present-at-
hand situation (namely: the group of men surrounding a solitary man) that contains the present-
at-hand property of ‘suffering’ or ‘ill will’ or ‘unvirtuous behavior’; these properties are, 
moreover, simultaneous with my present-at-hand intuition of the cruelty of this gang initiation 
scene.  In other words, a present-at-hand subject leaps transcendentally outwards to a present-at-
hand object (in this case, the situation), judging this object to be ‘cruel.’  Although later63 we will 
briefly turn our attention towards this standard Interpretation, attempting to uncover why such an 
Interpretation is institutionally dominant in Philosophy, for the moment we can preview this 
forthcoming discussion by stating that the dichotomous ‘objectivist’/‘subjectivist’ (or 
alternatively, ‘absolutist’/‘relativist’) focus of ethical reasoning stems from the ontologico-
metaphysical basis of this Interpretation. 
For the moment, we have pointed out the ordinary way of Interpreting this phenomenal 
encounter in order to point out the deficiency such an Interpretation bears to the existential-
ontological Being of the human.  Indeed, in order to analyze this encounter existentially, we must 
Interpret it in regards to our Narrative-Being, which is constituted by the temporalizing ecstases 
of future, present, and Past, into all of which I project and am thrown. 
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As I am initially walking homewards, my proximal Being is my going-towards-getting-
home; if you were to ask me ‘who are you?’ at this point, I would be baffled at the question; but 
if you were to ask me ‘what are you doing?,’ I would be able to clearly provide you with an 
answer: ‘I am going home.’  Of course, this proximal projection-upon the possibility of getting 
home is merely an x embedded along a narrative line that is implicitly founded-upon and 
culminates with an xf; nevertheless, concretely, my xf is not present-at-hand in my mind.  Soon, 
however, my x changes: I hear suspicious noises, and I now am as a going-towards-avoiding 
danger.  However, once it becomes apparent that the suspicious noises are emanating from a 
‘gang initiation’ situation, my x once again changes: I now am as a going-towards-alerting-the-
authorities.  My initial x of getting home no longer concerns me: the ‘object’ of my concern now 
is ‘justice’ or ‘helping the innocent, stopping the guilty.’  This indicative phrase clearly conveys 
moral import: phenomenally, the situation (in this case, a gang initiation) is cruel.  That is to say, 
this situation is primordially disclosed to me as unjustly cruel: it is not primarily a perception of 
various agents and motives, and secondarily a ‘judgment’ of cruelty—there is no cognizing or 
conscious judging or intellectualizing to be done.  Phenomenally, this situation is unjust and 
cruel. 
But this phenomenon of cruelty, as encountered by me, must be encountered only in 
relation to my existential-ontological structures.  This is the case because I myself, whose Being 
we have followed Heidegger in describing as ‘existential,’ am not as a present-at-hand substance 
with present-at-hand properties superadded on to it, nor am I the unitary sum of various compiled 
present-at-hand properties—in short, we cannot describe my encounter with cruelty as some 
free-floating or otherwise present-at-hand property or sum of properties, as would be the case in 
a ‘biological’ or ‘psychological’ analysis.  Rather, the Being of the human being we have, 
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following Heidegger, characterized as ‘existence,’ which signifies, as we said above in section I: 
a Being that is in every case mine own, that is problematical and calls for a resolution, and that is 
disclosed as such (i.e., disclosed as my project to solve).  The problematic, for Heidegger, is that 
I am the null basis of a nullity: I am at every moment a possibility-negating ‘not-yet’ who is 
ever-bounding towards a constantly impending ‘nevermore-to-be.’  However, this problematic is 
not a damning one: although it cannot be escaped, it can be resolved: Thus, implicitly my Being 
is as a project aimed at the implicit optimum of resolution.  This resolution is my authentically 
Being-a-whole, the basis of which lies in anticipatory resoluteness: taking hold of myself while 
at the same time leaving myself open to withdrawing myself in the face of my impending death.  
While we here have not disagreed or contradicted Heidegger in our conception of human Being, 
we have emphasized our Being-a-whole differently: our Being-a-whole has its basis in our 
Narrative-Being: projecting ourselves (understanding ourselves) upon some fundamental 
possibility-of-Being, which has its basis in our Being-continuously-towards-a-horizon.  The 
fundamental projection is our Narrative horizon, and we project-along a continuum that holds 
open this horizon: this continuum, when existentielly concretized, we have indicated by the term 
‘narrative.’ 
How can we describe the encounter with cruelty in relation to my Narrative-Being?  How 
is my encountering cruelty related to my narrative, which is as an existentiell route-towards-xf?  
The clue to this answer lies in our above analysis of antagonism in the most banal everydayness.  
In that analysis, we demonstrated that antagonism is disclosed as a standing-against-my-going-
towards-x: this involves projection (namely, my x that I am going towards) and thrownness 
(being thrown-into projecting-upon x, in virtue of which I must overcome that which stands 
against me), which in turn are equiprimordially disclosed via understanding (I proximally see 
	  	   98 
myself as going-towards-x) and state-of-mind (I proximally feel my having-to-deal-with that 
which stands against me). 
If there is any moment in my existentiell encounter with cruelty wherein I proximally am 
not my mere x, but rather my xf, then this will provide a clear route to understanding the 
relationship between my encountering cruelty and my existential Being-a-whole as Narrative-
Being: if this relationship mirrors the phenomenal antagonism in my banal everydayness, then 
we must be able to demonstrate how my encounter with cruelty is, primordially, as antagonistic-
to-my-xf. 
In order to demonstrate this, it is helpful to call forth another phenomenon for 
Interpretation: namely, the phenomenon of conscience.  In undertaking our Interpretation of this 
phenomenon, however, it is important that we first recall Heidegger’s analysis of the call of 
conscience and relatedly Being-guilty, in order to underscore whereupon we concur with and 
diverge from his Interpretation of this phenomenon.  Conscience calls us forth to our ownmost 
Being-guilty, which discloses our problematic to us (our being the null basis of a nullity), which 
problematic can only be resolved in anticipatory resoluteness: sighting and projecting-upon our 
death, and taking hold of ourselves as an authentic whole. 
Although we have hitherto shied away from discussions of inauthenticity and 
authenticity, we have nevertheless described our own understanding of an implicit optimum in 
my project of Being: namely, my becoming xf.  Although my xf is always an integral constituent 
of my Being (as constituting the narrative that I am projecting-along at any given moment; as 
Being the basis of each mere x upon-which I project), at any given moment we can nevertheless 
bear different proximal relationships towards it: there are times when, proximally, my concern is 
directed towards a given contingent x, and other times when my concern is directed towards xf  
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itself; and indeed it is possible that my concern be directed at a given x that is either closer to or 
further away from xf. 
Proximally and usually, I project-upon and understand myself merely as the given x that 
lies closest to me: generally my concern is directed straight ‘in front of’ me; in fact, my xf, my 
horizon, is so far ahead that the smog of life usually conceals it entirely.  Despite the fact that my 
Being as going-towards-x has its basis in my Being as going-towards-xf, I only understand 
myself as the former.  Although my full understanding of myself as going-towards-xf ‘lurks 
somewhere in the back of my mind’—for, as being the basis of my x at all, I must implicitly 
operate as oriented-towards-xf—proximally, it is beyond my comprehension.  Consider the 
following example to illustrate: 
 In this instance, let us call my xf ‘becoming a professional philosopher.’  Automatically, 
my narrative is born: before me lies a series of dependent projections that function as ‘in-order-
to[s]’ as in, ‘in order to become a professional philosopher.’  This series of projections involves, 
among others, my Being philosophically inspired, my achieving highly at an undergraduate 
level, my sincerely searching for the proper graduate program, my being accepted, Being-
inspired, finding a niche, achieving highly, gaining recognition, looking for employment, getting 
hired, teaching and publishing at a high level.  These projections lie dependently on a narrative 
line, culminating with my fundamental projection; they are implicit in this fundamental 
projection.  However, at a given moment along this narrative line—e.g., in my projecting-upon 
being a successful undergraduate—I generally ‘lose’ myself.  That is to say, my Being is so 
absorbed in projecting-upon this x, this ‘becoming a successful undergraduate student,’ that I 
lose myself in this contingent projection—I am torn away from myself as ‘going-towards-
becoming-a-professional-philosopher.’ Although I am deeply and pre-theoretically in 
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understanding of myself as going-towards-xf, since it is only in virtue of xf that I project-upon x 
at all (e.g., it is only in virtue of my going-towards-becoming-a-professional-philosopher that I 
am going-towards-becoming-a-successful-undergraduate), I nevertheless proximally understand 
myself as nothing beyond the x that instantaneously occupies my Being.  This Being-lost in my 
contingent x is equiprimordially disclosed by a state-of-mind: this state of mind we signify by the 
term despair.  
Thus, factically in my everydayness, I am absorbed in my contingent x(s), losing sight of 
my constitutive xf(s): that is to say, I am proximally absorbed in my close-by projections, losing 
sight of my horizonal-projections and thereby my Being as Narrative.  Thus, how can we 
Interpret the phenomenal call of conscience?  Namely, as a calling forth of me from my proximal 
everyday understanding of myself as my close-by x to my proximally understanding myself as 
my horizonal and constitutive xf.  The call of conscience discloses to me and preserves me in my 
existentiell narrative, thus holding-me-to the implicit optimum of my Narrative-Being as 
becoming xf.  How can we make this phenomenally concrete? 
Taking our above example (the ‘gang initiation’ witness) as our first, let us sketch several 
more examples, so as to, in a comparison of said situations, make clear the existential-
ontological structures of conscience. 
Example #2: my xf is finding lifelong romantic love.  However, I have another xf, as 
well: namely, financially supporting my lifestyle.  As projecting-upon this latter narrative, I have 
been working as a long-distance trucker, making cross-country shipments for an electronics 
company.  Today, I stopped by a road house for a quick meal on my way to delivering a 
shipment of printers to Oregon—I am running a few hours behind, and I will need to wolf 
something down quickly in order to have a chance of making up the lost time.  As I sit down at 
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the bar, I glance at the woman seated next to me—she is wearing the hat of my favorite sports 
team!  I decide to let her know about our mutual interest in this sports team, and before I know it, 
a deep and lasting conversation is upon us.  We talk about our lives, our pasts, our futures—
we’re both single, but not planning on being so for long.  However, the alarm on my watch goes 
off—it’s time to go, and I’ve barely eaten my charred burger and stale fries.  Hastily and with 
reluctance, I say my goodbye and run out of the restaurant.  Jumping in my truck, I realize I can 
make it on time if I go a few ticks above the speed limit.  Before I know it, I am back on the 
highway, heading northwesterly.  But I can’t stop thinking about this woman—we connected in a 
way I never thought possible.  What if I didn’t have to make this shipment, if I called it off and 
decided to give things a try with her?  But no—my bosses would be angry, and in either case, I 
have this shipment to make.  Still, continuously the thought scratches the back of my mind: will I 
ever forgive myself if she is ‘the one,’ and I missed her for a shipment?  Suddenly, I pull over, 
call Oregon and tell them their shipment won’t be coming in today.  I turn around, and drive 
back towards the road house—with any luck, she will still be there. 
Example #3: My xf is helping rid the world of economic injustice, being a leading source 
of progressive change.  Thus, this automatically births a narrative line, which in this case 
involves my becoming employed at a top-level Washingtonian think tank.  There is one think 
tank that I especially want to work for: and with my Ph.D. from UC Berkeley in neo-Marxist 
socioeconomic justice, I am a top candidate, and should be primed to easily get the job.  On the 
way to patting myself on the back, however, I receive a phone call: it is the hiring manager for 
the think tank, and he is thanking me for my interest, but advising me that I should try and apply 
again next year, since the job has been offered to another candidate.  Shocked, I gulp down a 
‘thank you’ and hang up.  Soon, however, I gain hold of myself and direct my fury: how could I 
	  	   102 
not have been hired?  I am as high-level a candidate as can be found, after all.  I decide that 
something must have been wrong with the process—yes, something underhanded must have 
occurred, since I am extremely qualified, after all.  I decide to make some calls and see if I can 
figure out who was hired in my place.  Within a few hours, I find out that a woman named Jane 
Doe was hired.  With a little bit of web research thrown in, I discover that Ms. Doe is black and, 
of course, female.  Now, being the white male that I am, I immediately surmise what has to be 
the truth: I was racially profiled—Ms. Doe was hired simply for the sake of ‘diversity!’  Furious, 
I brood for hours, considering what to do.  It dawns on me that I should pick up the phone and 
call that hiring manager back and give him a piece of my mind!  But suddenly I recall something: 
my dissertation on neo-Marxist socioeconomic justice involved some pretty heavy research into 
racial and gender disparities in America with regard to socioeconomic opportunities: indeed, my 
conclusions were none other than affirmative action is far from outdated—indeed, it is 
imperative to bridge the still embarrassing opportunity gap between white males and the rest of 
society. Indeed, I realize that Ms. Doe, being a black female from South Central Los Angeles, 
must have overcome incredibly enormous odds in order to be competitive for such a prestigious 
position.  Embarrassed, guilt-ridden, I put the phone down, and resolve to check myself and my 
privilege evermore. 
Example #4:  My xf is becoming a leading philosophical voice and source of pride for 
my nation.  My narrative is born around this fundamental possibility-of-Being, and involves 
rising to prominence in the country in which I was born, raised, and trained—let’s call this 
country ‘Germany.’  It just so happens, however, that Germany at this time is undergoing a 
massive and controversial shift in its political climate: the newly elected executive of the nation 
has some controversial but nonetheless popular anti-Semitic and nationalistic views; already, the 
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nation is dividing along cooperative and resistant lines: if I wish to remain comfortably in my 
native Germany, I must act quickly: and indeed, I join the this leader’s controversial party.  My 
becoming a member being celebrated, and with the party’s nationalistic ideas bearing some 
relationship to my views about the importance of history and tradition, I begin a systematic 
integration of my philosophical concepts with the party’s; from my now authoritative position in 
the nation’s academia, I denounce several Jews, fail to provide support for my Jewish mentor, 
and sever relationships with some Jewish colleagues with whom I previously enjoyed great 
professional and personal relationships.  Throughout, I turn a blind eye to the ongoing genocide 
inflicted against the Jewish people by the leader I have so publicly supported.  Before long, 
however, it dawns on me that in my everyday dealings of maintaining and developing my 
reputation amongst the ruling class in Germany, I have become despised by the professional 
community elsewhere in the world, including by my former colleagues; indeed, it is clear to me 
that I am an embarrassment to my people, rather than a source of pride. I have lost sight of my xf 
in projecting upon my x.  Although I attempt to regain myself in my xf, it is too late: I will 
forever be an embarrassment. 
These four examples are meant to illustrate the existential-ontological structures of 
conscience: in each case, my conscience discloses my Being-lost in x at the expense of xf.  What 
is the character of this disclosure?  As Heidegger tells us, it is a voiceless, wordless, 
uncondemnatory phenomenon: I am not called ‘bad’ by my conscience, but rather, lacking—my 
existentiell narrative as going-towards-xf has been attacked, but attacked by me: I am the basis of 
my straying from my narrative, and thus of my closing-myself-off-from-my-Narrative-fulfillment.  
As such, I am ‘guilty’ in that I am indebted to myself: I have failed to be as the narrative within 
which I deeply and primordially understand myself as Being. 
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Each example is different, and different in several ways: Example #1 involves a relatively 
‘uncontroversial’ ethical picture: I witness something that is in the main considered morally 
deplorable, and I answer the call to do something about it in the way my society has provided for 
me (namely, I call the police); however, the x that initially distracts me from my xf is not on the 
same narrative: namely, my x concerns simply getting-home, which exists on the narrative of, 
e.g., ‘live a comfortable life,’ while my xf involved in calling the police is something more like 
‘be a positive social agent.’  Example #2 involves a situation that might seem less ‘moral’ but 
nevertheless ‘ethical’: I am not phenomenally in contact with any ‘moralizing,’ but I am 
nevertheless called by my conscience—although it is once again the case that in example #2 my 
x lies on a separate narrative from my xf.  In examples #3 and #4, however, my x and xf lie on the 
same narrative, and in both cases, I encounter something like an ontical injustice, and am called-
upon to comport myself properly towards it. 
Thus, what we hope is clear is not that these differences are overly significant: rather the 
hope is to illustrate how in spite of these ontico-existentiell differences, the phenomenon of the 
call of conscience is identical, existentially-ontologically speaking.  Namely, the call of 
conscience calls me forth from my proximal Being-lost in my close-by and everyday x(s), to my 
proximally understanding myself as the xf that I primordially am: in the call of conscience, I am 
summoned to my narrative and disclosed as needing-to-be-in-such-a-way-as-to-remain-in-my-
existentiell-Being.  My conscience ‘alerts’ me to something or someone standing in the way of 
my primordially Being-towards-xf, antagonizing the implicit optimality of my Narrative-Being as 
fulfillment.  This ‘thing’ could be a ‘not-doing-this-or-that’; this ‘someone’ could be ‘me.’  
Nevertheless, my conscience alerts me to an antagonism to my narrative, and calls upon me to 
take action against and overcome this antagonism.  The understanding associated with this 
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phenomenon is an understanding of my existentiell Being itself: my particular xf.  The state-of-
mind equiprimordially attesting to this phenomenon is guilt: in guilt, my ‘that-I-am’ as ‘failing-
to-be-existentielly-whole’ or ‘failing to live up to myself’ is disclosed to me. 
Thus the phenomenon of ‘antagonism’ has provided us a route to understanding the 
Being of ethics as ‘holding-me-to-my-existentiell-narrative-as-imperativizing-me-towards-
Being-existentially-Narratively-optimal-as-fulfilled.’  But at the beginning of this section, we 
pointed out two phenomena central to getting a hold on the Being of ethics: namely, antagonism 
and underminingness.  Having articulated our Interpretation of the former, we move on to the 
latter. 
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IV.3. Immorality via Underminingness 
The phenomenon of ‘underminingness’ is meant to signify my existentiell narrative’s 
being undermined, thus also undermining the implicit optimality of my existential Narrative-
Being.  This phenomenon provides a route to understanding one of the constituents of the Being 
of ethics.  But how can we unpack this phenomenon?  We will, below, Interpret ‘evil’ as that-
which-undermines-my-Being. 
As in every other theme within our discussion of my Narrative-ethical-Being, we must 
begin by recalling the existential-ontological structures of human Being: namely, Narrative, 
which we have tirelessly unpacked as Being-oriented-as-going-towards-xf-with-a-that-which-
brought-me-here-that-attests-to-my-existentiell-Being.  In other words, future-oriented-Being-
carrying-with-it-the-Past—this ‘line’ of Being stretching from the Past through the present to the 
future we have Interpreted as a projection-continuum, and signified it in its existentiell modality 
by the term ‘narrative [line].’ 
Our previous discussion, centered around what we termed ‘antagonism,’ Interpreted 
ethics as a holding-me-to-my-existentiell-Being, in the sense of providing me with an imperative 
to ‘live up’ to my optimality of Being—one might say, alternatively, that the discussion focused 
on ethics as ‘directing myself ethically.’  But what about the phenomenon of finding the world 
valuable?  It is to this phenomenon that we turn our attention in our Interpretation of evil as 
undermining. 
In my everyday dealings in the world, I am proximally projecting-upon x—that is to say, 
rather than xf—and thus encounter the world as organized around this x that I am going-towards.  
For illustration, recall the ‘traffic on the way to work example’ referenced at the beginning of 
this section: the traffic is disclosed to me as ‘bad’ or ‘ought not be the case’ or ‘to be overcome.’  
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In these kinds of everyday and trivial instances, wherein proximally I understand myself as the 
mere x that I am going-towards and conceal my Being as primordially going-towards-xf—my 
Being is, instantaneously, threatened and/or compromised.  How this is the case in terms of the 
imperative to overcome antagonism to my existentiell Being has already been discussed; but how 
this is the case in terms of a value-laden undermining of my existentiell Being as undermining my 
existential-Narrative optimum has hitherto been neglected.  Such discussion will, as focusing on 
a contingent and trivial x, be succinct, and moreover provide a framework for Interpreting my 
essential Being as going-towards-xf to be constitutive of the ontological structures of ethics. 
Consider: in projecting-upon ‘getting-to-work-on-time,’ I proximally and concretely am 
as a going-towards-getting-to-work-on-time.  Therefore, my world is organized around this 
projection: things are meaningful and valuable insofar as they relate to this possibility.  That 
which stands-against-this-possibility is ‘bad’ and ‘to be overcome.’  But ‘standing against’ is 
tantamount to antagonism.  However, what about that which nullifies this possibility?  Indeed, 
the phenomenal ‘to-be-overcome’ implies ‘can-be-overcome,’ no matter how remote this ‘can’ 
is.  But nullification implies ‘cannot be overcome,’ or ‘destructive to the foundations,’ or 
‘essentially undermining.’ 
Let us clarify: when I project-upon a possibility x, my world is disclosed to me as 
relating-to-x.  Phenomenally, this is made clear in how I find things meaningful and valuable in 
relation to my x.  But indeed, this ‘finding things valuable as they relate towards x’ means the 
following: in my encounters with entities, they can be disclosed to me as either good or bad with 
regard to my going-towards-x.  This is to say that entities can either contribute to or undermine 
conditions conducive to my going-towards-x.  Thus, in projecting-upon x, reality is disclosed to 
me as conditioned.  Thus, looming in the background of reality as constituted by any x is the 
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nullification of itself: namely, the possibility of the conditions ‘failing to obtain,’ or the 
possibility of the impossibility of my going-towards-x.  This is not meant to convey a ‘list of 
necessary present-at-hand factors that must obtain in order for me to get-to-x’; rather, these 
‘conditions’ we speak of are fundamentally an ‘conditioning-my-existentiell-Being-as-going-
towards-x.’ 
Various things can nullify my Being as going-towards-getting-to-work-on-time: viz., the 
clock striking ‘9:01,’ my being still stuck in traffic at 8:50 30 miles away, my car breaking down, 
my getting pulled over for road rage and reckless driving, etc.  In these instances, the utter 
impossibility of my becoming x is manifest; my Being as going-towards-getting-to-work-on-time 
is nullified; now, I must (i.e., my thrownness dictates that I) project-upon (understand myself as) 
some other possibility: e.g., going-towards-not-being-too-late; going-towards-having-a-good-
excuse, etc.  As my existentiell Being is nullified—in this case, my going-towards-getting-to-
work-on-time—I am thrown-back on myself existentially; I am existentielly-ontically disclosed 
to myself as an existential-ontological being: my narrative is disclosed to me, and disclosed as 
null; as such, I instantaneously understand myself as a thrownness-unto-projecting, whose Being 
consists essentially in projection.  In these most ephemeral moments, all my entrenchedness in 
my Past is voided—properly speaking, I am now displaced from my existentiell Past, since my 
Past is my that-which-brought-me-here-now-as-going-towards-x, and yet my going-towards-x 
has been nullified. 
Thus, the immediately foregoing discussion provides us with a map and a clue as to how 
our Interpretation of Narrative-Being (as fundamentally constituted by going-towards-xf) in 
regards to the phenomena of underminingness and evil constitutes the Being of ethics.  However, 
some confusions might have arisen in this discussion due to the contingency of x as opposed to 
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the utterly fundamental, generative constitutiveness of xf; this might have led some to believe 
that our previous discussion was of only side interest to ethics, and it certainly obscured any 
connection with the phenomenon of evil that we will Interpret as constituted by this projection-
conditioned world whose nullification is possible. 
Existentially-ontologically, my Being is as Narrative: I am an ongoing, unfolding project 
implicitly aimed at the fulfillment of existentiell narrative lines, or implicitly aimed at becoming 
one or more fundamental possibilities [xf(s)] of Being. Recall our above analysis of ‘Being-
oriented’ as the meaning of my Being-towards the ecstatical present: we understood this 
phenomenon of ‘orientation’ to consist in a locatability, an arrangement, and a Being-
directionalized.  But we also understood ‘orientation’ to mean, in everyday parlance, something 
akin to a ‘meaning and value-laden perspective or standpoint.’  While above, we neglected to 
dwell on this ‘meaning-ladenness’ of orientation, this now will become a theme for investigation.  
Indeed, ontically, it is said that our ‘ethical systems’ are fully comprised within these 
‘orientations.’  How can we make sense of this? 
The ontical understandings permeating our everyday logos state that orientation is an 
‘approach’ or a ‘meaning and value-laden perspective on the world.’  While both of these 
conceptions are troublingly mingled with the metaphysical tradition of presence (i.e., they 
presuppose an unexamined ‘inside-outside’/‘subject-object’ relationship between the human and 
the world), they nevertheless ‘point-towards’ the implications of our existential analysis: insofar 
as I am ecstatically-temporally facing my Being (whether forwards or backwards), I have an 
approach; as Being-oriented-along-a-narrative, I ‘go forth’ as located within a narratively-
organized world towards my xf; moreover, I ‘go forth’ as Being brought-here at every moment.  
As Being-oriented, I ‘approach’ my existence at every moment. 
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As Being-oriented, as well, my world is primordially meaningful and valuable.  But this 
is to assert only a redundancy in light of our previous analysis: as Being-oriented, I am located 
within an existentielly narratively organized world.  What is the nature of this ‘narrative 
organization?’  Namely, the Being of reality as towards-my-narrative, or towards-my-xf.  Entities 
within the world primordially are as (un)ready-to-hand for my becoming xf. 
But why have we undertaken the foregoing analysis?  Is it only to redundantly 
recapitulate that which we already Interpreted ad nauseam above?  Indeed, with apologies to our 
readers for our exhaustion of the topic, we have recapitulated our above analysis.  However, this 
recapitulation was done as a means to making-accessible the phenomenal bridge between ethics 
and Narrative-Being.  For indeed, it is not at all uncommon to hear statements relating morality 
and one’s ‘orientation’ or ‘standpoint’ or ‘perspective.’  And having phenomenologically 
unpacked the signified Being of these terms (and steered clear of the perverting effects of our 
linguistic and metaphysical tradition), we can now phenomenologically unpack the signification 
of Being implicit in statements such as ‘you only believe that [some moral position] because of 
your perspective,’ or ‘if you had a different orientation, you wouldn’t believe that.’ 
Statements such as these are generally made as talking points in debates between moral 
absolutists and relativists in defense of the latter position; the standard formula is picking out two 
cultures’ (or individuals’) divergent moral positions on a certain subject—e.g., honoring the 
deceased by ‘burial’ vs. ‘burning’—and then stating that these positions are entirely ‘subject’ to 
one’s ‘orientation,’ or ‘perspective,’ or ‘standpoint,’ whether individually or culturally based.  
Although for the moment, this ‘debate’ won’t occupy our attention,64 what is nevertheless 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 A thorough critique of this position and the common moral debate in general is outwith the 
bounds of this project and certainly of this section.  However, a provisional critique of the 
current ‘dialectic’ on morality will be undertaken below (section V). 
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important to our present purposes is phenomenologically unpacking the meaning behind such 
‘relativist’ statements. 
While the purpose of such statements often consists in reducing morality to some non-
real or non-absolute phenomenon, the premise that the relativist considers damning for an 
absolutist ethics is the relationship between ethical value and orientation.  This relationship is the 
following: factically, one’s held-to ethical precepts/beliefs/propositions are dependent upon 
one’s orientation.  Indeed, having Interpreted ‘orientation’ to signify my ‘Being-located within a 
narratively-organized world, temporalizing ecstatically forwards and backwards,’ we have 
nothing left but to unpack the Being of ethical value in order to understand these statements.  But 
of course, the Being of ethics is precisely the unitary focus of this project, and is a phenomenon 
far too problematical to be tackled all at once.  Thus, in unpacking these statements, let us 
phenomenologically unpack an ontical manifestation ontically considered to bear on the very 
nature of ethics: namely, evil. 
In Interpreting any phenomenon, we might technically analyze its disclosedness: how is it 
equiprimordially disclosed via the projectival understanding and thrown state-of-mind?  Recall 
that understanding has its basis in projection—either future (going-towards-xf) or Past (that-
which-brought-me-here) focused—while state-of-mind has its basis in thrownness—either future 
(that-I-must-project) or Past (that-I-am-attested-to) focused.  Thus, how do I understand evil?  
What is my state-of-mind in encountering evil? 
Formally, I understand evil as that-which-threatens-my-existentiell-Being.  But what is 
the nature of this ‘threat?’  Do I understand the ‘threat’ of evil as I understand the ‘threat’ of a 
wild, hungry bear in the woods?  Indeed, concretely, my understanding of evil can appropriate 
itself as ‘something that threatens my Being-present as such,’ in the way that the wild, hungry 
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bear does.  However, primordially, evil is not that which threatens the simple fact of my Being-
present-at-hand for myself; rather, evil is understood as that which threatens my world.  That is 
to say, evil does not primordially threaten my being-here-as-such (i.e., my Being present-at-
hand) in the world; rather, evil primordially threatens the world’s Being-here-for-me.  The wild 
hungry bear is not primordially disclosed as evil because the wild hungry bear leaves my world 
untouched—rather, she simply threatens my Being-present within the world. 
Consider the following ontical examples of ‘evil’ drawn from literature and history: in J. 
R. R. Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings trilogy, Sauron is undoubtedly the epitome of ‘evil.’  But 
what is the Being of Sauron as evil?  Is it his being a threat to the characters’ lives within the 
novel?  This manifestly is not the case: the Fellowship (i.e., the band of protagonists attempting 
to rid the world of Sauron and his evil as embodied in ‘the ring,’ consisting of Frodo, Aragorn, 
Gimli, Boromir, Legolas, Sam, Merry, Pippen, and Gandalf) sets off on its journey in full 
awareness of its risking the ontico-biological death of all of its members.  In fact, their 
confronting evil entails their acceptance of a significantly heightened risk of their no-longer-
Being-present-at-hand-in-the-world.  Thus, Sauron manifestly is not evil on the basis of his 
threatening many individuals’ Being-present-within-the-world.  Therefore, on what basis can it 
be claimed that Sauron is ‘evil?’  Manifestly, it is only on the basis of his threatening the world 
as such that Sauron is evil.  This is phenomenally manifest, indeed.  Consider: what is the Being 
of the trilogy’s heroes (e.g., Frodo, Aragorn, Sam, Gandalf) qua heroes?  The answer to this 
question might be the most ontically conspicuous but ontologically inconspicuous of all: namely, 
the heroes are heroes insofar as they risk their own Being-present-at-hand-for-themselves for the 
sake of saving the world.  To put it plainly, why is Frodo the novel’s hero?  Because he risks his 
own life to save the world. 
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Before we move on to discussing the implications of this phenomenal truth, let us first 
sketch another example, drawn from ‘real’ history this time, for the sake of those readers who 
think literary illustrations unpalatable. 
To draw-forth the most trite, overly-referenced instance of historical evil, consider Adolf 
Hitler and his Nazi regime, eugenically inspired to cleanse the world of all non-Aryans, primarily 
focusing on Jewish and Romani peoples.  Often, Hitler is taken as the most evil individual in 
recent history, if not in all of history.  But on what basis is Hitler considered evil as such?  What 
is the Being of Hitler qua evil?  Certainly, he murdered many people—at least 6,000,000 Jewish 
peoples alone, and many millions more Romani peoples, homosexuals, disabled peoples, 
communists, certain religious sects, etc.—and that is only discussing his responsibility for those 
who died in The Holocaust.  When one considers the countless millions lost to the warfare that 
he caused in the world, his ‘death toll’ is absurdly, astronomically, tragically high.  But is it the 
ontico-biological deaths of these people that in and of itself comprises Hitler’s evil?  Indeed, 
intuitively this is a more difficult case than that of the literary Sauron: when the people who died 
and suffered were real people who you or I might have known, their deaths confront us far more 
tragically and radically than the deaths of fictional characters.65  But let us examine more closely 
Hitler’s evil: is it simply the fact of those many millions of people no-longer-Being-present-at-
hand that constitutes Hitler’s evil?  When we speak of Hitler’s evil, what do we proximally 
imply is the Being of him qua Being-evil?  Indeed, in everyday discourse on the subject, people 
frequently cite the numbers of people who were killed as an attestation to his evil.  Primordially, 
however, that which Hitler threatened (and for some, even as a mere specter, continues to 
threaten) is not, at its basis, the Being-present-at-hand of millions of people—for many millions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Certainly, as a person of Jewish descent, I have long been keenly aware of and affected by the 
historical decimation of my peoples. 
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more would have willingly risked their lives in the fight to stop him.  This is to say, if Hitler had 
killed nobody at all, his Being-evil would remain Being-evil, only no longer extensionally ready-
to-hand qua quantifiable.  What is fundamentally evil about Hitler, what is threatening about 
him, is not merely the staggering number of murders and deaths traceable back to his hands; 
rather, it is the basis for these murders: namely, the narrative that he foisted upon the world.  
This we discuss as his dreams of a ‘Third Reich’; his understanding of the going-towards-Being-
the-Third-Reich involving ‘The Final Solution’; Hitler’s evil is phenomenally a threat to the 
world.  Today, the quantifiable ‘numbers game’ of the murders and deaths traceable to his hands 
serves as a stark and sobering reminder of the lengths that he went to in order to ‘take over the 
world’—i.e., establish his narrative as supreme.  The numbers remind people of the specter of 
his evil: the world was closer to the brink of a ‘new world order’ than ever before.  But this 
reasoning might still seem callous to our readers, who think we are concealing the true evil of the 
incomprehensible numbers of deaths and murders.  Perhaps this final line of discourse will ‘pick 
up’ our readers where our previous analysis might have ‘put them off’: whom did Hitler pose the 
most serious threat to?  Certainly, the Jewish peoples.  What is the nature, however, of this 
threat?  Is it the possibility of the no-longer-Being-present-at-hand of the Jewish peoples?  Is it 
the ‘threat of extinction’ that Hitler posed to the Jewish peoples, one of whom I surely would 
have been?  This is not the case; this Interpretation of Hitler’s threat to the Jewish peoples 
Interprets us as merely a present-at-hand entity.  We are not merely a ‘race’ contained within the 
physical bounds of that spheroid that we fondly refer to as ‘Earth.’  Rather, we are existents; we 
exist.  And as is the case for all other existents, we are as existentially constituted by existentiell 
narratives.  As Narratively-Being, our world is as our ‘wherein’ in which we are; that is to say, 
our projection-along a narrative line automatically organizationally constitutes reality: it gives us 
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the home in which we can be.  To destroy one’s world is coextensive with destroying one’s 
narrative; to destroy one’s narrative is to really destroy one’s world—although one will certainly, 
so long as one is, project-along another narrative line and thus find oneself thrown into a world 
organized around that narrative.  Thus, what shall we say Hitler’s threat is to the Jewish peoples?  
It is the specter of the annihilation of our world—Hitler disclosed and enforced a narrative that 
left the Jewish peoples ‘without a home’ in the world.  This is only to say that Hitler represents 
the prospect of the annihilation of the world for the Jewish peoples. Our world thus annihilated, 
so are our narratives.  But to say that ‘our world’ and ‘our narratives’ are prospectively 
annihilated is just to say that we are presented with the prospective threat to our very optimality 
of Narrative-Being.  Even more formally, we may describe the encounter with evil as 
‘threatening-my-existentiell-narratives-and[-thus]-my-existentially-optimal-Narrative-Being.’  
What is at stake in our encountering evil—what was at stake in the world’s encountering 
Hitler—is not the ‘potential ontico-biological extinction (i.e., no-longer-Being-present-at-hand) 
of the human (e.g., Jewish) peoples qua animals’; rather, what is at stake is the openness of the 
possibility of my implicitly optimal existential-Narrative-Being. 
Thus, we have Interpreted the phenomenon of evil as ‘that-which-threatens-my-world.’  
However, we have furthermore followed Heidegger in Interpreting ‘the world’ out of the 
clutches of the metaphysics of presence, rather positing that the Being of the world is the 
‘wherein’ of my Narrative-Being.  It is the space in which my narrative is—that is to say that 
phenomenally, the world is the ‘wherein’ of my narrative’s concretely spatially investing itself.66 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Some people might object to this statement regarding a perceived ‘ambiguity’ in it.  However, 
the basis for sighting this ‘ambiguity’ lies in the metaphysics of presence: the critical reader 
might ask ‘but is the narrative inside the mind, or out there in the world?’  Or to phrase is more 
formally: ‘is one’s narrative subjective or objective?’  But this very question presupposes the 
mutual presence-at-hand of a subject contained within an ‘object.’  We answer, following 
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Therefore, evil as ‘that-which-threatens-my-world’ is more primordially understood as ‘that-
which-threatens-my-narrative-as-going-existentielly-towards-xf’ and still more primordially 
understood as ‘that-which-threatens-my-existential-optimum-of-Narrative-Being.’ But this is to 
say that evil is understood as the potential annihilation not just of my existentiell future (as 
going-towards-xf), but also of my existentiell Past: for if I am no-longer-going-towards-xf, then I 
no longer am as the that-which-brought-me-here that I was before.  In the face of evil, the 
potential is there for the annihilation of my very Being: my going-towards-xf is disclosed as a 
distinct impossibility; my narrative, constituted by a future, present, and Past, is void. 
Our foregoing analysis of evil, moreover, can be attested-to by our states-of-mind, which 
equiprimordially with the understanding disclose the phenomenon of evil (however, in terms of 
our thrownness as opposed to our projection).  These states-of-mind might be indicated by the 
signifiers of ‘terror,’ ‘forlornness,’ ‘dumbfoundedness,’ and ‘outrage.’  What is it in the face of 
which I am terrified, forlorn, dumbfounded, and outraged?  Namely, some manifest evil—e.g., 
Hitler—or the fact of a manifest threat to my world, a potential annihilation of my spatially-
invested world.  But what is it about which I am terrified, forlorn, dumbfounded, and outraged?  
Namely, the looming threat to my existentiell Being as the potential annihilation of my 
existential-Narrative optimum of fulfillment.  Terrified, I find myself anticipating the utter 
destruction of my narrative; forlorn, I find myself as ‘abandoned’ by the world that I had 
formerly found a ‘home’ in; thrown, forced, and folded back upon the existential structures of 
my Being, I find myself as dumbfounded, lost in nullity—when my existentiell Being (i.e., my 
narrative) is destroyed, who and how am I?  Outraged, I tenaciously fight against this potentiality 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Heidegger in SZ 62, that ‘the mind’ is always already-outside-alongside the world.  There is not 
a subject-object distinction: the mind is as dwelling, cohabitating within the world.  There is no 
transcendent leap required: the world simply is as the mind is: namely, narratively. 
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of annihilation.  My ‘that-I-am’ is disclosed as ‘having-to-exist-in-the-face-of-a-threat-to-my-
narrative.’ 
Thus, having Interpreted evil as the ‘potentiality-for-the-annihilation-of-my-existentiell-
narrative-in-the-face-of-which-I-am-thrown-back-upon-my-existential-Being-as-Narrative,’ we 
might more economically say that the Being of evil is undermining-my-narrative. 
Having reached this point in our analysis, we might retrace our steps so as to reorient 
ourselves to the holistic goal of this section.  Consider, we have now explicated the Being of evil 
as ‘that-which-undermines-my-narrative.’ The ‘way in which it undermines’ is via disclosing an 
utter threat to my existentiell narrative, folding me back upon my unfulfilled existential 
Narrative-Being.  This utter threat takes the form of ‘that-which-might-annihilate-my-narrative-
as-utterly-invested-in-the-world.’  My Narrative-Being, of course, can be more formally 
indicated by the term: ‘Being-oriented-as-going-towards-xf-brought-here-now-by-an-attestation-
to-my-existentiell-Being.’  But now recall our earlier analysis of ‘underminingness’ in my going-
towards-x, which was meant to provide a clue for the analysis to come.  Let us see if that earlier 
analysis of x makes more sense as applied to xf.  There, we discussed ‘underminingness’ as the 
potential nullification of my going-towards-x, which potential nullification is phenomenally 
disclosed as the potential nullification of my conditioned world as holding open the possibility of 
my going-towards-x.  This possibility is ‘held-open’ on the basis of the possibility of becoming-
x—for, since my going-towards-x is only on the basis of my projecting-upon x, if the 
impossibility of projecting-upon x is disclosed to me, then not only is my projection-upon x 
nullified, but thereby also nullified is my narrative as going-towards-x.  Thus, we said that in my 
Being-thrown out of my existentiell Being, I am thrown back upon my existential Being. 
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Formerly, as our analysis took as its ‘subject’ my mere and contingent going-towards-x, 
this ‘underminingness’ seemed at quite a distance from moral import.  Although we analyzed 
reality as meaning and value-laden, it might have seemed that the ‘towards-x’ organization of the 
world around my projections is only one of prudential value.  But with our thematic analysis of 
‘underminingness’ to my fundamentally and constitutively going-towards-xf through the 
phenomenon of evil, the conditioned value-ladenness of the world as holding open my ontico-
ontological fulfillment is something far from ‘merely prudential’: there is nothing ‘contingent’ or 
‘conditional’ or ‘hypothetical’ about the undermining of my narrative itself, of my optimal 
Narrative-Being, as going-towards-becoming-xf, for this concerns not some contingent projection 
along my narrative ineffectual against my existential-Narrative optimum, but rather the whole of 
the narrative itself, utterly undermining of my existential-ontological optimum of fulfillment. 
Thus concludes our thematic discussion of the Being of immorality as that-which-
undermines-my-existentiell-Being-as-going-towards-xf.  But in order to finally conclude our 
hermeneutical analysis of the Being of ethics, we must first demonstrate our hitherto 
undemonstrated claim that the underminingness of immorality, in addition to undermining my 
existentiell Being, throws me back upon my existential Being. 
Being-thrown-out-existentielly-and-thrown-back-upon-existentially is phenomenally 
disclosed to us as ‘disorientation.’  How might we describe the existential-ontological structures 
of disorientation?  To begin with, let us refer back to our prior discussion of Being-oriented: 
above, we described our Being as Being-oriented as ‘finding-myself-along-a-narrative-line.’  
Moreover, we unpacked this as stating that it is my ‘finding-myself-as-located-within-a-
narratively-organized-world-facing-forwards-futurely-and-backwards-Pastly-towards-my-
Being.’  But we determined this to mean ‘my-Being-locatable-as-within-a-narratively-and-
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coextensively-organized-existentiell-Being-and-world.’  Thus, what does it mean to be 
disoriented?  Namely, it means my ‘not-Being-locatable-as-within-a-narratively-and-
coextensively-organized-existentiell-Being-and-world.’  In disorientation, I am thrown out of my 
existentiell locatability within a narrative, and into the depths of my existential Being as thrown 
projection (i.e., having-to-have-a-narrative).  Disoriented, I cannot find myself existentielly; I 
confront myself as a needing-to-existentielly-manifest-existentiality.  And this is tantamount to 
stating that I find myself as existential—i.e., having-to-have-a-narrative.  What is it that ‘throws 
me out and folds me back?’  Obviously, our foregoing Interpretation of evil attests to this 
disorientation: evil is as a ‘that-which-threatens-my-world,’ which we analyzed to more 
fundamentally mean ‘that-which-threatens-my-existentiell-Narrative-Being.’  In the encounter 
with evil, my world and therefore, equiprimordially, my Being is disclosed as threatened by 
annihilation.  The possible nullification of my Being as I know it (i.e., existentielly) is disclosed 
to me.  As such, I find myself disoriented.  I am disclosed as a potentiality-to-existentielly-
perish.  This disclosure throws me out of my ontico-existentiell Being, and forces upon me my 
Being ontico-ontologico-existentially: since my existentiell Being is so utterly disclosed as 
threatened by null-ification, I disclosed to my bare existentiality.  I am disoriented—that is to 
say, my thrownness into my Being is disclosed via the state-of-mind of disorientation.  As 
disoriented, I am ontically ontological. 
 Thus, we are now in a position to unpack the ‘relativist’ statements mentioned above 
linking one’s ‘ethics’ to one’s ‘orientation’ as the final phenomenal key to our understanding the 
Being of ethics as an existentiale.  Despite the perverting effects of our inherited philosophico-
linguistic tradition of a metaphysics of presence permeating statements such as these—they 
attempt to ‘deny’ the ‘absoluteness’ of ethical statements on the basis of their being ‘not 
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objectively present-at-hand’—we can nevertheless understand them as relating a primordial 
understanding of ethics to orientation.  Let us now recall: my Being-oriented is an ontological 
constituent of my Being.  The implicit optimum of my Narrative-Being is narrative completion—
fulfilling my narrative line.  Along my narrative line at any given moment, I am presently 
oriented.  Orientation, that is to say, is existentially-ontologically required in my fulfilling my 
existentiell-ontical narrative—so long as I am existing along my given narrative lines, I am 
oriented.  As Being-disoriented, however, I am torn away from my existentiell-ontical narrative, 
and so all possibility of fulfillment is closed off. 
 In order to preserve my implicit imperative in existence—which we have Interpreted as 
fulfillment of a narrative line—I must be oriented.  Disorientation, which arises on the basis of 
the annihilation of my existentiell Being, throws me out of my orientation and closes off the 
implicit optimum of existence.  Thus, the Being of ethics is constituted by ‘that-which-keeps-me-
oriented’ as Being ‘that-which-holds-open-my-existentiell-narrative-fulfillment.’ 
 Consider, the standard ‘relativist’ line that we have taken as a[n admittedly corrupt] clue 
to our analysis here generally states something like ‘psychological considerations—either located 
biologically, socializationally, or volitionally—determine one’s ethical system, rather than 
putatively metaphysically moral matters.’  In one sense these statements are entirely beside the 
point—they seek causal explanations—i.e., metaphysical explanations—of ethical phenomena; 
we however, are interested in no such hifalutin metaphysical matters.  Rather, we are interested 
in ethical phenomena as they are constitutive of my existential-ontological structures of Being.  
In another sense, however, these statements are deeply indicative of our present theme of 
discussion: my Being, as an existentiell particular within the existential universal, is constituted 
by existentiell narratives as instantiations of my existential Narrative-Being.  These narratives 
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are fundamentally constitutive of my Being at any given moment as oriented-within-a-narrative.  
This orientation primordially is as ‘within the bounds of my narrative.’  What lies outside the 
bounds of my narrative is disorienting.  How does something lie outside the bounds of my 
narrative?  Namely, by threatening to undermine my narrative, understood as closing-off-the-
possibility-of-my-becoming-xf.  Therefore, the discordant-with-me Being of ethics is as 
‘undermining-my-narrative.’  What then, might we say is the accordant-with-me-Being of 
ethics?  Namely, ‘reinforcing my narrative.’ 
 We can better demonstrate this Being of ethics by referring to our earlier analysis as 
coupled with Heidegger’s analysis of the ‘worldhood of the world.’  This is, namely, organizing 
the meaning and value of my experiences with entities within-the-world around my existentiell 
projections, which we have Interpreted as narrative lines.  That which is discordant to my 
narrative, my temporal line of Being based on a going-towards-xf, is meaningful and valuable as 
‘bad’ or ‘ought not to be the case.’  That which accords with my narrative is meaningful and 
valuable as ‘good’ or ‘ought to be the case.’ 
 Consider: if my xf is ‘becoming the world’s most prolific serial killer,’ then the detective 
fast on my trail and soon to catch me is phenomenally bad, even evil—she is the force against 
my very Being.  She ought not to be doing this—it is unfair that she is trying to thwart me!  
However, the rash of potential victims lying mere feet from my clutches conveniently located 
next to a steep cliff-side is a good, it is a ‘right-that-it-is-there.’ 
 Also consider: if my xf is ‘leading the charge to rid the world of malaria,’ then the apathy 
in the wealthy, developed nations towards providing charitable support for those who need it is 
bad, evil, unfair.  Meanwhile, those powerful people who support my cause are ‘righteous’ 
individuals, ‘morally laudable’ individuals. 
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 These final two illustrations now take us ‘full circle’ in our Interpretation of the Being of 
ethics.  At first we analyzed ethics via the phenomenon of ‘antagonism,’ coming to the 
conclusion that constitutive of the Being of ethics is ‘holding-me-to-my-existentiell-narrative-as-
imperativizing-me-towards-Being-existentially-Narratively-optimal-as-fulfilled’ disclosed as a 
‘calling-forth’ of the conscience.’  We then analyzed the Being of ethics via the phenomenon of 
‘underminingness,’ coming to the conclusion that the Being of ethics is as ‘that-which-holds-
open-my-existentiell-narrative-as-conditioning-the-world-towards-my-existential-Narrative-
optimality-of-fulfillment’—i.e., the phenomenally ‘ethically bad’ closes-off my existentiell 
narrative; the phenomenally ‘ethically good’ reinforces my existentiell narrative.  We have 
analyzed these phenomena in separate spaces, but this might mislead the reader into thinking that 
these are disconnected ‘properties’ inhering in a present-at-hand ethical being; in fact, nothing 
could be further from the truth.  These two phenomena express different analytic ‘sides’ of a 
unitary phenomenon, a phenomenon whose Being is a constituent of my Being as Narrative.  
What is this unitary phenomenon of ethics?  Namely, ‘conditioning-my-existentiell-narratives-
as-holding-open-the-world-for-and-imperativizing-me-to-my-existential-ontological-Narrative-
opimum-of-fulfillment.’  When I project-upon an xf, thereby projecting-along a narrative line, 
equiprimordially disclosed with my future Being as ‘where-I-am-going-towards-xf,’ my present 
Being as ‘Being-oriented-as-going-towards-xf,’ and my Past Being as ‘that-which-brought-me-
here-attesting-to-my-Being-as-going-towards-xf,’ is a constant ‘that-which-holds-open-and-
holds-me-to-my-fulfilled-going-towards-xf.’  The ethically bad undermines and antagonizes my 
Being as going-towards-fulfilling-xf; the ethically good reinforces and supports my Being as 
going-towards-fulfilling-xf.  In the ethically bad, my existence is primordially disclosed to me as 
failing-in-my-going-towards-xf, either as potentially nullifying (i.e., undermining) or stultifying 
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(i.e., antagonizing) my Being as going-towards-xf.  In the face of antagonism, my conscience 
calls me forth, saying ‘become’ or ‘overcome!’  In the case of underminingness, my existence is 
disclosed to me as threatened qua my world’s Being-threatened.  Of course, these phenomena are 
interrelated: as threatened, I must overcome/become or else perish (existentielly) and fail 
(existentially); as becoming/overcoming, I am no longer threatened, and thus my world and my 
existential-Narrative optimality are preserved.  The value (reinforcing/threatening) and the 
imperative (to become or overcome) are equiprimordially disclosed and phenomenally unitary. 
 Thus, the frustrating exhaustion of our demonstration behind us, we may Interpret with 
confidence the Being of ethics: namely, ‘conditioning-my-existentiell-narrative-Being-in-the-
world-as-holding-open-and-imperativizingly-holding-me-to-my-existential-Narrative-optimum-
of-becoming-xf.’  But perhaps a more economical signifier for the Being of the phenomenon of 
ethics as constitutive of my Narrative-Being is ethos. 
  
	  	   124 
V. Conclusions 
V.1. Objections 
 In this section, we anticipate and respond to some prominent objections to our analysis.67  
The objections that we will consider object to the following in our analysis above: a perceived 
‘Non-Cognitivism,’ a neglect of the interpersonal dimension in ontical ethical practices, a 
confused treatment of the ontological difference, and a problematical arbitrariness in our 
account of the ontological structures of ethics. 
 
Cognitivism and Non-Cognitivism 
 One sort of objection to our analysis objects to our advocating a stance on ethics that 
renders ethical phenomena as essentially ‘non-cognitive.’  Such an objector might state the we 
have argued that the meaning of the Being of ethics is ‘ethos,’ or ‘holding-open-and-holding-me-
to-my-existential-Narrative-fulfillment-via-my-existentiell-narrative-fulfillment.’  But this fails 
to explain how it is that when we operate morally, we don’t simply ‘feel’ or ‘intuit’ ethical 
goodness and badness; rather, we make judgments, discuss arguments, etc.  In short, ethical 
phenomena comprise a remarkably cognitive or intellectual kind of activity—such phenomena 
might at some level involve non-cognitive structuring, but they certainly more fundamentally are 
constituted by the intellect.  Thus, how is it that our manifestly cognitive moral activity can be 
made sense of from within our non-cognitivistic stance? 
 Although Cognitivism in ethics can hardly be dismissed in a handful of paragraphs, we 
can reply to our objector by simply presenting an account of how it is that such a seemingly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 NB: this section will not include objections to Heidegger’s work in general, as this is beyond 
the bounds of this essay—this is not to say that such objections are not important, but merely that 
this is not the space to consider them. 
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cognitive activity can be fundamentally ‘non-cognitive,’ or as we prefer to say, pre-intellectual.  
How do we get from a pre-intellectual ethical conditioning to the indubitably intellectual activity 
of ‘making judgments, arguments, etc.?’ 
 The answer to this is remarkably simple: any kind of intellectual cognizing is an ontical 
activity that has its roots in a pre-cognitive ontological supposition.  Thus, to insist on Being-
ethical as moralistically cognizing is simply to operate with a pre-cognitively pre-supposed 
ontology.  And until this pre-supposed ontology that consists in one’s fore-having is investigated 
in one’s fore-sight and fore-conception, and thus lies unconcealed, one has not adequately 
investigated any phenomenal field, including the field of ethics. 
 Nevertheless, this ‘brushing-off’ of our objector might seem a bit brusque and pre-
mature.  Our objector indeed has a good point that we have neglected to address: as ethical 
phenomena are manifest via ontical happenings, even if our investigation is primarily 
ontological, we nonetheless must not stray from the ontical manifestations that make our stance 
concrete, and allow it to be called an inquiry into ethics, rather than simply an inquiry into some 
other phenomenon.  Ontically, ‘ethical discourse’ unfolds at the highest cognitive-intellectual 
level as sophisticated and civil debate, and at a lower intellectual-cognitive level as angry and 
belligerent confrontation.  And throughout all of these activities, conceptions about ‘right’ and 
‘wrong,’ ‘good’ and ‘bad’ are consciously-cognitively held.  How does our ontological 
conception of ethics make sense of these ontical manifestations? 
 As Heidegger states, truth can never lie in judgments, arguments, or any sort of mode of 
discourse.68  That is to say, truth lies in the phenomena themselves at which any mode of 
discourse at some level indicates.  That is to say, what is primary in discourse is ‘what-the-talk-
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is-about,’ not ‘what-is-said-in-the-talk.’  Thus, even the most highly-intellectualized and 
explicitly-articulated modes of ethical discourse are grounded in and pointing back towards 
phenomenal encounters.  Thus, the cognized articulated statements of types like ‘y is wrong’ and 
‘one ought to do z’ (and vice versa) are grounded in and pointing-back-towards phenomenal 
encounters.  Therefore, when I say ‘it is wrong to steal’ or ‘don’t steal!’ or ‘one ought to refrain 
from stealing,’ I am pointing back towards a phenomenal encounter with a meaningful 
manifestation—in this case, ‘theft’—that is not a present-at-hand entity secondarily ‘predicated-
upon’ by the form of ‘badness’ or the like, but rather is through and through as ‘bad,’ ‘not to be 
done,’ etc.  Thus, we can see why in moral debates about stealing, we often find trivial linguistic 
differences, e.g.: ‘you say it is stealing when a poor young man takes a loaf of bread from the 
wealthy merchant in order to feed his family; meanwhile, I say it is justice being served, I say it 
is an action done for a higher good.’  Such statements indicate how the very articulation of 
‘theft’ is tied-up through and through with moral concerns, just as the more formally articulated 
‘taking of a thing that is owned by someone else’ is loaded with all sorts of its own moral 
meanings.  Therefore, to judge an entity (action, situation, etc.) as ‘wrong,’ ‘right,’ ‘bad,’ ‘good,’ 
‘ought to be the case,’ or ‘ought not to be the case’ is to formally articulate the phenomenal 
givenness of these entities, actions, situations, agents, etc. as whatsoever they ethically are. 
 When we have said that the Being of ethics is ethos, we mean that constitutive of my 
Being is a phenomenal ‘disclosing-as-ethical’ that is conditioned around my xf and its subsequent 
narrative.  Thus, when I ethically intellectualize, I convert this phenomenal givenness of ethical 
experiences conditioned around my narrative to articulated conceptualizations. 
 
Being-with and Intersubjectivity 
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 Another sort of objection our analysis is apt to encounter asks the following: have we 
problematically and arbitrarily privileged an account of the human as primordially individual 
rather than collective?  On what basis can we justify our thoroughly neglectful phenomenological 
treatment of ontically interpersonal ethical manifestations—especially considering that such 
interpersonal ethical manifestations constitute a significant amount of ontical ethical 
manifestations in general? 
 We answer this objection affirming the objector’s position: our analysis has indeed been 
thoroughly neglectful of ontical-interpersonal ethical manifestations, and certainly has neglected 
Being-with as an existentiale of human Being.  This neglect certainly should arouse the reader’s 
suspicion until properly treated.69  Nevertheless, we have our reasons for neglecting this 
discussion at the current moment.  Namely, we explicitly set-aside any treatment of fallenness 
and Being-with (and thus, any treatment of intersubjectivity) as ontological structures 
constitutive of the human on the following basis: we claim that it is Heidegger’s focus on these 
structures that leads him to automatically pass-over a thorough phenomenological treatment of 
ontical ethical manifestations, instead considering them merely as ontical dealings of the purely 
inauthentic they-self; thus it was our very aim to investigate whether or not ontical ethical 
dealings could be made sense of as ontological constituents of the human purely by way of the 
ontological structures of projection and thrownness. 
 And indeed, even in the thoroughly individualized human, upon a close 
phenomenological analysis of these aforementioned structures, ontical ethical manifestations 
exhibit an ontological constitutiveness.  That is to say, there is a thoroughly intra-personal 
dimension to ethical phenomena, and this intra-personal dimension is constitutive of human 
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Being: it is the making-intelligible of the world and my existentiell Being as towards-Narrative-
fulfillment. 
 But none of this is to say that the Being of ethics is not equiprimordially interpersonal—
our explicitly neglecting to phenomenologically treat Being-with and thus this ‘intersubjective’ 
dimension to ontical ethical manifestations is based upon our aim to not automatically pass-over 
ontical ethical manifestations as simply the ontical dealings of the inauthentic they-self.  Having 
now made-secure a hermeneutic of ethics that reveals ethical phenomena to be genuinely 
constitutive of human Being, we can now safely circle backwards and undertake a 
phenomenological analysis of ethical Being-with. 
 
The Ontological Difference 
 Have we held-fast the distinguishing line of the ontological difference (viz., Being vs. 
beings (or entities)), or have we slid-back into a slippery ambiguity in our treatment of the 
human being’s meaningfully Being?  Consider: our objector here might state that our analysis of 
the Being of ethics (namely, holding-open-and-holding-me-to-my-existential-Narrative-
fulfillment-via-my-existentiell-narrative-fulfillment) is innately infected by a confused treatment 
of the ontological difference.  This confusion occurs as a muddling of the distinction between 
existential-ontological Being (as Narrative) and existentiell-ontical manifestations (as narrative).  
Accordingly, can we thus say with any certainty whether the inquiry that we have tirelessly 
undertaken even has any right to go by the name of ‘ontological?’  Is it possible that our inquiry 
has turned-out to ground the meaning of ethics ontically rather than ontologically?  Moreover, 
has our inquiry thus revealed itself as lacking substantive faithful commitment to Heidegger’s 
‘Dasein’ and ‘care?’ 
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 This objection, if it proves successful, would represent quite the undermining force to our 
work qua its stated aims of an ontological hermeneutic of ethics.  What might we say in defense 
of our analysis? 
 Let us first relate some key terms.  What we have called my ‘ontological-existential-
Narrative-Being’ is a formal account of my Dasein or Da-sein.  What we have called my 
‘ontical-existentiell-narrative-Being’ is a formal account of my concretized human be-ing (or 
rather: my individually-lived existence in the world).  ‘Da-sein,’ as ‘Being-there,’70 is as the 
making-intelligible of Being (qua entities’ ontological structures); my Da-sein is my Being as my 
thrownness into ontologically disclosing the ontical. 
 But what is peculiar about my Da-sein is the nature of its disclosing: for it discloses in a 
peculiar way, according to a peculiar ontological structure constituting it itself: namely, it 
discloses entities’ meaningfully Being in accordance with its own existential nature.  That is to 
say, entities’ meaningfully Being is always disclosed as relating to my Being’s being an issue for 
me.  To rephrase: any disclosing discloses in connection with my existential problematic. 
 But what more can we say about the nature of the existential problematic (i.e., my 
Being’s being an issue for me)?  Namely: “[o]nly the particular Dasein decides its existence . . . 
[t]he question of existence never gets straightened out except through existing itself.  The 
understanding of oneself which leads along this way we call ‘existentiell’” (SZ 12).  Thus, as any 
disclosing discloses in connection with my existential problematic, we can more specifically 
state that any disclosing discloses in connection with my existentiell existing as existentially 
constituted.  That is to say that any entity’s meaningful Being is always as existentially disclosed 
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in connection with my existentiell existence—any existential disclosing cannot be otherwise than 
existentielly located. 
 Therefore, Da-sein can only be itself—i.e., make-intelligible, disclose entities’ 
meaningfully Being—through its existential structures as constituted by thrown projection, 
which structures can only be as concretized existentiell possibilities.  Thus, any existential-
ontological disclosing is always via ontical-existentiell be-ing. 
 Therefore, in Interpreting the existential-ontological structures of the human as Narrative, 
we have interpreted the existentiell-ontical be-ing of the human as consisting in narratives.  That 
is to say, I am only concretized as the narrative existence that I am on the basis of my Narrative-
Being; however, I am only Narratively disclosive as disclosing via my concretized narrative.  
Thus, my Narrative Da-sein’s disclosing always discloses via my existentiell narratives.  That is 
to say, my existentiell narratives are intimately in reciprocity with my existential Narrative-
Being.  Thus, although the problematic and the optimum (i.e., the resolution) implicit in my 
Narrative-Being are ontological structures, these ontological structures can only be disclosed via, 
are intimately connected with, my existentiell-ontical narratives.  Thus, any existential-
ontological-Narrative problematic can only be resolved (i.e., any implicit optimum can only be 
attained) via my existentiell-ontical narratives.   
 Thus, what might we say to our objector?  Namely, that we believe that we have carefully 
held-fast to the ontological difference, in the sense of carefully holding-fast to the intimate 
relationship between my existential-ontological-Narrative Da-sein and my existentiell-ontical-
narrative-be-ing.  However, we must nevertheless take care to forthrightly admit our fallibility in 
these matters: it is indeed eminently possible that our understanding has herein led us astray. 
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Arbitrariness and Normativity 
Our next objector might object to our account’s entailing a problematical relativism in 
ethical judgments and arguments.  Indeed, our account seems to entail that what really is ethical 
is that-which-conditionally-holds-open-as-holding-me-to-my-Narrative-fulfillment-via-narrative-
fulfillment.  Since our analysis has not revealed any non-arbitrary evaluability concerning which 
narratives I ought to adopt, our objector can claim that we have, in phenomenologically 
analyzing ‘ethics,’ thoroughly ‘relativized’ the ethical phenomena.  Thus, how can we justify 
typical Philosophical practice of formulating robust moral arguments replete with truth-values 
and conditions, and aggressively critiquing others’ moral positions on the basis of their ‘being 
untrue’ or ‘failing to attain to truth conditions?’  To put it another way, how can we say that 
morality is ‘absolutely normative’ or ‘objective’ on our account?  If we cannot, this viciously 
reduces ethical statements to relativism, in which case, our ethical conversations are revealed as 
useless and baseless. 
 This set of objections reveals a metaphilosophical understanding of truth as ‘that which 
we all agree upon being the case,’ or rather, ‘that which, were all our biases removed, we would 
agree upon being the case.’  As Heidegger states, our metaphilosophical understanding of truth 
lies in unconcealed Being rather than such universal agreeability.71  Thus, this objector objects to 
our analysis because it manifestly counts as truly ethical what are manifestly divergent ethical 
stances entailed by different peoples’ existentiell narratives.  Meanwhile, what is important in 
our conception of ethics is that we have unveiled its Being in relation to our general human 
Being. 
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But we can perhaps flesh out our response to this objector, and to the traditional way in 
which ethics is Philosophically considered.  ‘Ethics’ is often taught according to the dichotomy 
of ‘objectivist/absolutist’ theories against ‘subjectivist/relativist’ theories.  And indeed these 
terms imply an ontologico-metaphysical tradition that privileges enduring presence, in terms of 
an enduringly present mind (i.e., subject) encountering an enduringly present set of external 
entities (i.e., objects).  Thus, the ‘problem of [ethical] knowledge’ obtains: how can an inner 
subject transcend itself outwards to meaningfully ground itself in an outer object?  That is to say, 
‘reality’ is understood as ‘that which is object-like or objective, outside the mind’; ‘truth’ is 
understood as ‘a subject’s acts of judging that transcend her inner limits and accord absolutely 
with mind-independent entities’; and ‘knowledge’ is understood as ‘a subject’s true, justified 
judgments.’  Therefore, ‘absolutism’ is typically associated with ‘objectivism’ as ‘that which 
absolutely and beyond justified disagreement is real’; meanwhile, ‘relativism’ is typically 
associated with ‘subjectivism’ as ‘that which lacks absolute accordability with mind-independent 
entities’ or ‘that on which another cannot justifiably agree or disagree.’  Thus, the ‘objectivist-
absolutist’ versus ‘subjectivist-relativist’ ethical dichotomies that are Philosophically considered 
are rooted in a metaphysics of presence that privileges ‘absolute agreeability’ (i.e., absolute 
object-likeness, absolutely mind-independent presence) as the Being of truth and reality. 
Rather, we state, following Heidegger, that reality is a primordial meaningfulness of 
Being, and that truth is unconcealed Being; knowledge is not one’s cognitive mastery over the 
Being of entities, but rather one’s unveiling of Being. 
Still, perhaps we can say one thing in order to once again bring our typical ontical 
practices into ontological clarity regarding Philosophy’s traditional treatment of ethics.  We have 
found the metaphysical inheritance of an ontology of presence underlying the ‘objectivist-
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subjectivist’ distinction, and we have found that this distinction informs our understanding of 
‘absolute’ and ‘relative,’ and thus tells us why it is important that an ethical theory be ‘absolute’ 
(i.e., because if and only if it is objectively absolute is it real, true, and thus worth considering), 
and why avoiding relativism is a philosophical problematic.  But if we divorce our understanding 
of ‘absolutism’ and ‘relativism’ from ‘objectivism’ and ‘subjectivism,’ we can find a more apt 
and primordial description that these ontical terms bear for the ontological Being of ethics as 
ethos.  If we consider ‘absolute’ to signify ‘absolutely normative or prescriptive’ rather than 
‘absolutely objectively-present,’ and if we consider ‘relative’ to signify ‘really relative to one’s 
existentiell narrative’ rather than ‘subjectively-arbitrarily relative to one’s standpoint’ then we 
can attain a further grasp on the ontological constitution of ethics as ethos. 
To be absolute as consonant with our understanding is to be ‘normative or prescriptive 
concerning other ethically-constituted beings’; to be relative as consonant with our 
understanding is to be ‘relative to one’s existentiell narrative.’  Thus, ‘relativism’ seamlessly fits 
into our conception of the Being of ethics: one’s ethical understanding is relativized or 
conditioned around one’s narratives—these terms are virtually equivalent in signification, in this 
case; they both indicate ‘organization around my narrative line.’  But has our previous discussion 
anticipated our statement that ‘ethics is as absolute?’ 
Indeed it has: consider our formal statement of the Being of ethics as ethos: conditioning-
my-existentiell-narrative-Being-in-the-world-as-holding-open-and-imperativizingly-holding-me-
to-my-existential-Narrative-optimum-of-becoming-xf.  What is crucial to our present purposes is 
that the world is made meaningful in its holding-open my narrative fulfillment.  But now 
consider that our world is, as Heidegger states, always as a with-world.72  Thus, our Being-with 
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is always already as ethically conditioned as holding-open my narrative fulfillment. 73  Therefore, 
my Being-ethical is always-already normative: it automatically implicates other humans, other 
ethical beings.74 
But perhaps we can cast our response to our objector in slightly different terms: what our 
objector might call the ‘mere instrumentality’ in our account of ethics we would prefer to call an 
existential instrumentality.  That is to say, since my implicit existential-ontological-Narrative 
optimum of fulfillment is an absolute, non-relative structure, but a structure whose content is 
inherently open, therefore, what is absolutely substantive in our account of ethics is its Being as 
this ontological structure that holds-open and holds-me-to my narrative (and thus, Narrative) 
fulfillment.  Therefore, we might state with confidence that the truly ethical person, on our 
account, is the person who is as utterly engaged with her implicit optimum of fulfillment.  Thus, 
her ‘instrumental’ ethics is not ‘merely instrumental,’ but rather absolutely instrumentally 
normative qua directing her towards her implicit optimum of Narrative fulfillment.  
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V.2. Implications 
 This second subsection of our concluding section comprises some reflections on how this 
piece adds to a philosophical conversation, and the future work it implicitly calls for to be 
undertaken. 
 How might our project bear on the current Philosophical conversations regarding ethics?  
Certainly, it has highlighted the problems with an ‘objectivist-absolutist’ vs. ‘subjectivist-
relativist’ dichotomy traditionally schematizing ethics classes; but this insight it has no claim 
whatsoever to contributing originally; rather, it merely underlines an already-existent 
conversation about the problematical ‘subject-object’ dichotomy as based on a metaphysical 
tradition that privileges mere and bare presence. 
 Additionally, we would like to distance ourselves from those who would claim that our 
position is ‘anti-realist’ with regard to ethics.  This is a problematical designation: for if our 
conclusions are in line with our intentions, then our project has not in any way diminished the 
reality of ethical concerns.  Rather, our analysis undermines the stance that ‘ethics’ and 
‘morality’ comprise primarily intellectual phenomena that are best formulated as deductively-
valid propositional arguments with robust ‘truth’ (i.e., agreeable with ‘objective reality’) values 
and conditions.  Nevertheless, our claims do not undermine the real phenomenal Being of ethics.  
In fact, our conclusions do not even undermine the existential and philosophical importance of 
ethics.  Rather, they steadfastly affirm the crucial connection that the Being of ethics bears 
towards the human as one of her constitutive ontological structures. 
 But this is only to say that our analysis has revealed phenomenologically what is ontically 
manifest: namely, the utter inexorability and indispensability of ethical discourse.  As we have 
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found that ethics is of its very Being a constituent of my Being, to attempt to ‘avoid’ or 
‘undermine’ ethical discourse—which often lurks as an inconspicuous motive or perceived 
‘implication’ of ‘relativism’—is not only laughably impossible, but existentially counter-
optimal.  My Being is, as Narrative, implicitly oriented towards the optimum of narrative 
fulfillment.  Ethics, as an ontological constituent of my Being that conditions my very 
existentiell Being as holding-open and holding-me-to my narrative, cannot possibly be 
outstripped—even people who think of themselves as ‘a-moralists’ are simply advocating their 
own peculiar ethics as based on their existentiell narratives.  Nor ought one to ‘try’ to outstrip its 
influence on us: as steadfastly directing me towards my Narrative fulfillment, I ought to embrace 
my Being-ethical as part of the full embracing of my Narratively-Being. 
 What might we say concerning the future work to-be-undertaken that this project 
implicates?  As already mentioned, in order to fully round out our Interpretation of the 
ontological structures of human Being as Narrative, we must now go forth and re-Interpret 
Narrative-Being in light of the ontological structure of fallenness or Being-with.  And indeed, 
having held-fast the Being of ethics prior to such an analysis of ethics in connection with 
fallenness, we can now go forth in inclusion of this care-structure, assured that we will not slip 
into the trap of automatically depreciating ethical Being as a mode of the they-self’s 
inauthenticity.  This analysis of Being-with will (indeed, must) undertake a phenomenological 
analysis of the ontical-interpersonal manifestations of ethics. 
 Our immediately preceding statement points us towards another analytic to be 
undertaken: namely, an analytic that considers ontical-ethical manifestations in far greater 
breadth: our analysis, as being merely provisional, only considered ‘conscience’ and ‘evil’; but 
certainly, there are far more that any ontological account of ethics must make sense of.  
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Therefore, in order for our Interpretation of the Being of ethics to be properly complete, we must 
phenomenologically analyze a greater breadth of ontical-ethical manifestations. 
 Finally, we must also consider the question of the possibility of my Being as Being-a-
whole qua Being-a-unitary-project.  In other words, we must undertake a phenomenological 
analysis of my ontical-existentiell Being as meaningfully unitary.  If it is the case that I am, at 
any given moment, projecting-along various disparate—even possibly contradictory—narratives, 
how is it that I nevertheless primordially understand myself as a unitary project-of-Being-as-
becoming?  Is there some super-Narrative-structure that meaningfully grounds my Being-
unitary?  Will this help us make sense of my phenomenally finding myself in more intimate 
relationships with some xf(s) than others?  Will this help us make sense of instances wherein 
conflicts that force a projective ‘choice’ between xf(s) arise? 
 We have put these questions and implicated analytics off to one side in our analysis, as 
we have been focused on gaining a merely provisional sketch of human Being as Narrative as a 
means of accessing the phenomenal field of ethics with primordiality; nevertheless, these 
questions and analytics are pertinent to our conceptions of Narrative-Being and Being-ethical, 
and thus must be undertaken if our hermeneutic has any pretensions to transcending its status as 
provisional towards becoming complete. 
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V.3. In Conclusion 
 Above, we have undertaken a phenomenological description of the Being of ethics, as in 
relation to the Being of the human being.  But in order to make most accessible this phenomenal 
field of ethics, we found that a re-Interpretation of human Being was necessary.   Our re-
Interpretation is fundamentally indebted to Heidegger’s conception of human Being in Being and 
Time, which he indicates by the term Existenz, or more formally as Da-sein, Being-in-the-world, 
and care; nevertheless, although our work is a mere re-capitulation of Heidegger’s conception of 
human Being in its substantive constituents, emphatically our work lies some distance away from 
his.  We have systematically Interpreted human Being as Narrative, which in its existentiell-
ontical manifestations takes the form of ‘narratives.’  This Narrative-Being involves the human’s 
projection and thrownness into the ecstases of future, Past, and present.  My projection into the 
future is indicated by the phrase ‘going-towards-x,’ where x stands-in for any possibility-of-
Being; however, more formally, my projectival-futural Being is indicated by the phrase ‘going-
towards-xf,’ where xf stands-in for any fundamental possibility-of-Being.  Crucially, projection-
upon some fundamental possibility-of-Being automatically births a ‘projection-continuum,’ 
which we understand as a network of dependent projections leading up to this fundamental 
possibility-of-Being as an ‘in-order-to’ that contingently is for-the-sake-of the fundamental 
projection.  Thus, my Being-towards the future is as a ‘going-towards-xf.’  My Being-towards the 
present is my Being-oriented, which involves my Being locatable, directionalized, and arranged.  
My projection into my Past is indicated by the phrase ‘that-which-brought-me-here-now[-as-
going-towards-xf]’; my thrownness into my Past is indicated as ‘attesting-to-my-existentiell-
Being.’  Our unitarily existential Being as involving as constituents all of these ecstases we have 
re-termed Narrative.  Existentielly, our Narrative-Being manifests itself as narrative lines or 
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simply narratives, which are the projection-continuums stretching forwards and backwards and 
constituting my concretized Being. 
 Next, we moved on to discussing the Being of ethics as having its basis in human 
Narrative-Being.  We undertook this discussion phenomenologically via Interpreting the 
phenomena of antagonism and underminingness.  With regard to antagonism we Interpreted 
existentially-ontologically the phenomenal ‘call of conscience’ in a way not substantively but 
rather emphatically different than the treatment of this phenomenon by Heidegger, as ‘holding-
me-to-my-existentiell-Being.’  In the call of conscience in the face of antagonism, the ‘ethical 
imperative’ is disclosed as ‘holds-me-to-my-existentiell-narrative-fulfillment.’  In our analysis of 
underminingness, we existentially-ontologically considered the phenomenon of evil.  In the 
encounter with evil, we found that evil is essentially a threat, but a threat of a special sort: that is 
to say, evil is as a threat to my world.  And threatening my world is tantamount to threatening 
my very narrative Being.  Thus, evil is as a ‘that-which-threatens-my-existentiell-Being.’  The 
ethical import of evil is in its disorienting me.  My Being, as having its basis in Being-oriented 
along a narrative, is thus ethical in its being conditioned around my narrative.  Formally, thus, 
the existential-ontological Being of ethics is as a ‘conditioning-my-existentiell-narrative-Being-
in-the-world-as-holding-open-and-imperativizingly-holding-me-to-my-existential-Narrative-
optimum-of-becoming-xf’; less formally, the Being of ethics might be indicated by the term 
ethos. 
 Thus, we have provisionally, broadly, but rigorously attempted to unconceal the Being of 
ethics through this phenomenological description. 
 Along the way in our project, we also gave a broad metaphilosophical stance, introduced 
and defined some technical terminology, and provided a ‘preview’ as a means of orienting our 
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reader in an introductory section; we undertook a broad summary of the most pertinent analysis 
from Heidegger’s Being and Time; and we concluded by first raising and answering some of the 
more prominent objections that might be raised against our project, and finally considering some 
important implications of our analysis. 
In any case, we have attempted to basically and provisionally sketch the Being of the 
human Being as Narrative in order to make accessible the phenomenal field of ethics, which we 
have existentially-ontologically Interpreted as ethos.  
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